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Hearing Transcript
1 Monday, 12th May 2003
2 (9.40 am)
3 MR MARTIN INGRAM (affirmed)
4 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH
5 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Ingram, if you look across immediately in
6 front of you, towards the bench, you can see who is
7 talking to you. I am the Chairman. I say this to all
8 the witnesses: the questions will come in the main from
9 the barristers, the people in front of me. Could I ask
10 you to pull that microphone a little closer to you, so
11 we are all able to hear what you have to say.
12 A. Is that okay, sir?
13 LORD SAVILLE: That is fine, thank you, very much.
14 MR ROXBURGH: May we have on one side of the screen
15 page KI2.1, please and on the other side KI2.9.
16 Mr Ingram, you have made three statements to this
17 Inquiry. Would you confirm, please, that what we have
18 on the screen are the first and last pages of the first
19 statement that you made and signed on 26th July 2002.
20 A. Good morning, Mr Roxburgh. Yes, I can confirm that.
21 Q. May we have KI2.32 on the left, please and KI2.35 on the
22 right, please. Are those the first and last pages of
23 a supplementary statement that you made on
24 10th February 2003, in order to deal with certain
25 matters arising out of articles published in the
1 Sunday Tribune?
2 A. Indeed, I can confirm that.
3 Q. Finally, may we have KI2.40 on the left and KI2.42 on
4 the right, please. Are those the first and last pages
5 of a further statement that you made on 17th March 2003,
6 in order to address various matters arising out of your
7 first witness statement?
8 A. I can confirm that is accurate.
9 Q. Mr Ingram, do you have with you copies of those three
10 statements that you have made?
11 A. I do, sir.
12 Q. Taking them all as a whole, are the contents of those
13 statements true to the best of your knowledge and
14 belief?
15 A. They are, sir.
16 Q. May we have page KI2.1 on the left and KI2.40 on the
17 right, please. In your first statement which we have on
18 the left-hand side of the screen, paragraphs 1 and 2,
19 you explain that you joined the intelligence corps in
20 1980 and during 1981 were posted to 121 intelligence
21 section at Headquarters Northern Ireland.
22 Is it right that between 1980 and 1981, you were
23 going through your intelligence corps training?
24 A. That is true, sir.
25 Q. And you then went to Northern Ireland as your first
1 posting?
2 A. That is true.
3 Q. What rank did you hold when you were first sent to
4 Northern Ireland?
5 A. It is, in the intelligence corps, when you leave
6 training, you become a lance corporal, a junior NCO.
7 Q. Then in paragraph 2 of your second statement, on the
8 right-hand side, you tell us that you were first posted
9 to 3 Special Collation Team at Headquarters Northern
10 Ireland.
11 Was that part of 121 intelligence section, or was it
12 something different?
13 A. Well, let me explain. The first two Alpha numerics "1,
14 "2", signifies 12 Intelligence Company and within the
15 company structure there are a number of security and
16 intelligence sections. For instance 121 is associated
17 with 12 company, 12 Intelligence Company.
18 Within 12 Intelligence Company, as I said, there are
19 a number of units. 3SCT was a very small off-shoot of
20 an IT section that dealt with vehicle intelligence and
21 the computer system at the time and it is, as it says
22 there, it stands for Special Collation Team.
23 Q. Is it right that at that time, 3 Special Collation Team
24 was responsible for transferring intelligence material
25 on to a new computer database?
1 A. No, let me just clarify that.
2 It was responsible for one thing and one thing only,
3 to input SB50s, which were the Royal Ulster
4 Constabulary's source reports which were being loaded
5 secretly, without the RUC's knowledge, and that is what
6 prompted the level 1 significance. The RUC did not want
7 it to go on to any data retrieval base and that is why
8 it was done in that way.
9 Q. To understand the position: you are saying that 3SCT was
10 solely concerned at that time with loading the SB50s
11 into the database?
12 A. Indeed. Just to give you an example of the size, it was
13 a 24/7 operation and four operators on each shift.
14 Q. Was some other unit responsible for loading material
15 into the computer database?
16 A. That would be done by the intelligence sections because
17 organically it was Army information that was being
18 produced, therefore, if it was at a local level, they
19 had the ability to input it and it would go via the
20 intelligence sections or, indeed, if, for instance, as
21 in 1980 the FRU, the FRU would input their own material
22 on to the system.
23 Q. Was 121 intelligence section itself responsible at that
24 time for loading some material into the database?
25 A. Very, very little.
1 Q. What kind of material was 121-section loading into the
2 database?
3 A. They would load the odd intelligence summary and that
4 sort of thing. As I say, the responsibility is by the
5 unit that actually produces the information.
6 Q. What about historical material that had been created
7 before the introduction of the database?
8 A. Even with the material that goes on to the computer
9 base, there is always a hard copy, the Army is
10 a bureaucratic system and tends to rely, quite rightly,
11 on hard copy.
12 Q. At the time when you were there, if 3SCT was working on
13 the SB50s, was someone else working on the historical
14 intelligence reports from the Army?
15 A. Do you mean to update the computer system?
16 Q. Yes.
17 A. No, because it would be such a mammoth thing to go
18 backwards, they would rely on the, mostly, as I said,
19 the local units, it would have been done over a number
20 of years. The system did not come in -- 3702 did not
21 come in in 1980, it had been in over a period of time,
22 it did not just suddenly arrive.
23 Q. While we are on the matter, is an SB50 something
24 different from what you refer to elsewhere in your
25 statement as an RUCIRAC?
1 A. A RUCIRAC. It is just our abbreviation for an RUC
2 intelligence report. The police would call them an SB50
3 and Box 500 call them SB50. We call them RUCIRACs.
4 Q. It is the same thing?
5 A. It is the same beast.
6 Q. Approximately how long did you spend as a member of
7 3 Special Collation Team?
8 A. The same as everybody else because it was such a boring
9 and mundane job, approximately two or three months until
10 you can engineer your own escape, the quicker the
11 better!
12 Q. If we look again at paragraph 2 of your first statement
13 on the left, you say that 121 intelligence section
14 provided support for the GOC, CLF and the entire G2
15 support staff of HQNI?
16 A. Just, if I may interrupt you there, that should also
17 include the civilian representatives, the Security
18 Services representative, he is known as JIRO, Joint
19 Intelligence Research Officer.
20 Q. You would include him among the people that your section
21 provided support for?
22 A. Yes, I worked directly to ... in my area, but I will not
23 name him.
24 Q. Would it be right to understand that your section was
25 not itself part of G2, but operated in support of G2?
1 A. No, G2 is, the Army works again, G1, G2, G3, G4. G2 is
2 intelligence full stop. The G2 staff, they do not --
3 they are part and parcel of the intelligence community
4 and G2 is -- signifies intelligence. So we work in
5 support of the commander's staff. Our job is to produce
6 to the commander, information that he requires.
7 Q. Was 121-section part of G2 or not?
8 A. Indeed, yes. Yes, the intelligence community is G2.
9 The G2 staff -- the offices which occupy the G2
10 corridor, we worked to them and they worked to the CLF
11 and he works to the GOC.
12 Q. Within the G2 branch, would it be right to understand
13 that there would have been a number of senior
14 intelligence officers?
15 A. The honest answer to that is: no. You had one SO1 who
16 was an intelligence corps half Colonel/full Colonel and
17 the remainder could be officers who had very little
18 knowledge of intelligence work; they had staff officers
19 who were drafted in. For instance, my staff officer was
20 totally inexperienced in this work and he relied quite
21 heavily on his junior NCOs to produce material, and that
22 is not uncommon, that is the same throughout the, the
23 Army.
24 Q. Is it right that within the Intelligence Branch, there
25 were desk officers with responsibility for producing
1 intelligence assessments in particular fields?
2 A. That is true, but that does not mean to say that they
3 are experienced.
4 Q. What rank would those desk officers typically have held?
5 A. Major and captains. Captains and major, SO1s, SO2s,
6 SO3s.
7 Q. Would people in your section have reported directly to
8 those desk officers or would there have been other
9 officers in between?
10 A. No, no, we worked directly to them.
11 Q. When you use the phrase "G2 support staff" in your
12 paragraph 2 on the left, what category of staff or
13 category of officers are you referring to there?
14 A. The Administration, the clerks and the Registry, which
15 is a very large set-up in a G2 environment.
16 Q. You say also in that paragraph that you started off
17 doing work associated with the Loyalist paramilitaries
18 and after a short period, were given the job of
19 maintaining the Derry Republican desk. At the end of
20 the paragraph you say, as you have said this morning,
21 that you reported to a GSO2 major and the
22 Security Service representative?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Their names have been blanked out of your statement for
25 security reasons?
1 A. Indeed.
2 Q. May I ask you, please, not to mention the names of any
3 military or intelligence personnel in the course of your
4 evidence today.
5 Was that major the G2 desk officer with
6 responsibility for a particular type of intelligence?
7 A. No, he was responsible for Derry, and Derry county, the
8 whole -- Londonderry as a county, and Derry City.
9 Q. Both Republican and Loyalist or just --
10 A. Well, in theory both Republican and Loyalist, but we
11 would pay very little attention to the Loyalist side.
12 Q. When you were on the Derry Republican desk in
13 121-section, was there anyone else working with you on
14 that desk or was it just you?
15 A. Just me.
16 Q. Would it be right to say that your job description, so
17 to speak, at this time, was that you were a JNCO
18 collator?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. You then say that your position required a level 1
21 password for the computer system, with regular access to
22 source material from the Security Service Force Research
23 Unit, Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch and
24 occasionally Secret Intelligence Service. May we keep
25 KI2.1 on the left and put KI2.3 on the right, please.
1 On the right we have the third page of your first
2 statement. We can see that at the top of that page, you
3 say:
4 "No Security Service information was collated or
5 retained within 121 intelligence section offices.
6 Although Security Service documents were circulated
7 within the office, they were not retained. One
8 exception was the Security Service tout telephone
9 folder, which was operated out of hours by the
10 121 intelligence section duty operator."
11 Just to be clear about this: is it right that it was
12 never part of your job at 121 intelligence section to
13 collate reports from the Security Service?
14 A. That is true. We did not collate the material
15 generated, but let us be under no illusion that they did
16 not generate very much, they did not have a very big
17 presence and so, frankly, they did not really come into
18 the equation.
19 Q. You say that Security Service documents were circulated
20 within the office but not retained?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. When you had seen a Security Service document, were you
23 required to destroy it or did you have to give it back
24 to someone or what happened?
25 A. No. No, the procedure is, it goes into the Registry,
1 the Registry then puts it on a circulation slip which
2 involves you signing that the appropriate desk officer
3 has seen it. Then once it has done what we call
4 "a round-robin" and it has been accounted for and at the
5 end of the day there is a head check on each of the
6 files to make sure that they are not left, which
7 sometimes does happen, it is part and parcel of the duty
8 of both the Registry staff and also the junior NCO to
9 make sure that every document is accounted for.
10 It returns at the end of the day back, in theory,
11 back to the Registry, but the GSO2, GSO1 invariably keep
12 them on their desk if they are working late at night.
13 As I say, quantity-wise there was not a great
14 amount.
15 Q. Is it right that information derived from
16 Security Service reports would never have been entered
17 into the Army's computer database?
18 A. That is an accurate statement.
19 Q. Would the same apply to reports from SIS?
20 A. That is accurate.
21 Q. Approximately how frequently would you say that you in
22 fact saw Security Service reports while you were in this
23 post?
24 A. You would not, if we took a week you might see six or
25 seven files.
1 Q. Six or seven files?
2 A. Files, as in circulation files. Within those might be
3 one or two documents.
4 Q. If you were not permitted to collate Security Service
5 reports or to enter them into the computer database,
6 what was the purpose of showing them to you?
7 A. So you maintain your knowledge, your operational
8 knowledge of the area. So you are constantly updated.
9 It is one of the fundamental principles of intelligence,
10 it actually breaches the fundamental principle which is
11 centralisation which is something which the Army come to
12 learn its mistakes by.
13 But I just want to emphasise one thing in that
14 respect and I do not want people to get hung up on this.
15 They produce very, very little. As I say, we had within
16 121 their folder which contained their out-of-hours
17 contact numbers for all their agents, believe you me,
18 there were not many.
19 Q. Do you know who would have decided what Security Service
20 reports should be circulated to you?
21 A. Well, they come into the Registry and if you want the
22 textbook answer, if you want to follow the Manual of
23 Army Security as opposed to living in the real world,
24 the Manual of Army Security will say that it is on a
25 need-to-know basis. The reality of the situation, if
1 you have a 24/7 operation and you live and sleep in
2 there and you have access to documents, then, frankly,
3 there is no document which is not accessible.
4 But if you want the textbook answer, then I would
5 imagine the SO2 or the SO1 would decide on the
6 circulation.
7 I think, as Officer Y and one of the other officers
8 says, that it is the practice to disseminate the
9 information as widely as possible, for obvious reasons.
10 Q. You say that the reports would have come into the
11 Registry. Would one of the staff officers have had to
12 examine the reports after they came into the Registry
13 and form a view about who they should be sent to?
14 A. No, no, let me say this: the right-hand man of the GSO2,
15 who may well be an inexperienced officer coming in for
16 the first time; he is finding his feet. The person that
17 he relies upon is his junior NCO, his foot soldier.
18 Therefore, if I am going to produce a report that he is
19 going to stand in front of the CLF, I can tell you now,
20 he wants it accurate. Therefore he aint not going to
21 show me everything that is relevant; I am his eyes and
22 ears.
23 Q. Does someone in the Registry just decide to circulate
24 the report?
25 A. Yes, it would be circulated relatively on a, on a -- not
1 an informal basis, but just on a routine basis. As far
2 as I was aware there was never any occasion where they
3 would vet a document.
4 Q. When you did see documents from the Security Service,
5 what sort of documents were they?
6 A. Source reports.
7 Q. Were they definitely source reports as opposed to some
8 more sanitised form of intelligence report?
9 A. No, it was basically source reports you would see.
10 Q. Are you sure they were not documents more in the nature
11 of intelligence summaries?
12 A. Mr Roxburgh, having worked in the Ministry of Defence,
13 I think I know what a Box 500 and a CX report looks
14 like.
15 Q. But not necessarily everybody in this room does, so I am
16 trying to obtain your evidence.
17 A. What I am saying to you is they were source reports.
18 Q. If we go on, please, to paragraph 3 of your first
19 statement, you say:
20 "Upon assuming this job, I knew nothing about Derry.
21 I enthusiastically began to read both the intelligence
22 files and search the computer system to glean a basic
23 grounding of the intelligence picture of Derry and
24 surrounding areas. I would say that the intelligence
25 coverage of Derry during this period, in comparison to
1 other areas was good, with all agencies having good
2 access.".
3 Should we take that last observation to be a comment
4 about the quality of intelligence coverage of Derry in
5 1981 or 1982 as opposed to the position ten years
6 previously?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. In paragraph 4, I can pick it up in the third line, you
9 say:
10 MR ROXBURGH: "The process of collating and producing
11 analysis work for the staff officers of HQNI was
12 interesting, though in truth I spent many hours, like
13 other 'new boys', reading both source and open reference
14 material on all the major events affecting both the six
15 counties and the 26 of the Republic. For example,
16 during the early 1980s, if you were to enter either the
17 title "Le Mon" or "Miami Showband", both well-known
18 incidents of the Troubles, as a key word, or the dates
19 into the 3702 computer with a level 1 password, a long
20 list of titles would be available to access."
21 Could you just explain, please, Mr Ingram, what you
22 mean by "a long list of titles"?
23 A. Okay. Well, if -- the best way I can describe it: if
24 you were in the modern day, was to be surfing the web
25 and you put in a key word into Google and it came back
1 with a number of hits, 100 hits and you were then to
2 page through because, basically somewhere in the text,
3 the main text of a document that it has been linked to,
4 it makes reference to the, the incident that is being
5 reported upon.
6 Q. So did these titles contain references, then, to reports
7 that had been entered into the database?
8 A. Yes, the title may well not relate directly to the
9 incident. Within -- it is part and parcel of the
10 collator's job, whoever is inputting it to
11 cross-reference the document, so the document itself may
12 well be linked to 50 different topics.
13 Q. Suppose, for example, you had searched in relation to
14 a particular incident and it had thrown up 50 hits,
15 might one of those hits, just purely for the sake of
16 example, be a reference to something written in an SB50?
17 A. It could well be, yes.
18 Q. And would the database tell you that that is what it
19 was?
20 A. Yes, because it would come up with a level 1.
21 Q. If you then decided that you wanted to see what that
22 SB50 had to say about the incident in question, could
23 you get that information out of the database?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Would the database have given you access to the full
1 text of the original report or just to a summary of it?
2 A. No, it would be the full text, along with the analysis
3 comments and also the linking. To give you an example
4 of that: if I refer back to the famous Martin McGuinness
5 MISR or source report, at the bottom of that it makes
6 reference to other incidents that are linking to
7 Martin McGuinness.
8 Now, a real document would put -- would prove the
9 linkage. In other words, it would make reference to
10 documents which were supporting that document.
11 Q. So, generally speaking, would it follow that if you had
12 found a reference to a particular report in the database
13 and you had read whatever it had to say, there would not
14 have been any need for you to go back to try to locate
15 the original paper report?
16 A. That is true, yes, that would be a nightmare.
17 Q. If you had wanted to try to track down the original
18 paper report, what would you have done?
19 A. Well, it would be nigh on impossible. I refer you to
20 Officer Y's statement who, and again as in all these
21 things, he breaches the Manual of Army Security when he
22 admits that a common procedure was to photocopy a source
23 document 20 times and then cut and paste on
24 to documents, which -- he is telling the truth there,
25 but that is totally in contravention of the rules and
1 regulations.
2 Now, what I am saying to you there, if you were to
3 photocopy that source document 20 times, then in theory
4 you should enter that 20 times into a MoD form 102
5 giving the details and location that you are storing
6 that document.
7 Q. In practice, was that done or not?
8 A. The answer to that is: no.
9 Q. Are you in a position to say one way or the other
10 whether reports that had been entered into the database
11 were kept in hard copy?
12 A. In relation to SB50s, no, they were not kept as
13 a routine. When we entered them in -- on 3SCT they were
14 photocopied as such. In 121 they were filed. So 121
15 would be the only place that documents of the level 1
16 and an SB50 would be stored, other than in a FRU office,
17 I am talking purely in an Army context now.
18 If, for instance, there was a level 1 document which
19 referred to Derry, for instance, then that document
20 would be copied to FRO(North) for the attention of the
21 handlers.
22 Q. Four lines from the end of paragraph 4, on the left-hand
23 side of the screen, you say:
24 "All HQNI intelligence staff and FRU personnel had
25 level 1 passwords; at HQNI only between 10 and 20 people
1 would have had access to a level 1 password."
2 If all HQNI intelligence staff had level 1
3 passwords, would that not mean there were many more than
4 20 people with access to such a password?
5 A. No.
6 Q. May we have on the right-hand side of the screen
7 page KI2.40. First of all may we look on the left at
8 paragraph 5, where you say:
9 "As part of the learning curve, I undertook a number
10 of projects to examine the intelligence picture
11 available. These projects were either requested by the
12 staff officers or undertaken on my own initiative.
13 Examples were vehicles of interest which used particular
14 permanent vehicle checkpoints and Bloody Sunday."
15 If we look across to the right-hand side of the
16 screen, you say in paragraph 2 that after your time in
17 3SCT, you went to the Derry desk, working for the major
18 at 121.
19 "He was an easy-going guy. I cannot say that he
20 told me to do the project on Bloody Sunday, although he
21 might have done. Basically it was a project in
22 collation, bringing together sources of information
23 available in the section. It was very loose, not
24 structured. I think that the exercise was something
25 that I initiated. It probably only took about a week to
1 10 days to complete it, doing it at odd times. It was a
2 written report. Major blank was aware of it.
3 I completed it well before I left 121. I typed it
4 myself. I would expect it still to be in existence.
5 I was the originator of the document. I classified it
6 as secret and I believe that the Registry clerk entered
7 it on the MoD form 102."
8 At one point you say that the major might have told
9 you to do the project and at another point you say that
10 you think you initiated it yourself. What is your best
11 recollection as to how this project came about?
12 A. I think, if you refer back to Officer Y, he says that it
13 was a practice that individual collation, collators
14 would actually undertake projects like this.
15 My best recollection is, I carried it out, but
16 I could not honestly tell you whether that major -- the
17 other thing you have to remember, as well, that major
18 actually came in part of the way through my tour in
19 there, as always happens there is an overlap and
20 I cannot remember whether it was the previous major or
21 not, but my best recollection is that it was that
22 particular individual. But with the passage of time,
23 I would not swear to it.
24 Q. Are you confident that, whichever major was around at
25 the time, you did show the report to a staff officer in
1 G2?
2 A. Yes, yes. You know, in layman's terms, it is a bit of
3 Brownie points.
4 Q. You would have been doing this report in or about 1982;
5 is that right?
6 A. Yes, give or take a few months, yes.
7 Q. So approximately ten years after Bloody Sunday?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. What was the purpose of doing this report?
10 A. Well, as you take over a desk, whether it be the Syrian
11 desk as I took over in the Ministry of Defence, the
12 first thing you do is read into an area and probably --
13 not probably, the biggest single event of Derry was
14 Bloody Sunday. So to get a grasp of the area, it seems
15 both logical and common sense to me that you would
16 undertake a project which would involve links to the
17 majority of the major players.
18 Q. Can you remember, approximately, how long your report
19 was?
20 A. It was produced when you were on duty operator so out of
21 hours where you basically sleep there during the close
22 of hours and, you know, you have got time to surf the
23 web. I would not like to say it was the longest
24 document in the world, probably three or four pages.
25 Q. Did it attempt to answer any particular questions about
1 Bloody Sunday or --
2 A. No, no. The, the intention of the documents similar to
3 what I produced was to collate the material, not to come
4 to a determination.
5 Q. Obviously without mentioning any names, having produced
6 this report, can you remember to whom you circulated it?
7 A. No, I think -- again, it is an informal thing. As
8 Officer C has said, it was fairly common, you know, that
9 desks, junior NCOs would produce this sort of thing.
10 That is what a collator does; that is his job, to
11 produce material for and on behalf of the staff officers
12 and if you do something which a staff officer has not at
13 first requested, especially when he is new, if it was
14 indeed that major, which is why I believe it may well
15 have been him because I was partly motivated by showing
16 him something to bring him into his new area and just as
17 a matter of time, we actually visited Derry, myself and
18 him, and we visited the Royal Anglian Regiment on the
19 ground and we both patrolled in green uniform.
20 Q. Are you saying, then, that you do not think you would
21 have copied the document to anybody other than the
22 major?
23 A. No, no.
24 Q. Do you remember receiving any comments from anyone about
25 your report?
1 A. Not particularly, no.
2 Q. How did you go about doing the research for the report?
3 A. Just purely off the 3702.
4 Q. What kind of searches did you run on the database?
5 A. I was probably very lazy and put in the key word
6 "Bloody Sunday," that is a sure key to success.
7 Q. As a JNCO collator, would you have been entitled to go
8 into the G2 Registry and ask to see any file that you
9 liked?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Would you have been allowed to take files out of the
12 Registry?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And if you did that, would you have had to sign for
15 them?
16 A. No. If you want to refer to the Manual of Army
17 Security, you should have done.
18 Q. What about files held within 121 intelligence section,
19 would you have had unrestricted access to them?
20 A. Absolutely.
21 Q. If we look back to paragraph 5 on the left-hand side of
22 the screen, you say:
23 "A project would involve examining military
24 intelligence source reports, intelligence reports,
25 intelligence summaries; RUCIRACs and other documents.".
1 You did not in fact examine hard copy documents, you
2 have just told us, for the purposes of your project?
3 A. No, I did not.
4 Q. Are those the sorts of documents that you would have
5 accessed through the database?
6 A. Agreed.
7 Q. Can we go back to the previous page to look at that list
8 of different kinds of documents.
9 So far as a Military Intelligence source report is
10 concerned, is it right that that is a document that will
11 contain intelligence from a source of some kind, but
12 that it will not be apparent from the document, or
13 should not be apparent from the document, who the source
14 is?
15 A. That is accurate.
16 Q. You then refer to "Int reps" obviously intelligence
17 reports. What sort of documents are those?
18 A. Those could be produced -- normally produced by the
19 local unit on the ground and they would come in at
20 level 7 or level 9 and I give you an example, that could
21 be that James Martin McGuinness was seen at 3.30
22 entering Butcher's Gate.
23 Q. That is something distinct from source reports?
24 A. Indeed, yes.
25 Q. And then you refer to Int summs. Are you referring
1 there to military Int summs?
2 A. Yes, yes.
3 Q. And we have dealt with the RUC documents. So far as the
4 SB50s are concerned, is it right that they, too, would
5 have been drafted in such a way as to conceal the
6 identity of the sources of information?
7 A. In 99 per cent of cases, yes.
8 Q. Were there any other kinds of document that you could
9 access through the computer system?
10 A. No. Well, as I say, sighting reports and that sort of
11 thing. Other than that, not really.
12 Q. In answering my next question, please do not, for the
13 moment at least, go into any details but if you can,
14 just answer it yes or no: do you now remember any
15 specific pieces of intelligence that you saw concerning
16 Bloody Sunday when you compiled this project?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Please be very careful not to say anything that might
19 identify a source and please do not name any individuals
20 in your answer. Are you able, subject to that, to
21 describe in general terms the nature of the intelligence
22 that you remember, concerning Bloody Sunday?
23 A. Well, there was material prior to Bloody Sunday in the
24 lead-up to Bloody Sunday. There was clear infiltration
25 of the civil rights movement, the Derry Young Hooligans
1 and then, obviously on the events of the day there was
2 coverage and then post the events and when I say "post
3 the event," material is still coming in 10, 12 years
4 after the event. I remember quite distinct -- well, if
5 you take the Infliction case as an example, but
6 I remember in a military context, every informer that is
7 basically extracted for whatever reason, he is
8 thoroughly debriefed and asked about all salient points
9 and that is a question which is always asked.
10 Q. Let us take those in turn: so far as material showing
11 infiltration of the Civil Rights Association and the
12 Derry Young Hooligans is concerned, first of all do you
13 remember whether this was police or Army material?
14 A. I could not put my hand on my heart and say -- basically
15 I formed an overview, given the passage of time I could
16 not give you an honest recollection of whether it was an
17 Army Box 500, RUC or, indeed, a signals intelligence
18 report.
19 Q. It would not have been Box 500 if you saw it in the
20 database, would it?
21 A. No, I am talking about my overall view of the material
22 available to me. I am not just talking -- my statement
23 is not in relation to just that, that project of
24 producing that document. My statement is in response to
25 my experience as an intelligence operator.
1 Q. Let us go back a step because I will come to other
2 intelligence that you may have seen later on. But what
3 I want to ask you for the moment is whether or not you
4 remember specifically any intelligence that you saw in
5 connection with this project that you did on
6 Bloody Sunday. As I say, I do not want you to go into
7 the details of it.
8 Do you have a recollection of intelligence that you
9 saw, in that context?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And did it include material showing infiltration of the
12 Civil Rights Association and the Derry Young Hooligans?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did that material, showing infiltration of the
15 Civil Rights Association and the Derry Young Hooligans,
16 cast any light on the plans of either organisation for
17 the march on 30th January 1972?
18 A. I do not know.
19 Q. When you talk about "infiltration of the Civil Rights
20 Association," are you talking about infiltration of the
21 Civil Rights Association by the Security Forces or by
22 the IRA?
23 A. No, Security Forces.
24 Q. And you have referred also to seeing coverage of the
25 event itself when you did your project; is that right?
1 A. That is correct, yes.
2 Q. Do you have any recollection -- again speaking for the
3 moment in general terms -- of what was reported in that
4 coverage?
5 A. Just over the period, the weeks after, there was
6 a number of source reports coming in giving their, their
7 accounts of the incidents of that day. If you will, if
8 you have got eyes and ears then obviously one of the
9 primary responsibilities is to debrief them as
10 thoroughly as you can. It does not make sense to have
11 a network of informers if you do not use them.
12 Q. Is there anything that you can say about what the
13 content of that coverage was in a way that will not
14 prejudice any source?
15 A. Okay, well, I will give you -- this particular gentleman
16 is dead now, so it will not make him --
17 Q. I do not want you to, even if he is dead, I do not want
18 you to say anything that would lead to him being
19 identified --
20 A. Okay, I just want to say I was involved in his
21 relocation and I had many an opportunity to speak to
22 him. I refer to officer -- not Officer Y, the other
23 one, whatever he is --
24 Q. Officer Z?
25 A. Officer Z makes reference that there may well have been
1 references in contact forms as opposed to a MISR. It is
2 a very significant point that he raises.
3 If, when you are debriefing a source, whatever is
4 produced is similar to an iceberg. If you produce
5 10 per cent there is a vast amount of material which is
6 not produced in or disseminated to outside agencies, for
7 a variety of reasons. Nonetheless that material is
8 recorded on what is called the contact form and that is
9 basically the font of knowledge as opposed to MISR.
10 MISR is relatively insignificant.
11 Q. Let me put it another way: did any of the coverage of
12 the events of Bloody Sunday that you saw when working on
13 this project, cast any light upon the circumstances in
14 which either the Army or the IRA had opened fire that
15 day?
16 A. I, I remember seeing no material which would have
17 suggested there was hostile fire.
18 LORD SAVILLE: That was not quite the answer to
19 Mr Roxburgh's question. Could you put it again,
20 Mr Roxburgh.
21 MR ROXBURGH: Yes. Did any of the coverage of the events of
22 Bloody Sunday that you saw, when working on this
23 project, cast any light upon the circumstances in which
24 either the Army or the IRA had opened fire that day?
25 Let us take the Army first.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. The difficulty I have, I do not want to go into the
3 precise details of any intelligence that you may
4 remember in public because of the possible danger to
5 sources. But can you answer this question: is your
6 memory of the material that you saw sufficiently precise
7 that it would now enable you to give details of the
8 content of individual source reports that you saw when
9 compiling this project?
10 A. No. I gained an overview and when I first made the
11 point that there was material which I believed was not
12 or would not be delivered to this Inquiry, it was on the
13 basis of an overview as opposed to specifics, but there
14 are specifics, as I have intimated to you previously.
15 But, frankly, you are asking me to dance a tango on my
16 own.
17 Q. So far as the overview is concerned, what was the
18 overview you derived from reading these documents?
19 A. That there had been no hostile fire and that the Army
20 had overreacted and that there had been a large amount
21 of casualties, some of which had been taken to hospitals
22 across the border and people had been involved in
23 ferrying people backwards and forwards, including
24 agents.
25 Q. Are you saying that the agents were involved in ferrying
1 people backwards and forwards or that the agents were
2 among the people who were taken to hospital?
3 A. No, the agents were involved in ferrying people.
4 Obviously they were present on the day and became
5 involved in it, they were entangled in it.
6 Q. You cannot remember whether these were police agents or
7 Army agents?
8 A. No, I am talking now in reference to material in contact
9 forms and my discussions with agents who were present on
10 the day.
11 Q. Are you now coming on to your second job?
12 A. Yes, I am moving on now to my second job in the FRU,
13 yes.
14 Q. So far as the project you did at HQ Northern Ireland is
15 concerned, have you now told us as much as you can
16 remember of the general overview that you derived from
17 reading those documents and compiling that project?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. In paragraph 3 of your third statement, on the
20 right-hand side of the screen, you say:
21 "I had access to and saw hundreds of documents
22 relating to Bloody Sunday.".
23 You are still talking here, are you not, about your
24 first job at HQNI; is that right?
25 A. It was, yes.
1 Q. Is that literally true, that you saw hundreds of
2 documents?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. Would some of those documents have been reports about
5 other subjects that just contained incidental references
6 to Bloody Sunday?
7 A. That is, that is true in part, but the vast majority
8 would be made up of sighting reports, particular people
9 being sighted at given times on the day and in the march
10 and in the presence of given individuals, which is
11 a primary function in -- after the event that you can
12 piece together exactly what has happened.
13 Q. Are you aware that there were annual marches throughout
14 the 1970s and beyond in commemoration of the events of
15 Bloody Sunday?
16 A. I have been present on them myself.
17 Q. Is it possible that some of the documents that you saw
18 contained intelligence about people taking part in those
19 commemorative marches rather than about the march on
20 Bloody Sunday itself?
21 A. I do not believe so, but I accept the point you are
22 making, um, it is a point to be considered but I do not
23 think so; I would not totally discount that. But you
24 see the problem is, it is dated and it is done on
25 precedent. So when you put in your question for the
1 computer, obviously the most recent input in and
2 relation to the DOY, which is your date of incident,
3 signifies were on the actual list or the print-out the
4 material is placed.
5 Q. Are you able to be sure or not that you saw sighting
6 reports that actually related to Bloody Sunday itself?
7 A. I am sure, 100 per cent.
8 Q. Do you know whether these were reports of sightings by
9 soldiers or by sources or agents who were reporting on
10 sightings or what?
11 A. Both, but in separate documents.
12 Q. So far as sightings by soldiers are concerned, in the
13 first instance, would you please just answer this
14 question yes or no, if you know the answer: would these
15 have been soldiers from Regular Army units, or not?
16 A. All soldiers.
17 Q. In other words, soldiers both from Regular Army units
18 and from other units?
19 A. Indeed.
20 Q. Again, would you just answer this question yes or no,
21 please: so far as soldiers from Army units other than
22 Regular Army units are concerned, do you know to what
23 unit or units those soldiers who made sighting reports
24 belonged?
25 A. Within a, within a title, yes. I mean, the titles vary
1 from month-to-month as a means of disguising, but if you
2 are asking me whether it is a surveillance unit, a
3 specialist unit or, in a similar way to the MRF or, you
4 know, or 14 companies today, then, yes.
5 If you are talking to me, was it a specialised unit,
6 then the answer to that is: yes, but I would not get too
7 hung up on the actual individual titles of units because
8 that is very loose.
9 Q. It may be important for us if we are trying to establish
10 whether or not a sighting took place.
11 You mention the MRF?
12 A. Let me just answer that, I think, before we go on just
13 to give you an example --
14 Q. Before you give the example, I must ask you, please, to
15 confine yourself to any evidence you can give about
16 units that were operating in 1972 and not to --
17 A. That is what I am trying to explain to you in that
18 I cannot remember exactly what the numerics were but
19 1 signals unit was titled, for instance, 14 signals unit
20 but it did not perform any signals task. Does that
21 answer your question?
22 Q. It is helpful, thank you.
23 You have referred to the MRF. Do you know whether
24 or not the MRF was operating in Derry at that time?
25 A. I do not know if the MRF were operating at that time,
1 but a unit which had a similar capability undoubtedly
2 was.
3 Q. Is that something you actually know or are you just
4 going on the basis that there must have been a unit of
5 some kind?
6 A. No, you can -- well, surveillance is quite a specific
7 sort of role that can only be undertaken by professional
8 people and these people have that expertise, therefore,
9 it is not something that, when you see a surveillance
10 report, which is, as I said previously, I think I put in
11 my statement as regards Martin McGuinness,
12 Martin McGuinness was obviously a key person on that
13 march and an SOP, a Standard Operating Practice, would
14 be to place key people under surveillance and --
15 Q. Is it possible, Mr Ingram, that by the time you became
16 involved in Northern Ireland, things may have become
17 more sophisticated, but that at the time of
18 Bloody Sunday, any sighting reports that there may have
19 been, would have been sighting reports by individual
20 soldiers from Regular Army units?
21 A. Mr Roxburgh, the world of intelligence is as old as the
22 world of prostitution and it has changed very little in
23 many hundreds of years.
24 Q. Again, in the first instance, can you please confine
25 yourself to answering this question yes or no: do you
1 remember the identities of any particular individuals
2 who were the subject of these sighting reports on
3 Bloody Sunday?
4 A. The answer to that is: yes.
5 Q. Was one of them Martin McGuinness?
6 A. James Martin McGuinness.
7 Q. Apart from Mr McGuinness, and please do not give their
8 names, do you remember the names of any other people who
9 were sighted on Bloody Sunday?
10 A. No, but there were -- but again because Mr McGuinness is
11 such a high profile individual and I maintain to keep an
12 interest in him, he was of interest to me.
13 Q. Can you remember where he was sighted on Bloody Sunday?
14 A. Well, I know Derry very well and, um, today the names
15 would be familiar to me. In those days they were just
16 names, but he followed the route round Butcher's Gate
17 and that type of area. I do not remember specifically
18 an area that he was there, other than names of streets
19 and that type of thing.
20 Q. Are you saying that you remember a report of him being
21 in the Butcher's Gate area or is that just a --
22 A. No, I am using that as an example. I could not tell you
23 off-hand, it would not really mean very much to me at
24 the time, other than he was under surveillance.
25 Q. Is the position this: you saw a report or reports about
1 Mr McGuinness's whereabouts on that day, but you cannot
2 now remember specifically where he was supposed to have
3 been?
4 A. That is accurate, yes.
5 Q. Can you remember this: did the sighting reports
6 concerning Mr McGuinness simply indicate where he was or
7 did they give any detail about what he had been doing?
8 A. It mostly focuses upon your company and at what point
9 and at what time. Surveillance is very useful in that
10 respect, to making linkages.
11 LORD SAVILLE: I am sorry, Mr Ingram, it is the Chairman.
12 I did not quite understand: it mostly focuses upon your
13 company --
14 A. The company.
15 LORD SAVILLE: That is to say the people that were with, in
16 this instance, Mr McGuinness.
17 A. Indeed.
18 MR ROXBURGH: If we look again at paragraph 3 on the
19 right-hand side of the screen, you say in the second
20 line:
21 "During that period they used a crude intelligence
22 system. This was at HQNI."
23 What exactly do you mean by that?
24 A. Do you want me to go into specifics?
25 Q. Let us take it generally first and I will see.
1 A. Okay. Well, fundamentally the intelligence system was
2 not run by professional intelligences, and I mean that,
3 by the intelligence corps, who are specifically trained
4 in that game. It was run on a fragmented basis,
5 therefore there was no centralisation which, as
6 I alluded to earlier, is a fundamental principle and
7 from 1980 that changed.
8 So what I am saying is, there was a crude ad hoc
9 system which relied upon the local units to be the
10 tentacles and to report back to the SMIOs and SMIU and
11 to the FINCOs.
12 Q. Would it be right to say your criticism is essentially
13 of the structure of the organisation?
14 A. Yes, yes.
15 Q. Then you say:
16 "The majority of information would be stored at
17 8 Brigade."
18 What kind of information would be stored at
19 8 Brigade that were not available at HQNI?
20 A. Well, as I have just explained to you there, the local
21 units report directly through the Brigade Commander.
22 Now, the Brigade Commander, who is the man obviously
23 responsible for his area, his troops, ie the local unit
24 are the people carrying out the function of
25 intelligence, now that was a primary fault and that is
1 where, you know, they made their mistakes and
2 effectively the Brigade Commander was autonomous.
3 Q. Then, still in the same paragraph, you say:
4 "It was not the job of FRU to hold documents, its
5 job was to get the information and pass it on."
6 A. True.
7 Q. "On night shift it would be boring with nothing to do,
8 I would go on to the computer to occupy my time. In
9 1984 when I was there, I could access all areas with my
10 level 1 password."
11 When you talk about what you did on the night shift
12 and going on to the computer to occupy your time, are
13 you talking there about your job at HQNI or your job at
14 FRU, or both?
15 A. No, part of both, in that particular -- I think is that
16 my second or third statement?
17 Q. That is your third statement.
18 A. That is my third statement. I was asked a specific
19 question and that response can be read both ways, but it
20 is meant in the context of the FRU. What I was trying
21 to say is, it is not the FRU's document to act upon the
22 information or, indeed, keep vast amounts of material,
23 other than material that they have generated. So any
24 Int summaries or Int reps which we would come through on
25 a routine basis would not be kept on a long-term basis.
1 Q. When you were serving in the FRU, then, did you have
2 access to the same computer database that you had access
3 to when you were in 121 intelligence section?
4 A. Yes, just an upgraded version, it become crucible.
5 Q. At the end of that paragraph, you say:
6 "They did not put Security Service or SIS material
7 on to the computer on a routine basis ...".
8 I think we have established they did not put
9 Security Service or SIS material on to the computer at
10 all; is that right?
11 A. You are making a fundamental mistake there, Mr Roxburgh,
12 because what I said was "not on a routine basis".
13 Q. Does that mean they did sometimes put Security Service
14 and SIS material on to the computer?
15 A. Would you like me to explain that?
16 Q. Yes, please.
17 A. When a handler sees documents which come to him and he
18 then produces his -- let me take a step back. When you
19 meet with an agent and he gives you information, he
20 imparts information, that is not intelligence, that is
21 information of intelligence value. The intelligence is
22 derived by a process called the intelligence cycle. So
23 you come back into the office and by means of
24 constructive comment and analysis, you produce
25 a document which is then an intelligence report.
1 Therefore the analysis of the document is the
2 intelligence. Now, it is a fact that in -- when you
3 have come into possession of knowledge and you are
4 trying to make the case, you sometimes use material to
5 substantiate your case in the analysis without making
6 reference to the source of it. Therefore you use
7 extracts which may well be in other people's documents;
8 It is naughty but it sometimes happens.
9 Q. Is this the position: that what might have gone into the
10 database is documents written by people in the Army or
11 the police which drew on material that they had seen
12 that originated from the Security Service or SIS?
13 A. In a small way, yes.
14 Q. But the Security Service and SIS reports themselves
15 would not have been put into the database?
16 A. Indeed.
17 Q. You go on in your paragraph 3 to say that you had access
18 to the hard copy documents held in the Registry. What
19 categories of Security Service and SIS documents did you
20 have access in the Registry?
21 A. I am sorry, I am missing the point there; what do you
22 mean?
23 Q. What you said in this paragraph is that Security Service
24 and SIS material was not put on to the computer on
25 a routine basis:
1 " ... but I had access to the hard copy documents
2 held in the Registry where I saw them. They also came
3 round on round robins in hard copy."
4 Were the hard copy Security Service or SIS documents
5 held in the Registry to which you had access, the same
6 documents as the ones that came round on round robins?
7 A. Indeed, yes.
8 Q. Do you know whether there may have been Security Service
9 and/or SIS material held in the Registry to which you
10 did not have access?
11 A. Everything is possible, but highly unlikely.
12 Q. I do not want you to go into details about this, please,
13 for the moment, but can you say this: do you remember
14 whether when you were working at HQNI you ever saw
15 either Security Service or for that matter SIS material
16 relating to Bloody Sunday?
17 A. I will have to answer that: probably not.
18 Q. May we then go to page KY1.1, please. This is
19 a statement made by an officer who we know as Officer Y.
20 His identity may or may not be known to you. If you do
21 know who he is...
22 A. Obviously I will not, sir.
23 Q. ... please do not mention his name. In paragraph 1 we
24 can see that he was posted to 121 intelligence section
25 in March 1981 as the corporal on the desk dealing with
1 Loyalist paramilitaries and then, in mid-December 1981,
2 he says that he moved to the sergeant's post on the desk
3 dealing with Republican paramilitary organisations.
4 That would mean that he was in 121 intelligence
5 section at the same time as you?
6 A. He was my immediate boss.
7 Q. Exactly. KY1.3, please. I would like to go through
8 some parts of his statement with you. First of all,
9 paragraph 5, in the last two sentences, he says:
10 "The vast majority of intelligence processed by the
11 121 intelligence section was from RIRACs ... and MISRs.
12 However, a lesser amount of other intelligence product
13 such as Int reps and Int summs from the three brigades
14 and their subordinate units as well as open source
15 material such as newspapers was also processed at
16 121 intelligence section."
17 Is that an accurate statement of the position as you
18 remember it?
19 A. No, he misses out the Security Services.
20 Q. Even allowing for that, is it not correct that the vast
21 majority of the intelligence that you processed was from
22 the RIRACs and the MISRs?
23 A. Well the vast majority of intelligence in the whole
24 equation is produced by those two agencies and very
25 little is produced by the Security Services.
1 Q. If we go on to paragraph 7 at the foot of the page, he
2 confirms that his time in 121 intelligence section was
3 very busy, particularly during the hunger strikes.
4 Right at the end he says:
5 "This led to a marked increase in the number of
6 RIRACs we received from two or three per day up to six
7 or seven per day. These were usually received in the
8 late afternoon and it was the job of the duty JNCO, who
9 manned the office during silent hours, to carry out
10 intelligence database checks against all the names
11 mentioned in the reports."
12 Do you agree with that?
13 A. Yes, but let us just understand what he means by RIRAC
14 in that context, what he means by that is reports.
15 Within that RIRAC there may be 30 source reports. So
16 where he uses the term "two or three per day", there may
17 well be 90.
18 Q. He goes on in paragraph 8 to say:
19 "The RIRACs were usually divided into Loyalist and
20 Republican reports. Each report then consisted of
21 a number of paragraphs and was usually three or four
22 pages long."
23 Is what you are saying that within those three or
24 four pages, there may have been several paragraphs, each
25 dealing with a different matter?
1 A. Indeed, yes.
2 Q. Would they then have had to be split up and put on the
3 appropriate files?
4 A. Yes, if you read his statement, he says that he
5 photocopies them 20 times and cuts and pastes, and that
6 is an accurate reflection of what happened.
7 Q. Take your time to read paragraph 8, do you essentially
8 agree with everything he says in paragraph 8?
9 A. No.
10 Q. What is there in paragraph 8 that you disagree with?
11 A. Well, think of the logistics of it. If you were to
12 enter every one of those you have cut and pasted, if you
13 photocopy a report 20 times and there are three or four
14 pages, let us for instance say there is 30, that is to
15 the factor of 20, so that is 600 entries on a daily
16 basis in a MoD form 102. That means you are going
17 through one MoD form 102 every day. I think his memory
18 is a little bit suspect.
19 Q. So you agree with the description of the collation
20 system, but not with what he says about entering the
21 details --
22 A. Yes, it is a minor point, but generally his thrust of
23 his statement in that respect is accurate.
24 Q. Is it your recollection that the MoD form 102 was just
25 not used at all or that it was used but people did not
1 use it all the time and it was not maintained as
2 thoroughly as it should have been?
3 A. It was maintained for the first copy.
4 Q. So, so far as the first copy is concerned, the system
5 worked, did it?
6 A. Indeed. You see, working on the premise that the RUC
7 did not want you to put it on to the computer in the
8 first instance, it would be quite foolish, would it not,
9 to be entering it into a MoD form 102, saying where you
10 had put it.
11 Q. Was the form 102 just a single sheet of paper or was it
12 a booklet or what was it?
13 A. The MoD form 102 is attached, if you read Mr Harding's
14 submission, he gives you an example of a MoD form 102,
15 it is a book.
16 Q. Once the book had been completed, what was done with it?
17 A. Master MoD form -- there is a MoD form 102 and a master
18 MoD form 102. The Manual of Army Security dictates that
19 that document will then be kept until the last document
20 is either transferred, a live document is transferred to
21 an existing document or the file is closed and then kept
22 for, in those days, ten years, and today it is five
23 years.
24 Q. Suppose that in 121 intelligence section you had
25 a form 102 which was filled up, what was actually done
1 with it; did it stay in 121-section, did it go somewhere
2 else?
3 A. Every year you have a security check from a unit called
4 120 security section which is a part of 12 company.
5 I myself was trained in that particular aspect, that is
6 why I am quite well versed in document security
7 procedures. Therefore it is relevant if I was to come
8 along and ask to see folio 133 I would then want you to
9 produce it in the file that has been designated and in
10 the filing cabinet that has been described as holding
11 it.
12 Q. Is the answer to my question: that the completed form
13 102 would have remained at 121 intelligence section?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. If the underlying documents, for whatever reason, had
16 been destroyed, is that something that would have then
17 been recorded in the form 102?
18 A. It would, but why would you destroy a document?
19 Q. If a time came when all the documents recorded in the
20 register had been destroyed, might the register itself,
21 in due course, have been destroyed?
22 A. After ten years, yes. Ten years from the date that that
23 document -- that that Registry is closed, but then there
24 is a master MoD form 102 which then records who
25 authorises the destruction and it needs to be at least
1 a captain alongside a senior NCO.
2 Q. After a certain period of time, might the master form
3 itself come to be destroyed?
4 A. Yes, but I would beg the question: why would you destroy
5 an intelligence document in the first place?
6 Q. Can we go on, please, to paragraph 9 of Officer Y's
7 statement. Where he begins by saying:
8 "This manual collation system meant that files were
9 filled relatively quickly. Each JNCO collator had one
10 by four-drawer filing cabinet adjacent to his or her
11 desk in the Int section office."
12 Is that correct?
13 A. It is, but that is only for current material. There was
14 archived material as well.
15 Q. He goes on:
16 "Further storage space was available in a storage
17 room immediately below the intelligence section office.
18 This room contained approximately 25 by four-drawer
19 security filing cabinets which held all of the closed
20 files."
21 A. That is not accurate, what he means by a closed file.
22 A file may well have been in existence for one month and
23 it is full, therefore, it is termed "closed file" but it
24 is not closed as in an understanding that it is ten
25 years old.
1 Q. Would those files, the ones held in the storage room,
2 have included both files on individuals and also files
3 on particular subjects?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If, let us say, an SB50 came in and it was copied
6 a number of times and paragraphs extracted from it were
7 placed on a number of different files, what would be
8 done with the original complete SB50?
9 A. They were kept on specific SB50 files. That is why I am
10 saying, if you looked in a MoD form 102, you would see
11 one entry and one entry only and if the RUC were to
12 come, you would have the master document, they were not
13 to be aware that it has been put on to the system or
14 indeed put into the manual collation system.
15 Q. Would those master files of SB50s be kept within 121
16 intelligence section or would they go somewhere else?
17 A. From memory, I think they were kept there, but I would
18 not put my hand on my heart.
19 Q. If we read on in Officer Y's statement, he says:
20 "As far as I can remember, the system in place at
21 that time was that as soon as a current file became
22 full, a new volume was opened and the full file closed
23 and moved to the storage room."
24 A. I concur with that.
25 Q. "Space then had been made in the storage room by
1 destroying the most dated files. This was the only
2 storage space available for section files and its
3 capacity was limited to the number of filing cabinets
4 that could fit into the room."
5 What do you say about that?
6 A. I think he is slightly inaccurate again.
7 Q. What do you mean by slightly inaccurate?
8 A. Well, if you go to the expense of producing documents
9 and all intelligence documents are relevant whether it
10 is this year, next year or in 20 years' time; you do not
11 destroy documents on the basis you have no storage.
12 Frankly you could move the cleaner out and use her
13 office. I think her materials are slightly less
14 priority than, say, an SB50; would you not agree?
15 Q. Do you actually know that what he says here is wrong or
16 are you just expressing an opinion about what is likely
17 to have happened or not to have happened?
18 A. No, I make very clear when I am expressing an opinion,
19 Mr Roxburgh, I am telling you what I understand, I know
20 to be the truth.
21 Q. I do not want to go into the detail of the next two
22 paragraphs, can we go on, please, to KY1.6. We can see
23 that at the end of paragraph 11, Officer Y refers to the
24 existence of, in 121 intelligence section, of something
25 he describes as:
1 "The section's personality card index" which he was
2 "was acknowledged as being both comprehensive and
3 accurate and this was loaded on to the computer over
4 a period of time."
5 Do you remember that index?
6 A. I do, yes.
7 Q. What kind of information could one get from the index if
8 one looked up a particular individual?
9 A. The colour of his three-piece suite.
10 Q. I mean --
11 A. I am not being facetious.
12 Q. You are giving an example --
13 A. That is actually a field on the computer, I am not being
14 facetious, that is in actual fact.
15 Q. If you looked up a particular individual, would you find
16 a whole lot of information about his personal details,
17 where he lived --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Who his associates were, that sort of thing?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Would you find references to particular intelligence
22 reports or just --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Is it right, as Officer Y says, that the contents of
25 that personality card index, were loaded into the
1 computer?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Was the personality card index compiled on the basis of
4 SB50s and military intelligence source reports and all
5 the other kinds of documents that you have been
6 describing or was it based on other material?
7 A. No, it is built on all relevant access to material, but
8 the way you govern that then is to bring in the level
9 passwords, which is one to nine. Therefore someone in
10 the Ulster Defence Regiment who has a level 9 password
11 would only have the basic access to, for instance,
12 sighting reports, or indeed his address, date of birth,
13 that type of thing. The basic material would be on at
14 level 9, then going down to level 7 and down to level 3
15 and then down to level 1. But there are intervening
16 levels as well.
17 Q. If we go on to paragraph 12, Officer Y deals with
18 special projects. He says:
19 " I mentioned earlier the JNCO collators being
20 required to carry out analysis of data to identify
21 patterns and trends. Occasionally they were also
22 required to carry out special projects on a particular
23 subject. I can only recall two such major projects
24 being carried out during my time in this office.".
25 He says that one of them was to do with
1 rocket-propelled grenade attacks in Belfast. Do you
2 remember whether you were involved in that project?
3 A. I was not, no, but I do, I do have a vague remember
4 of ...
5 Q. He says:
6 "The second one was a large project involving all of
7 the JNCO collators" to do with a handbook entitled
8 "Notes on terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland";
9 were you involved in that?
10 A. I was, yes.
11 Q. If we go on to the next page and look at paragraph 13,
12 he says:
13 "During my tenure as the Republican desk sergeant
14 I do not recall anyone within 121 intelligence section
15 working on and completing a project on Bloody Sunday.
16 As the incident took place many years before, I do not
17 see how such an official study could have had any
18 relevance to the intelligence requirements of 1981,
19 unlike the projects I mentioned in paragraph 12.".
20 What do you say to that?
21 A. Well, he prefaces it by saying "official study" and
22 I have said that it was a private undertaking that I
23 took and I refer you back to his paragraph 15:
24 "However, junior NCOs would sometimes do their own
25 private research. That is exactly what I did. I do not
1 disagree with his interpretation, other than he cannot
2 remember me actually producing it and, as he has already
3 said, it was a very busy environment and I, you know,
4 I do not for one moment disagree with it, it is just
5 that he is wrong.
6 Q. He carries on:
7 "Moreover, it is unlikely that the files held at 121
8 intelligence section would have contained material going
9 back that far. For example, when completing the major
10 project on 'Notes on terrorist organisations in
11 Northern Ireland' which covered a wide range of
12 subjects, I remember that there was a lack of historical
13 data on which to draw. This was because information
14 older than five years was considered dated in current
15 intelligence terms and the limited storage capacity
16 meant that there was constant pressure to weed out and
17 destroy out-of-date intelligence reports."
18 A. So what he is effectively saying, then, for instance let
19 us use Martin McGuinness, at the end of five years we
20 ditch and then we just keep five years on him. I do not
21 think that is an accurate testament.
22 Q. If we go on, please, -- you have rightly drawn attention
23 to paragraph 15 where he refers to JNCOs doing their
24 private research. If we go on to paragraph 16 at KY1.9,
25 he says here:
1 "Research into archive material may have been
2 undertaken for the purpose of obtaining a greater
3 understanding of current events or of a particular
4 subject area ...".
5 A little further on he says:
6 " I would have been surprised to hear that a new
7 collator to the section was doing his own research on an
8 event that had taken place ten years earlier. Although,
9 if the new collator had had the time and the interest in
10 this subject area, then it is possible that a private
11 project could have been completed."
12 Is what you are saying essentially that this was
13 a private project?
14 A. I think I have made that very clear and I think I would
15 agree with him entirely. I think he supports my
16 position.
17 Q. Would you have kept a copy, then, of your report, just
18 in your own desk at 121-section?
19 A. No.
20 Q. Where would you have kept it?
21 A. It would have gone in the filing system. It may well
22 have been, as I have said earlier, it may well have been
23 archived.
24 Q. Could we next have, please, on the left of the screen
25 KI2.3 and on the right KZ1.1. I want to move on now,
1 please, to your next post as a member of the force
2 research unit. In paragraph 6 of your first statement,
3 as we can see on the left, you say:
4 "During 1982" you were posted to north detachment
5 Force Research Office as a collator. Was it in fact in
6 the autumn of 1983 that you were posted there?
7 A. My recollection of the date is earlier, but I am not
8 going to argue for a few months. I think my, my
9 documents would suggest it was some time in 1982. But,
10 as again, I did -- the collator that I eventually took
11 over, there was an overlap between me and him which was
12 agreed by -- and I will not name him -- by the officer
13 commanding 121. So as that when I moved into
14 FRO(North), I effectively engineered my own posting
15 there because of my knowledge within 121.
16 Q. Have you seen a copy of a letter that was written last
17 week by the Ministry of Defence, confirming some details
18 of your service history?
19 A. I have, yes. I do not have a copy with me --
20 Q. I will put it on the screen. We have it at KI2.43.
21 That is a letter that the MoD has provided, obviously on
22 the basis of checking their records; would you
23 disagree --
24 A. I would disagree with it in large parts. Well, we will
25 not argue about the couple of months for the actual
1 posting of such where there was an overlap, but if you
2 move on to the next page -- it is part of the paragraph:
3 "From 1984 to 1987 Mr Ingram was employed in
4 Great Britain. This tour included a six-month
5 deployment abroad".
6 What he also should have put is:
7 "Mr Ingram was also seconded to the FRU" or should I
8 say to SIW for the specific job of relocating two agents
9 who had been exposed, primarily because I had been
10 involved in the handling of them whilst I was on my
11 first tour. One of them is still alive and one is dead.
12 One of them is willing to give evidence to that effect.
13 So factually, you know, as -- it says "Ministry of
14 Defence", it should actually be Ministry of
15 Disinformation.
16 Q. In effect you say that a piece of information has been
17 omitted, in that there was a time between 1984 and 1987
18 when you were involved, when you were working in
19 Northern Ireland?
20 A. No, I was not working in Northern Ireland, I was working
21 on the mainland, but in the resettlement of those
22 exposed agents.
23 Q. You were employed in Great Britain, but you were
24 employed in Great Britain on a matter connected with
25 Northern Ireland.
1 A. I was employed by SIW who are the co-sponsors of the FRU
2 and I was working for the FRU assets which had been
3 exposed. Therefore their document there is selective at
4 best.
5 Q. Can we read on; is there anything else you disagree with
6 on this page?
7 A. No, I think we will --
8 Q. If you go to the next page, KI2.44.
9 A. I remember the date is December. It is probably about
10 six or seven weeks short of the three-year tour,
11 I think. You actually undertake a two-year tour and
12 I was granted an extension because they were -- it
13 suited me and it suited them because they did not have
14 very many experienced handlers at the time, there was
15 a shortage and so I agreed to a year's extension, on the
16 basis that, again, I engineered a posting to the
17 Ministry of Defence to a good EPV post which was an
18 Enhanced Positive Vetting post.
19 Q. Go back, if we may, to KI2.43. Is it right that during
20 the course of your first posting to FRU, you were
21 promoted to corporal?
22 A. That is true.
23 Q. May we have on the left-hand side of the screen KI2.3
24 again, please. On the right-hand side of the screen --
25 again, please respect his anonymity -- we have the
1 statement of Officer Z who --
2 A. I know the identity and I will not reveal it.
3 Q. He explains in paragraph 1 where he fits in. He says he
4 was posted to FRO(North) in 1982 and left in 1985?
5 A. Well I actually disagree with him on that as well.
6 I think he is mistaken because when I actually took --
7 when I was posted there, my boss, who is now deceased,
8 who died on the Chinook, was not this individual.
9 Q. You think this individual arrived some time after 1982?
10 A. I do not think, I know he did, or at least he, he
11 arrived after me.
12 Q. Then he says --
13 A. In fact, if I may just interject there, I actually have
14 a photograph of me, him, and my boss who died on his
15 hand-over in the offices in FRU with the brigadier at
16 the going-away reception. Therefore, I must have been
17 there before he came.
18 Q. Then he says:
19 "The FRO(North) was one of two subdivisions of
20 HQ West detachment which was part of the Force Research
21 Unit."
22 Would you please be careful in your evidence today
23 not to reveal any details about the whereabouts of
24 premises occupied by FRU. So, without saying where they
25 were located, is it correct that FRO(North) was one of
1 two subdivisions of HQ West detachment?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The next thing is this: if we look at paragraph 6 of
4 your statement on the left of the screen --
5 A. Can I just interject? What he does not say, though, is
6 I actually worked for both offices because I had
7 experiences of Derry. Therefore, if they were
8 short-handed, I would be asked to be involved in an
9 operation with Derry. Although I was working in, let us
10 say, the southern detachment for that period, I would
11 still be requested, on the occasion, to go north and
12 also I used to cover Christmas parties. Therefore,
13 every operator could leave and I would then be in sole
14 charge of FRO(North).
15 Q. Is what you are saying that you, at different times,
16 would have worked at FRO(North) and FRO(South) or
17 whatever --
18 A. That is right, yes, yes. It is west and north. Let us
19 just call it west and north.
20 Q. He talks about two subdivisions of HQ West detachment?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And then he talks about the officer commanding HQ West
23 detachment. Is the position that there are in fact
24 three headquarters or three offices: there is
25 Headquarters West detachment and then beneath that there
1 are two different subdivisions?
2 A. That is accurate.
3 Q. And I have understood you to say that at different times
4 you worked in each of the two subdivisions?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you also work at HQ West detachment or did you only
7 work in the two subdivisions?
8 A. No, let me explain: FRO(North) is Derry. FRO(West) is
9 another, is another location, okay. Headquarters is in
10 Derry. It is a matter of 50 yards away from FRO(North).
11 So it is within the brigade headquarters. That is not
12 giving anything away because he is ... okay?
13 Q. If we look back to paragraph 6 on the left-hand side of
14 the screen, you say, at the end of the paragraph:
15 "All intelligence generated and received from
16 outside agencies was seen by all members of the small
17 office (numbering approximately 10 members) and
18 circulated by the office clerk."
19 Once again his name has been blanked out. If we
20 look at what Officer Z is saying at the end of his
21 paragraph 1, he refers to that same clerk who he calls
22 Clerk XX. He says that he was one of the clerks based
23 at Headquarters West detachment and was not the office
24 clerk at FRO(North).
25 A. No.
1 Q. You have explained that --
2 A. Can I interject there, let us just bring a little bit of
3 reality to this: this individual, who we will call
4 Clerk XX, swore an affidavit in connection with an
5 offence under the Official Secrets Act which my legal
6 team are in possession of which he swears that he was
7 the clerk in FRO(North) and that the material that was
8 alleged to be a breach, that I was one of only a few
9 people who had knowledge of it and that he outlines his
10 role as that clerk.
11 Therefore, he did work in support of Westette at
12 a later time, but during this period that clerk was in
13 FRO(North). May I also interject, which is something
14 that Officer Z has forgotten, we were also augmented by
15 a second clerk, a lady, who I again will not name and
16 she became our clerk and he became Headquarters clerk.
17 Q. In any event, as you have said earlier, if I understood
18 you correctly, Headquarters West detachment and
19 FRO(North) were very close to each other?
20 A. Absolutely.
21 Q. Again in your paragraph 6 on the left you describe the
22 nature of the job that you had. You say:
23 "This job involved providing analysis and collating
24 all intelligence reports generated by the handlers after
25 their meetings with north detachment FRU agents.".
1 Then you identify your detachment commander and you
2 go on to say:
3 "This new job involved a requirement to read and
4 assimilate the information of intelligence value both
5 current and historical generated by the detachment
6 agents. This intelligence was both contemporary and
7 historical. Much of the historical information was
8 generated from the many 'screening' reports carried out
9 by the local unit handlers or FINCOs".
10 Was there something you wanted to say?
11 A. Yes, there is. There is an obvious mistake there, if
12 you can see it. If you read my paragraph 6:
13 "During 1982 I was posted to north detachment", and
14 then I go on to say "my detachment commander being Major
15 deceased".
16 One of us is lying, aint there. Either I am lying
17 or he is lying. Now, obviously he is not the guy -- the
18 deceased guy has not wrote that witness statement
19 because he is long gone. Now, he must have come after
20 me so if you can see how it has only just occurred to me
21 now. Do you understand what I am saying?
22 Q. No, I am afraid I do not?
23 A. "During 1982 I was posted to north detachment FRU as
24 a collator. My detachment commander being Major.." who
25 is now dead.
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. This gentleman, Officer Z, who I maintain came after the
3 event, okay, he does not --
4 Q. Officer Z is not the individual obviously who--
5 A. He is dead, the point being that, if he says "I was
6 posted to FRU (North) in 1982 and left in 1985"; do you
7 understand the context, therefore ...
8 Q. In the passage I read out, you refer to FINCOs. Can you
9 confirm that means Field Intelligence Non-Commissioned
10 Officer?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. If we go on in the statement to Officer Z, please, to
13 page 2, and paragraph 2, he says that he recalls you
14 being posted to FRO(North). Then he goes on to describe
15 what the role of a collator was. He says:
16 "At that time the main role of a collator was to
17 work in support of the agent-handlers within the unit.
18 The handlers would task the collators to bring together
19 all of the relevant information from a range of
20 documentary sources about the agent they were handling
21 as well as any other confirmatory information which
22 might assist the handler in continuing to work with his
23 agent. In this material the collator would probably
24 include any information that the agent had previously
25 provided to the handler."
1 Is that a fair summary of the work that you were
2 doing as a collator in FRO(North)?
3 A. Yes, but he misses out, because of manpower deficiencies
4 we also acted on cover and that is the reason why they
5 instituted the course to enable us to act as cover.
6 Again, I became involved, on a co-handling basis, with
7 some of the agents that I have alluded to which were
8 exposed and had to be resettled and because of my
9 experience I had to go with them.
10 Q. When an agent-handler asked you to assemble information
11 about an agent, as Officer Z describes in this
12 paragraph, was the information that you assembled all
13 put into the agent's file or was it put somewhere else?
14 A. It is put both into the file in the form of a contact
15 form and it is then subject to whether it goes on to
16 a military intelligence source report, depending upon
17 his release, whether the information is released or we
18 keep it ourselves, depending how sensitive the
19 information is.
20 Q. What Officer Z seems to be describing is a process
21 where, if you look at the third line:
22 "The handlers would task the collators to bring
23 together information from a range of documentary
24 sources."
25 A. Yes, I concur with that.
1 Q. Is that not a process of going to look at intelligence
2 reports or source reports or whatever it might be to see
3 what you could find out about a particular agent?
4 A. No, not about -- let us get rid of this distinction --
5 an agent is a professional source; so he is the person
6 who is employed by the agency, okay? So if the source
7 comes in and gives material which is of intelligence
8 value, then we are tasked by the handler, as the
9 collator to go and either confirm or get some collateral
10 for the information that he has provided and that is why
11 I was explaining to you about the intelligence cycle.
12 It is the analysis, it is the job that the collator does
13 which turns the information into intelligence.
14 Now, what he is saying there is correct, I have no
15 problem with that at all.
16 Q. Having been asked to go and see if you could find any
17 collateral, what would you do, would you produce
18 a document of your own which set out the results of that
19 or would you...
20 A. What would happen, the handler would produce the MISR
21 and then we would then write the analysis comment and
22 any, what we call P references. So, for instance, again
23 let us use Martin McGuinness. If Martin McGuinness is
24 used within the text of the document,
25 Martin McGuinness's unique P number would be assigned.
1 There may well be 50 people mentioned in this, there
2 would be 50 references, so they are all cross-referenced
3 to each file.
4 Q. You would write the comment and would that comment then
5 go on to the agent's file?
6 A. Yes, a copy of the document would then be placed upon
7 the file.
8 Q. Then Officer Z continues in paragraph 3:
9 "The collator would rely on sources from both open
10 and closed documents, ie information direct from the
11 agent's file which was located at FRO(North), from
12 screening reports, from the SB50s, from contact reports,
13 from information stored at HQFRU and from information in
14 the public domain".
15 Do you agree with that?
16 A. No, I would not draw from screen reports because
17 screening had ceased well before that period so there
18 was no screening in operation.
19 Q. Apart from that, do you agree with that sentence?
20 A. I will just read it again (Pause). Yes, it was a matter
21 of bringing all the agencies together.
22 Q. Would hard copies of SB50s have been available at
23 FRO(North) or would you have got them from the computer
24 system?
25 A. Both; you do have -- again our own robin system is in
1 operation because we also have a manual collation system
2 in the FRU -- at that time we did.
3 Q. Then he goes on to deal with screening reports and
4 quotes part of your statement, saying that much of the
5 historical information was generated from the many
6 screening reports. Is your evidence now that screening
7 reports had ceased to be created by the time you were at
8 FRO(North)?
9 A. I think if you read my evidence, I refer to screening
10 reports in the context of making a recruitment and that
11 we did not have to apply to the RUC Special Branch for
12 permission to recruit. If there had been any
13 information imparted at a screening, now, that is
14 a completely different subject.
15 Q. What you said a minute or two ago was that you would not
16 draw from screening reports because screening had ceased
17 well before that period?
18 A. That is right.
19 Q. So there was no screening in operation?
20 A. That is right, but that is not to say that we do not
21 hold screening reports because, as I have said, if you
22 have been subjected to screening, 20 years previously
23 and we have still got that report, then we do not need
24 permission by the RUC Special Branch to go and recruit
25 that individual.
1 Q. That is why I asked you whether your evidence now is
2 that screening reports had ceased to be created by the
3 time you were at FRO(North), in other words, the
4 screening reports were historical documents; is that the
5 position or not?
6 A. Screening reports, from memory, went out in the late
7 1970s.
8 Q. Right. So they were historical documents?
9 A. They were, but I would not -- no, his actual reference
10 to it is not correct. As a collator I would not refer
11 to a screening report. I would have no reason to go and
12 page through screening reports because they are not
13 input on to 3702. The only way that I would go and get
14 a screening report is in the context of making
15 a recruitment.
16 LORD SAVILLE: Sorry to interrupt. Mr Ingram, sorry, could
17 you explain to me what you mean by: in the context of
18 making a recruitment.
19 A. Okay. Well, fundamentally, sir, before you can make
20 a recruitment, before you identify a person who is --
21 fits the criteria of somebody you would like to employ,
22 you have to, um, overcome a major obstacle, which is, as
23 it was at the time, the RUC Special Branch who actively
24 played out a policy where they did not like the FRU to
25 recruit new sources.
1 Now a means of actually not having to go through
2 that process was, if the individual was either a past or
3 serving soldier, as in the case of Brian Nelson as an
4 example, or if there had been screening reports, then
5 you did not need to go through the formal procedure.
6 Therefore there was a requirement to hold those
7 documents which, at some stage maybe 20 or 30 years time
8 hence you could say -- you could basically outmanoeuvre
9 the RUC.
10 MR ROXBURGH: If we look, Mr Ingram, on the left side of the
11 screen at your paragraph 6 once again, you -- can I ask
12 the technicians to take off all the arrows, please --
13 say that your posting to north detachment FRU required
14 the collator to be trained at Repton Manor, Ashford, in
15 the sort of working on the ground as cover on pick-ups
16 and to be involved in the day-to-day running of agents
17 and, occasionally in the role of co-handler."
18 If we look at what Officer Z says about that, on the
19 next page of his statement, KZ1.3, in paragraph 5 he
20 says:
21 "Martin Ingram states that before being posted to
22 FRO(North)"?
23 A. No, I do not say that, where do I say before --
24 Q. Let me read the paragraph and then we will deal with
25 what you have to say about it:
1 "Martin Ingram states that before being posted to
2 FRO(North) he attended and passed a special course to
3 enable him to work as a collator and occasionally as
4 a co-handler. From memory, this was a one-week course
5 which was designed to provide an individual with the
6 basic skills to work as a collator and to provide
7 support to an agent-handler. It did not qualify the
8 future collator to run agents nor act as a co-handler."
9 Now, do you say that you attended a course which
10 qualified you to work as either an agent-handler or
11 a co-handler?
12 A. I do not -- I cannot see in my statement where I said
13 before I was posted to FRO(North); I do not see it.
14 Q. No, what you say is:
15 "This posting to FRU (North) required the collator
16 to be trained" you are quite right you do not say
17 whether that was before or after you went to FRO(North).
18 A. So in that instance -- let us take it, no, from memory
19 I think it was a fortnight's course, but again what
20 officer, was it Z, what Officer Z is saying is
21 incorrect. Primarily because of the numbers, and I do
22 not want to actually reveal the numbers, presumably you
23 do not want me to?
24 Q. No, I do not.
25 A. Because of the drain on manpower and the number of
1 informants we ran, we could be -- we could be running
2 three meets simultaneously in periods of high intense.
3 Therefore, we did not have the manpower and, whether he
4 liked it or not and whether it conformed to rules and
5 regulations, that happened and, as I have said
6 previously, a number -- certainly one living agent is
7 prepared to testify that I acted as a co-handler with an
8 individual, again I will not name and I was then, as
9 I said, I was later brought from a security section in
10 England. Prior to me actually attending the FRU course
11 in 1987 to undertake the resettlement of that individual
12 and I would only have done that because I had a working
13 relationship with that individual and I had an empathy
14 with him and that is why I was used in that role.
15 His, his accurate is false -- his testimony is false
16 in that respect.
17 Q. In paragraph 7 of your statement on the left you say:
18 "North detachment FRU stored all the source material
19 generated by FINCOs/local unit handlers and others prior
20 to the formation of the FRU in 1980."
21 Is that right?
22 A. Yes, that is right.
23 Q. Again, let us see what Officer Z says. If we go to
24 KZ1.4 on the right. He says:
25 "It is incorrect for Martin Ingram to state that all
1 source material generated by FINCOs prior to the
2 formation of the FRU in 1980 would have been stored at
3 FRO(North). I say this firstly because FRO(North) did
4 not exist prior to the formation of the FRU and, second,
5 any relevant intelligence information obtained prior to
6 the formation of the FRU would have been retained at HQ
7 Northern Ireland at Lisburn."
8 What do you say about that?
9 A. Well, what I say about that is: the Army was running
10 a network of informers and it was administered by the
11 FINCO and the local agent-handlers. Now, powers-to-be
12 decided that the intelligence corps would take a more
13 hands-on approach and the formation of the FRU was
14 brought about in 1980.
15 Now those same agents which were running by local
16 handlers and the FINCOs were not suddenly just demobbed
17 one day and then a magic wand was employed to bring in
18 30 or 40 touts the following day by the FRU, they are
19 the same beast.
20 So one day they worked for one employer; the
21 following day they worked for a new employer, entitled
22 the FRU. Consequently the paperwork generated prior to
23 1980 which supported the running of that agent was
24 transferred to the FRU.
25 Now, at best I think he has misunderstood my
1 statement. At worst he is trying to, well ...
2 Q. Are you able to say from your own knowledge that you saw
3 source material of the kind that you are referring to in
4 paragraph 7, stored at FRO(North) when you were working
5 there?
6 A. Mr Roxburgh, let us -- I will use -- rather than --
7 3018, let us use the code names, okay, 3018 had been
8 running for many years including and during the events
9 of Bloody Sunday. His file, when the FRU was formed,
10 was passed to the FRU. Therefore that file was relevant
11 and any material that he generated previous to me and
12 the other handlers, who were suddenly asked to run that
13 agent.
14 Therefore the FRU could not have existed without
15 that database. They suddenly did not just turn up in
16 the middle of Bogside: "Excuse me, would you work for
17 us?".
18 Q. Was the answer to my previous question: yes?
19 A. The answer simplistically is: yes.
20 Q. KI2.40, please, could we have that on the screen. This
21 is the third statement that you made. In paragraph 4
22 you say:
23 "When I moved to FRU in Derry I did more work on
24 Bloody Sunday. It was the most important event that had
25 occurred in the city. When you saw an agent for the
1 first time it was one of the topics that would always
2 come up."
3 Are you saying there that when you were serving in
4 FRU you did some specific piece of work on Bloody Sunday
5 like a project or something like that or are you saying
6 really that it was just a subject that always came up
7 when dealing with agents, or what exactly are you
8 saying?
9 A. I am saying two things really: when you have plenty of
10 time on your hands and you are surfing the web and just
11 trawling the system to see what is around, basically
12 I would have put in Bloody Sunday. So I did the same as
13 what I did in 121; the same as I would do if I put
14 Martin McGuinness in there just to see what was new and
15 the other thing which is when you speak to an agent,
16 when you are actually in with an agent, um, especially
17 as a new, you know, new kid on the bloke, one of the
18 first things to gain a grasp of the area, is to get
19 a feel, is to talk about events which have happened in
20 the past.
21 Q. Looking at Officer Z again, paragraph 8, he says:
22 "From my recollection, FRO(North) did not keep any
23 specific files on the events of Bloody Sunday."
24 Is that true or not?
25 A. That is true, that is accurate.
1 Q. "Any such files would have been of no current
2 intelligence value. Comments about Bloody Sunday might
3 have been reported within contact forms but these
4 comments would have been held on an individual agent's
5 file. During his tour with FRO(North) Martin Ingram
6 might have read comments from particular agents about
7 their knowledge of what happened on that day, although
8 these are likely to have been incidental to what the
9 agent was actually reporting on."
10 Is that paragraph fair comment or not?
11 A. It is. It is fair comment and that is the point that
12 I have made consistently: that there are documents which
13 are relevant to this Inquiry, or certainly I have not
14 seen but presumably Mr Roxburgh, have those documents
15 been delivered?
16 Q. KI2.4, please on the left --
17 A. Excuse me, before I can go on really I need to
18 understand the context of that because you have asked me
19 a question. I am asking you: were those documents
20 delivered up?
21 Q. Mr Ingram, you are here to give evidence and to answer
22 my questions, not to engage in debates about what
23 documents have or have not been produced.
24 A. They are relevant to my testimony. I will take it no,
25 then?
1 LORD SAVILLE: Could you answer the questions at the moment,
2 Mr Ingram, you will have an opportunity to say anything
3 that may assist the Tribunal at a later stage.
4 MR ROXBURGH: KI2.4 on the left, paragraph 8 of your
5 statement, talking about your service in FRU.
6 "During this tour I read many intelligence documents
7 and I cannot recall any which suggested that
8 Martin McGuinness was involved in the firing of a weapon
9 on Bloody Sunday."
10 If you are able to answer this question yes or no
11 please do so and please take care, in any event, not to
12 say anything that might disclose sensitive
13 information: was there, so far as you know in the early
14 1980s, any particular reason why FRU should have been
15 concerned to obtain information concerning the events of
16 Bloody Sunday, some ten or so years previously?
17 A. No, but there would be in relation to Martin McGuinness.
18 Q. In general terms what would the reason in relation to
19 Martin McGuinness be?
20 A. I do not think that would be a quite proper answer
21 to ...
22 Q. Again, if you can answer this question yes or no please
23 do so: if the Security Service had obtained information
24 from one of its agents in 1984 to the effect that
25 Martin McGuinness had fired a weapon on Bloody Sunday,
1 would there have been any need at all for that piece of
2 information to be disseminated to you?
3 A. I would have expected to have seen a document if --
4 which I have seen the one that has been generated, the
5 source report -- I would have expected to have seen that
6 and it would have been a topic of conversation,
7 certainly within the intelligence community.
8 Q. Would you have expected to see it simply because you
9 expected to be kept informed about all matters of that
10 kind or did you have some particular reason for
11 expecting to see that sort of document?
12 A. Mr McGuinness is probably one of the two most prominent
13 people in Northern Ireland and consequently anything to
14 do with him, in your area, is relevant.
15 Q. Reading on in your paragraph 8 you say:
16 "Indeed, I remember seeing documents that gave
17 details of Mr McGuinness's movements indicating that he
18 had been the subject of surveillance during the day of
19 the march."
20 Are these the same documents that you were talking
21 about earlier?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Sighting reports relating to Mr McGuinness?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Can you remember, did you see those documents in the
1 computer database or in hard copies in FRU's files, or
2 what?
3 A. I saw them at 121.
4 Q. And not at FRU?
5 A. And not a FRU, no.
6 Q. Is it not the position that surveillance reports from
7 any form of special surveillance unit would not have
8 been held in FRU at all?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. May we go, then, to KI2.41, please, your third
11 statement. In paragraph 7 what is said, is this:
12 "At FRU I saw documents relating to
13 Martin McGuinness's activities on the day, both before
14 and after the march. They related to what he was doing
15 and who he was with."
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is that right so far?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. "I saw none that suggested that he had a machine-gun in
20 his hand or fired a shot."
21 Is that right?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. "I think that they were surveillance reports not source
24 reports."
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Did you see surveillance reports when you were at FRU in
2 relation to McGuinness?
3 A. No, surveillance covers a multitude of sins. I did not
4 say surveillance carried out by a specialised unit.
5 Surveillance is carried out by the Army from the
6 observation points, Masonic, off the Derry Walls.
7 Q. What you are talking about...
8 A. I am talking about in the military context, Mr Roxburgh.
9 You know, if you would like me to explain it a little
10 bit clearer, you only have to ask.
11 Q. I will come to that. Let me ask you this: are you
12 talking about what one might describe as sighting
13 reports by Regular Army units?
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. Is there anything else you would like to explain about
16 that?
17 A. No, other than there would be photography as well from
18 that location.
19 Q. How do you know that?
20 A. It is a Standard Operating Practice, I have done it
21 myself.
22 Q. How do you know what was Standard Operating Practice
23 in January 1972?
24 A. Well, it is Standard Operating Practice from -- since
25 the year formation that you would want -- if you are
1 engaged in a cover operation or patrol, you would want
2 to take photography. I cannot imagine a scenario where
3 you would not have used cameras; cameras were invented
4 then.
5 LORD SAVILLE: I am not quite understanding, Mr Ingram,
6 I think it is probably my fault, forgive me. When we
7 look at paragraph 7, as Mr Roxburgh asked you to do, you
8 say, about the fourth sentence:
9 "I think they were surveillance reports".
10 Surveillance reports of what nature, I think you did
11 explain this, I am not sure I understood you?
12 A. If you know the typography of Derry and the walls and
13 the vantage point that is created from the Masonic --
14 not the walls, but from there -- certainly from within
15 the context of the Bogside, offers a fantastic view and
16 surveillance of individuals with night scopes and, and
17 technical kits allows good coverage; that is a form of
18 surveillance.
19 LORD SAVILLE: I follow that. If one looks at the end of
20 this paragraph, perhaps I am misunderstanding you, it
21 says:
22 " I do not think it would have been feasible to see
23 it from the Derry Wall, Masonic ... "?
24 A. What I am saying there is it is from the observation
25 post. I have not made it clear, then, it is my fault.
1 What I am saying there is in affect -- I am, the
2 question that was put to me by Mr Tate from memory was
3 an amalgamation of my knowledge of surveillance. In the
4 first part I am talking about, when I was talking about
5 the Army surveillance, in the second part I think I am
6 relating, I would have to see the context and what the
7 notes are by my legal team who were present, but I think
8 that I am referring to the surveillance report in 121.
9 MR ROXBURGH: You start off in the paragraph talking about
10 what documents you saw when you were at FRU; is that
11 right?
12 A. That is right.
13 Q. And you say that you think they were surveillance
14 reports, but you explain that by saying that you mean
15 sighting reports by Regular Army units?
16 A. That is right, yes, yes.
17 Q. Then you say:
18 "McGuinness was being targeted. If you have
19 a surveillance unit deployed as they were then it would
20 make sense for McGuinness to be a prime target."
21 A. In that context I am referring to the document in 121
22 and, as I say, I would have to see the -- how the
23 question was posed to me, but that is my recollection of
24 how I, how I delivered that statement.
25 Q. So --
1 A. The first part of it, let me just explain. The first
2 part of it I am referring to sighting reports and
3 surveillance by regular or close observation point; do
4 you agree with that; do you understand where I am coming
5 from?
6 Q. Yes, I follow that.
7 A. I think there were surveillance reports, not source
8 reports, full stop.
9 McGuinness -- then there was a follow-on question
10 I think, where McGuinness was being told:
11 "If your surveillance unit deployed" I think he was
12 then going on to question me about the MRF and that sort
13 of thing.
14 Q. Right, those are the documents --
15 A. This is a narrative statement in that it was taken by
16 Mr Tate, typing it down as I was speaking it.
17 MR ROXBURGH: Can we go to ...
18 LORD SAVILLE: Are we moving on to a new topic?
19 MR ROXBURGH: Yes.
20 LORD SAVILLE: I think it may be a convenient time to stop.
21 We will come back to this at 12.50. Mr Ingram, I say
22 this to all the witnesses: please do not discuss the
23 evidence you are giving until you have finished giving
24 it.
25 (12.00 pm)
1 (The Short Adjournment)
2 (12.50 pm)
3 MR ROXBURGH: Could we have on the screen, please, page
4 KI2.4.
5 Mr Ingram, this is the paragraph from your first
6 statement we were looking at before the adjournment, in
7 which you describe some of the material that you saw
8 during your first tour as a member of FRU. We have
9 dealt with the documents concerning Mr McGuinness's
10 movements.
11 In the next sentence you say:
12 "I can recall that there was information of
13 intelligence value received prior to the march from the
14 both Official and Provisional IRA agents that there was
15 no intent to undertake military activity during the
16 march."
17 Are the agents that you are talking about there,
18 should we understand, Army agents operating within the
19 IRA in January 1972, or is it something else?
20 A. It is both.
21 Q. What kind of documents did you see that information in?
22 A. I saw that in the contact forms and, and -- which is the
23 record of discussions between the agents and the handler
24 and those MISRs and SB50 -- I think it was an SB50,
25 I would not swear to the SB50s.
1 Q. You go on to say:
2 "It is also true to say that there were many reports
3 subsequent to the day which gave conflicting accounts of
4 the events, for example, about shots fired at troops
5 during the march."
6 A. That is correct.
7 Q. Again, are you there talking about reports from Army
8 agents or informants, or police, or both, or what?
9 A. Primarily Army.
10 Q. Are those documents that you saw on the files of people
11 who were current agents at the time when you were
12 working at FRU or --
13 A. And some historical ones which had been archived, ie
14 some inactive agents. We keep the dormant agents as
15 well on file.
16 Q. Where were the files on dormant agents kept?
17 A. Within the force research unit, and there is also
18 another category, which is "casual contacts".
19 Q. You say those files on dormant agents were kept in
20 FRO(North) or in HQ West detachment or --
21 A. No, in the actual handler's office, FRO(North).
22 Q. You do recall that some of those documents referred to
23 shots being fired at troops during the march?
24 A. Well, their accounts, contemporaneous accounts from
25 their agents on the ground.
1 Q. Then you say:
2 "The collated documents which I read would leave the
3 reader with the distinct impression that there were no
4 shots fired at the troops prior to the troops opening
5 fire."
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Are you still talking about the same kinds of documents
8 here?
9 A. Yes, I am talking about my -- in my overall view of the
10 documents.
11 Q. Your overall view of the documents you saw at FRO(North)
12 or --
13 A. No, in its totality.
14 Q. In its totality. Then you say:
15 "It is also my recollection that I saw no official
16 documentation suggesting that dead bodies had been
17 secretly buried across the border in the Republic,
18 although there were many reports of the wounded being
19 treated in the south for wounds received during the
20 march."
21 Did you see those reports about people being treated
22 in the south for wounds received during the march when
23 you were at FRO(North) or when you were at 121
24 intelligence section?
25 A. I cannot recall.
1 Q. You have used the expression "official documentation."
2 Just to be clear, should we understand that you never
3 saw any intelligence material at all that you remember
4 to suggest that dead bodies had been secretly buried
5 across the border?
6 A. I make the distinction, the official documentation, as
7 opposed to an open source.
8 Q. Official documentation would cover any secret or
9 confidential material?
10 A. (Witness nodding)
11 Q. Could we keep this page on the screen, please, and put
12 alongside it page KZ1.5. This is Officer Z's statement
13 again. In paragraph 10 he is dealing with what you have
14 said in the paragraph we have just been looking at?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. He says:
17 "Later in this paragraph Martin Ingram recalls two
18 possible facts: first, that he had seen intelligence
19 from agents within both the Official and Provisional IRA
20 that there was no intent to undertake military activity
21 during the march; and second that there were conflicting
22 accounts of the events on the day such as shots being
23 fired at troops during the march. It is my view that if
24 such intelligence existed on files held at FRO (North)
25 Martin Ingram would only have seen it on an agent's file
1 or he might have heard it from a casual contact or
2 possibly during the debrief of an agent-handler after
3 his meeting with his agent or when providing support to
4 a handler at meetings with low level agents."
5 Do you accept what he says in that sentence or not?
6 A. I am a little bit confused in truth, I had not actually
7 seen the significance of what he is saying, but I refer
8 you to the bottom of the paragraph, he says:
9 "At this meeting with an agent or when providing
10 support to a handler at meetings with low level agents."
11 Is he meaning I am actually discussing with the
12 agent; is he saying I am actually communicating with the
13 agent?
14 Q. We will have to ask him on Wednesday what he means by
15 that?
16 A. Fine.
17 Q. Generally speaking, are those the sorts of means by
18 which you could have obtained access to intelligence of
19 this kind during your job at FRO(North).
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Going back to your statement on the other side of the
22 screen, at paragraph 9 you say, this:
23 "There are a number of points to bear in mind when
24 assessing the intelligence generated by agents working
25 for the Security Forces prior to, during and after
1 Bloody Sunday. The civil rights march was a major event
2 with a reasonable lead-in period, that is to say, agents
3 from all parts of the 32 counties would have been asked
4 to attend."
5 Can you explain, please, what you mean by saying
6 that, "agents from all parts of the 32 counties would
7 have been asked to attend"?
8 A. Certainly. Am I allowed to explain it?
9 Q. As long as you do not go into any sensitive matters. Do
10 you think there is a difficulty in answering the
11 question, without going into sensitive matters?
12 A. There could well be, but I will try my best and keep
13 within the bounds of sensibilities.
14 Q. In that case, before I ask you to give a general
15 explanation, can I just try and clear up a couple of
16 points: is what you are saying here that the Security
17 Forces would have tasked agents from all parts of the 32
18 counties to attend, or are you saying that the civil
19 rights organisers would have asked people to attend from
20 all over the 32 counties, and some of those people would
21 in fact have been agents?
22 A. Both.
23 Q. Insofar as you are saying that agents from all parts of
24 the 32 counties would have been asked to attend by the
25 Security Forces, would it be fair to say that you make
1 that statement by reference to your own experience of
2 what happened in the 1980s when you were serving?
3 A. No, some of the documentation which the reference
4 numbers would identify from which office they generated
5 from.
6 Q. You mean some of the documents that you saw in the 1980s
7 carried reference numbers?
8 A. Yes, which --
9 Q. Which identified --
10 A. Which did not originate in FRO(North).
11 Q. Did they originate from some other Army unit?
12 A. Yes, they originated from Belfast.
13 Q. What did that tell you, the fact that the reference
14 number was a Belfast reference number, for example?
15 A. Well, that tells you that somebody from Belfast has
16 travelled and he has been debriefed by his handler in
17 Belfast.
18 Q. Are you talking here about police documents or Army
19 documents, or both?
20 A. No, no, you cannot tell with an SB50, at least I cannot.
21 Q. An SB50 itself is a police document?
22 A. I cannot tell whether it originated from a Derry
23 division or it originated from a Belfast division, but
24 I can with a MISR.
25 Q. You were able to see, from looking at MISRs, that some
1 of them related to sources, is this right, who had come
2 from other parts of the 32 counties?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Is it an overstatement to refer to agents from all parts
5 of the 32 counties or do you really mean that?
6 A. I am saying that to -- because it is feasible that
7 people from all Ireland attended and, therefore, if
8 there are assets in Armagh, Newry as well as in Belfast,
9 then you would ask them to attend.
10 Q. It is one thing to say what is feasible --
11 A. What I said was from all parts of 32 -- that is an SOP.
12 I go on to say:
13 "It would have been a Standard Operating Practice to
14 request photography."
15 What I am saying is to try and disguise the fact --
16 if you want me to point out that people from Belfast
17 have travelled -- I have tried to be a little bit, um,
18 fair and say that, you know -- the actual documents
19 I saw did suggest Belfast, but rather than say just
20 purely Belfast, I have said "32 counties," to try and
21 disguise the fact.
22 Q. Is this the position: you saw documents that you related
23 to Belfast and in your statement, in order to avoid
24 singling out Belfast, you put it more generally?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And said, "agents from all parts of the 32 counties"?
2 A. Yes. Obviously we do not have agents in Kerry.
3 Q. Just concentrating on the documents that you actually
4 saw, were they confined to Belfast?
5 A. They were, but I would expect if anybody was available
6 in south Armagh to have travelled, that they also would
7 have reported, but I cannot honestly say I saw any.
8 Q. Should we understand the next sentence in the same way,
9 when you say:
10 "To illustrate this point, agents from Belfast and
11 other areas of both the north and south travelled to
12 both participate and act as eyes and ears for the
13 Security Forces ..."
14 You know from documents that you have seen that
15 there were people from Belfast, but you do not actually
16 know about other areas; is that right?
17 A. Well, FRO(North) also covers Donegal and agents that
18 live in the Republic of Ireland, that is why I put north
19 and south.
20 Q. You did not see documents relating to Bloody Sunday that
21 carried references identifying the sources as coming
22 from anywhere other than Belfast and Derry itself; did
23 you?
24 A. That is right, that is right, but Derry controls Donegal
25 as well.
1 Q. Then you say:
2 "It would have been a Standard Operating Practice to
3 request photography by the agents of events or
4 'interesting' individuals for the Security Forces prior
5 to, during and after the march."
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Do you actually know whether or not that was Standard
8 Operating Practice in 1972?
9 A. The straight answer to that is: no, but I would be very
10 surprised if it did not take place.
11 Q. Would it not, at any rate in some circumstances, have
12 been rather unwise for an agent to draw attention to
13 himself by taking photographs of an interesting
14 individual?
15 A. That is the name of the game.
16 Q. If we look at paragraph 10 of your statement, you say:
17 "Within North Detachment FRU, we had two four- or
18 five-drawer cabinets which stored the contact forms for
19 all 'active' agents and a further two cabinets which
20 stored the files, including screening reports, for the
21 inactive agents who were either dead or had been stood
22 down."
23 I think you said something to the same effect
24 a little earlier in your evidence. Is it right that
25 screening reports were retained for people who had been
1 agents but were no longer agents, either because of
2 death or because they had been stood down?
3 A. Screening reports were kept for people who were of
4 interest.
5 Q. That would include, would it, agents who were either
6 dead or stood down?
7 A. If -- well, yes, but -- I make the reference to the
8 screening reports, as I explained previously, only as
9 a means of actually targeting somebody, but if that
10 agent has subsequently been recruited, then the first
11 document on his file would be the screening report.
12 Q. Then you say:
13 "The historical records were kept primarily for the
14 information contained within them which, from an
15 intelligence point of view, is invaluable."
16 What kinds of documents do you mean when you refer
17 to the "historical records"?
18 A. Exclusively to the agents. So his past records. For
19 instance, 3018 must have been 30 or 40 files.
20 Q. Then you say:
21 "In my experience, original source reports were
22 never destroyed."
23 A. No.
24 Q. "Such records might prove to be useful, even years after
25 they were produced."
1 A. Can you imagine the embarrassment if a source says to
2 you, "Do you remember I told Brian ten years ago," about
3 such and such a thing, and you cannot actually go and
4 recover that document? You lose all -- well, certainly
5 the agent would lose confidence in you and that is part
6 and parcel of the make-up of you as a handler. You have
7 got to engender confidence in him. He has to think
8 behind the scene there is an almighty powerful
9 organisation. He is wrong in that fact, but that is how
10 you have got to sow the seeds.
11 Q. If it is suggested that the reason why source reports
12 held at FRO(North) were not destroyed, is that the only
13 source reports that were held there were ones relating
14 to active agents; what do you say to that?
15 A. No, that is not true. An active -- a dormant agent can
16 be re-enacted, and I give you an example: 3018 was an
17 Official IRA source during this period that we are
18 discussing now; he was subsequently stood down for
19 a problem. He was re-enacted some years later and was
20 later responsible for the largest ever arms find on the
21 island of Ireland. If you had destroyed his files
22 previous to that, you would be starting back at ground
23 base zero, would you not?
24 Q. Officer Z, in paragraph 11, on the left of the screen,
25 says that he can:
1 "... confirm that FRO(North) had a number of
2 four-drawer cabinets which contained contact forms for
3 active agents as well as a cabinet holding general files
4 with obsolete screening reports in them."
5 We need not bother with the rest of that paragraph.
6 Paragraph 12 he says:
7 "However, files on inactive agents (ie agents no
8 longer used) or agents who had died were not kept at
9 FRO(North). Once an agent had become inactive or had
10 died, his file (with all the original documents on it)
11 would be sent back to HQFRU."
12 Is that not right?
13 A. No, he is reading from a textbook and it is not the
14 reality of life. You have got to remember that this
15 gentleman here, he probably only stepped into the
16 archive room once in his life; he would not normally be
17 there; it is not his office environment.
18 Q. Is the position that what he describes is what ought to
19 have happened, but that is not what happened in
20 practice?
21 A. Maybe.
22 Q. If we go on to the next page of his statement at
23 paragraph 13, he says that it is not right to say that
24 original source reports were never destroyed. That is
25 something that you have said a number of times?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Are you prepared to accept any possibility that you
3 might be wrong about that?
4 A. Do you want a one-word answer?
5 Q. If it can be done in one word, yes, please.
6 A. No.
7 Q. Let me ask you this: is it not the case that a great
8 many documents were destroyed after their contents had
9 been transferred into the computer system, on the
10 grounds that if they were in the computer you did not
11 need the original document?
12 A. No, you see, you are missing the point and so is the
13 officer: no contact form is entered on to any computer
14 system.
15 Q. What about source reports?
16 A. Well -- but they are also included in your files. The
17 source reports are organic to the file. So the source
18 report is part and parcel of the contact form. So there
19 is always a master record.
20 Q. What about SB50s?
21 A. I do not know, you will have to ask -- in relation to
22 what, though?
23 Q. Once their contents have been transferred into the
24 computer system, might they have been destroyed?
25 A. What happened with those, are we talking in FRO(North)
1 or are we talking in 121?
2 Q. Is this right, they would have been put into the
3 computer system as HQNI and also at FRO(North)?
4 A. No, FRO(North) would have had a hard copy sent to them,
5 only for matters which was in relation to Londonderry
6 and not into -- obviously they would only send Derry
7 matters which were relevant to Londonderry and matters
8 which went to Belfast would only refer to Belfast.
9 Q. If HQNI were sent SB50s and they were then logged into
10 the computer database at HQNI, might they then be
11 destroyed, having been put into the computer database?
12 A. No, I think the master one was kept. As Officer Y, is
13 it, the first one --
14 Q. Y is the first one, yes?
15 A. Officer Y explained, the original was photocopied 20
16 times and then cut and pasted. But my recollection is
17 that the original, because it was entered in MoD form
18 102 was returned, but again I could well stand to be
19 corrected on that.
20 Q. Could we go to KI2.6 on the right-hand side. At the
21 foot of the page you come on to dealing with your
22 dealings with Mr Liam Clarke and with Mr McCartney. If
23 we go over the page again, you say that one of the
24 reasons why you decided to supply certain information to
25 Mr McCartney was that you were suspicious that the Army
1 would not make a full disclosure of all relevant
2 documents to this Inquiry.
3 Was that just a general suspicion or was there some
4 particular reason for it?
5 A. It is born from experience.
6 Q. If we look at what you say in your later statement,
7 could we have KI2.41 on the left of the screen, please.
8 You say a little more about this in paragraph 6, where
9 you say:
10 "Given the full range of agencies that were
11 targeting the paramilitaries, it is inconceivable that
12 there was very little product generated on
13 Bloody Sunday. Therefore, I believe that there would
14 have been many documents created about Bloody Sunday.
15 The Army do not hand over documents unless pressure is
16 brought to bear on them: ask Sir John Stevens."
17 I do not want to get into the details of the Stevens
18 Inquiry at all. Is it the position that at least one
19 reason why you thought that the Army would not make
20 proper disclosure to this Inquiry is that, in your view,
21 they had not done so in the Stevens Inquiry?
22 A. I helped the Stevens Inquiry to locate a number of
23 documents, so that is born from experience, as I have
24 suggested to you.
25 Q. Is that essentially the reason why you were suspicious
1 that the Army was not going to make proper disclosure to
2 this Inquiry, or was there something more to it than
3 that?
4 A. No, it is born from experience.
5 Q. While we are on paragraph 6, on the right-hand side, you
6 refer to the full range of agencies that were targeting
7 the paramilitaries. What agencies are you talking
8 about?
9 A. Simplistically, or do you want me to go into detail?
10 Q. I would like you to answer the question in as much
11 detail as necessary?
12 A. Let us take the Army in the first instance. The Army
13 has a capacity to intercept signals, both on the C -- CB
14 was a big thing at that time, but also the Republic's
15 forces. You also have the surveillance units. You also
16 have the human -- HumInt, which is the source handling.
17 Q. Are you talking here just about Army agencies or are you
18 talking in paragraph 6 about other agencies?
19 A. No, I am talking about agencies plural there, about all
20 agencies, Box 500, SB, normal RUC.
21 Q. Just to understand that first sentence: are you talking
22 about agencies who were targeting the paramilitaries in
23 1972?
24 A. I am, yes.
25 Q. And you say that covers the Army, the Special Branch,
1 the regular police, Box 500; is that right?
2 A. Yes, signals, intercepts.
3 Q. Let us take the Army first: so far as the Army is
4 concerned, your evidence is that you actually saw,
5 during your time in Northern Ireland, a substantial
6 quantity of material containing Army intelligence about
7 Bloody Sunday; is that right?
8 A. That is right.
9 Q. So it goes a bit further on your account than simply
10 saying you believe there would have been many documents
11 created. You are saying, as far as the Army is
12 concerned, that you know that?
13 A. What I am saying to you there is -- I am being succinct
14 when I am saying, given the full range of agencies --
15 now this is in response to a question, this narrative
16 statement.
17 Now, what I have done is an accurate reflection as
18 I can. Now, given the full range of agencies which is
19 posed against that threat, in my experience it is
20 inconceivable that only a handful of documents would
21 have been handed over to this Inquiry.
22 Q. Is not your view that the RUC would have had only a very
23 limited amount of intelligence coverage in January 1972?
24 A. Define "limited"?
25 Q. Well, how would you characterise the --
1 A. Let me put it --
2 Q. -- quality and quantity of the intelligence coverage
3 that the RUC had in January 1972?
4 A. Okay, it would have been, in my opinion, much better or
5 more detailed than Box 500's would have been. The major
6 problem when you are dealing with human intelligence as
7 a point of contact is actually getting alongside the
8 individual.
9 Now obviously the RUC have that ability and so do
10 the Army, because of a day-to-day operation. It is very
11 difficult for a Box 500 representative to do that.
12 Now, the other thing you have to bear in mind, which
13 has not been covered in either of these statements, is
14 the operation and practice of actually co-handling with
15 Box 500. I myself have undertaken numerous operations
16 in conjunction with Box 500 and actually shared agents
17 where we cross-pollinate and we share agents. Indeed,
18 3018 is one -- an example. For a period of time he was
19 co-handled and so was -- well ...
20 So let us just say that I have got a little bit more
21 experience working with them and my best guesstimate for
22 you is that the RUC would probably have better coverage.
23 Q. Could we have on the screen KI2.13, please. Do you
24 recognise that document?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. That is a fax, is it not, that you sent to Mr McCartney?
2 A. Well, I did not send it directly, but ...
3 Q. It is a fax --
4 A. It is, yes.
5 Q. It is written by you?
6 A. It is, yes.
7 Q. In the third paragraph it says:
8 "RUC: the force was intelligence-naive during the
9 early days of the troubles and as such their coverage
10 during this period was sparse. It is probably over the
11 last 28 years that agents will have from time to time
12 made available information to their handlers, although
13 I would expect contemporaneous reports to be few and far
14 between."
15 A. Can I answer that?
16 Q. Yes, I have not asked the question yet, the question was
17 going to be: do you stand by what you say there?
18 A. I do indeed, yes. I mean, police officers are not
19 professional intelligences, but there is no doubt about
20 it, in the early days of the troubles, they had a void
21 of intelligence, and I have made that clear.
22 However, what I have tried to give to Mr McCartney
23 there is an overview of what was available at that time.
24 Q. Can we go back, please, to KI2.41, paragraph 6 again.
25 After the reference to Sir John Stevens, you say:
1 "Documents were not always stored under
2 Bloody Sunday by name but were stored by date."
3 Did you, as far as you remember, in the course of
4 either your posting at 121 intelligence section or when
5 you were serving in FRU, did you ever see a file of
6 documents under the heading "Bloody Sunday"?
7 A. Yes. Oh, yes.
8 Q. Can you elaborate a little on where you saw those files
9 or that file?
10 A. I think we have already covered that: within 121. But
11 the point that I am making there is actually in relation
12 to 3702, that was the question that was posed to
13 me: when documents were not always stored under
14 Bloody Sunday by name, but were stored by date and we
15 were talking about the retrieval system. What I said
16 was, you could either put a key word in, ie
17 Bloody Sunday or you could put the date in, or both.
18 Q. I am not asking at the moment about the computer system.
19 When you were at 121 intelligence section, did you ever
20 see a hard copy file of documents called "Bloody Sunday"
21 or something similar?
22 A. Yes, in the Registry department, which was the document
23 which supported the G2 staff.
24 Q. The document that supported the G2 staff?
25 A. Yes, they have their own file system. As well as 121
1 they have their own.
2 Q. So in the G2 Registry?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You say there was a file of documents relating to
5 Bloody Sunday?
6 A. Yes, with the title "Bloody Sunday".
7 Q. Do you remember what was in it?
8 A. More or less a mirror image of what was included in 121.
9 Q. Did 121 also have a hard copy file entitled
10 "Bloody Sunday"?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Are you sure about that?
13 A. Absolutely, but not, not in a sense of doing a piece,
14 a project piece, but documents which relate to it. Just
15 like you would have on the Teebane massacre, just like
16 you would have one for the murder of Constable Graham.
17 Do you understand the distinction?
18 LORD SAVILLE: Can I ask you a question, Mr Ingram: do you
19 have any recollection as to the size of these files,
20 what sort of numbers of documents are we talking about?
21 If you cannot remember, tell me, but ...
22 A. You know, just a normal size files, you know, nothing
23 extraordinary.
24 LORD SAVILLE: Can you give me any sort of idea of the
25 number of documents --
1 A. You would be looking at a fair amount of numbers, you
2 would be talking in excess of 50 documents.
3 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you very much.
4 MR ROXBURGH: Can we move on, please, to paragraphs 9 and 10
5 of this statement.
6 Mr Ingram, in your first witness statement you
7 expressed doubts about the existence of Infliction and
8 about the authenticity of the one document that at that
9 stage you had been shown.
10 Is it right that having now seen more documents
11 relating to Infliction and having heard what Liam Clarke
12 had to tell you about his conversations with a former
13 RUC officer, that you are not now suggesting that
14 Infliction is non-existent?
15 A. Yes, that is correct.
16 Q. And you are not now suggesting, are you, that any of the
17 documents that you have been shown are not authentic?
18 A. Oh, no, I have concerns over the documents.
19 Q. Are they concerns over the authenticity of the document
20 or concerns over the quality of the desk comment?
21 A. Well, as I have put in my statements later on, I would
22 like to see the supporting documents before I came to,
23 um, a final conclusion at that point.
24 Q. By the "supporting documents," you mean Registry
25 documents; is that right?
1 A. I would like to see, as I have explained previously, for
2 that MISR to have been conceived there has to be -- it
3 is not a stand-alone document, there has to be
4 a document which supports it and in outline that
5 document would detail how, where, when that agent was
6 met, how much he was paid, who also was on the meeting.
7 I would like to see those documents first, before
8 I made any comment as to -- as to whether that is an
9 accurate document or not.
10 Q. You know, do you not, that it is not a MISR?
11 A. No, it is a source report. I know it is not a MISR, but
12 it is a source report. When -- Box 500 make a meet,
13 they too also have to produce a report; they also too
14 have to account for the money that has been spent. They
15 have to account on a basis to see if there is any
16 progress in the source. So I would like to see the
17 periodical reviews of the agent and, as Mr Tate told me
18 in the presence of my solicitor, in 1984 he had been
19 running for a number of years; I would like to see the
20 documents which support that.
21 Q. In paragraph 10 you say:
22 "Having seen the statement of Officer A and the
23 documents he produces ... I observe that this document
24 is consistent with my understanding and recollection of
25 the Security Service product. I have seen many hundreds
1 of these documents in my career and remain adamant that
2 I have not seen any of these Infliction documents before
3 seeing them in connection with this Inquiry. I would
4 have expected to see it either during 1984 or on my
5 return to service in Northern Ireland in 1986 or 1987."
6 With that in mind, can we look, please, at the
7 document that you are talking about, which we have at
8 G109.670. Can we have page 671 on the screen as well,
9 please, side by side. Officer A has told the Inquiry
10 that this document is in the format of
11 a Northern Ireland intelligence report?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. In other words, a report from the Security Service to
14 its intelligence customers?
15 A. Indeed.
16 Q. Quite a lot of the details on the first page have been
17 redacted for security reasons, including details of its
18 intended distribution within the Army, but the second
19 page sets out the intelligence concerning Mr McGuinness.
20 Officer A has given evidence to this Inquiry that the
21 distribution of this report within the Army would or
22 should have been confined to a very small number of
23 senior officers. Are you really maintaining that you
24 saw many hundreds of documents of this kind during your
25 service in Northern Ireland?
1 A. In my career, I was saying many hundreds of documents in
2 my career, but I have seen -- again, let us not got hung
3 up with MI5. MI5 are very small producers of
4 intelligence material; they would not be the biggest
5 producers. So, you know -- now what he is saying,
6 effectively, is -- with this document it is, it is
7 classified "secrets". He says it is a delicate source
8 and it should go to limited distribution; do we agree?
9 Q. Well, that is what it says?
10 A. It is source description. Now, initially, as you are
11 well aware, I had my reservations because the grading
12 was redacted; that is correct, is it not?
13 Q. Yes, it is?
14 A. It is. Now, why was there a public immunity certificate
15 asked for to stop this Inquiry looking at a document
16 which is now not fully assessed? And he had been
17 running for a number of years. That is why I have
18 difficulty with this document.
19 Q. Yes. The question I wanted you to answer was whether or
20 not it is correct that you saw many hundreds of
21 documents of this kind during your service in
22 Northern Ireland?
23 A. The answer is: yes.
24 Q. And by "documents of this kind," do you mean
25 specifically Security Service documents?
1 A. Yes. I would, again not specifically to service in
2 Northern Ireland. Throughout my career I have seen --
3 I was using that as an example that I have seen that
4 type of document. In Northern Ireland, I would not say
5 "hundreds of documents," maybe 50.
6 Q. Did you see documents of this kind, both when you were
7 serving in 121 intelligence section and when you were
8 serving in FRU?
9 A. Well, you would see them mostly when you were in 121 and
10 then when you would visit Headquarters Northern Ireland,
11 which I would do very frequently, and I would call in to
12 see the operational officer of the FRU, I would see this
13 type of document.
14 Q. If we go back to your third statement, KI2.42,
15 paragraph 11, please, you set out further information
16 that you would like to see concerning these documents.
17 You refer in particular to the Registry documents and to
18 the regular appraisal of the source.
19 So far as the Registry documents are concerned, what
20 is the information that you would hope to gain from the
21 Registry documents that would assist in relation to this
22 report about Martin McGuinness?
23 A. Well, the Registry documents would tell me, dependent
24 with -- well, there are tests available and this
25 happened again with the Stevens Inquiry, they have found
1 evidence that the MoD forms 102 were tampered with and
2 that the documents, as they purported to be, were not
3 accurate.
4 Q. When you refer to "Registry documents," you are talking,
5 are you --
6 A. MoD form.
7 Q. The MoD form 102 covering the copy of the Infliction
8 intelligence report?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. That was received by the Army in Northern Ireland?
11 A. No, no, I am talking about the Security Services
12 equivalent to the MoD form 102. Their Registry
13 documents, which support this document here, I would
14 like to see.
15 Q. May we then go back to your first statement at KI2.8.
16 As we have seen, matters have moved on a little since
17 you made the comments that you made in this statement
18 about Infliction. But one thing you did say here in
19 paragraph 17, is that you were involved in the
20 debriefings of agents 3007 and 3018 and you say:
21 "I was involved in both debriefs which included
22 questions on any information about Bloody Sunday of
23 which they were aware."
24 I understand that I am at liberty to say that agent
25 3018 was Frank Heggarty, but not to refer to the
1 identity of agent 3007; do you follow?
2 A. I do, yes.
3 Q. Dealing first with 3007, whose name we will not use,
4 please, do you recall whether that agent was able to
5 give any information about Bloody Sunday in the course
6 of the debriefing that you were involved in?
7 A. I do not think he gave anything very meaningful.
8 Q. So far as Mr Heggarty, agent 3018, is concerned, what do
9 you recall about what he had to say about the events of
10 Bloody Sunday?
11 A. No, I mean Frank Heggarty and my discussions with him
12 were over a number of years as such and not specifically
13 just to that. I do not think I was actually present
14 when he was debriefed in the fullest extent on his
15 resettlement. But he is not only debriefed by the Army,
16 he is also debriefed by all three services
17 independently.
18 Q. In this statement you say that you were involved in this
19 debriefing; in a later statement you say you overheard
20 part of his debrief?
21 A. That is what I am saying, I was not actually the
22 debriefer.
23 Q. Do you in fact know whether, in the course of his
24 debriefing, he provided any information about
25 Bloody Sunday?
1 A. No, what I -- I do not. I actually do not know whether
2 he did or he did not, but what I have made reference to
3 in my statement is the information which is contained in
4 his contact forms.
5 Q. Let us look at what you say about that, KI2.40, please,
6 paragraph 5. The first part of this paragraph deals
7 with the debrief, but then you say, just where my blue
8 arrow is:
9 "The reference to no IRA activity on Bloody Sunday
10 came from a MISR document."
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Are you still talking about Frank Heggarty there?
13 A. I am, I am saying there was a MISR document generated
14 from information that he produced.
15 Q. You go on to say:
16 "He was emphatic when he told me that there was no
17 action planned by the Stickies on Bloody Sunday."
18 Is that the information that went into the MISR or
19 is that something different?
20 A. I do not, I do not recollect. I do not recollect that
21 was exact, you know, the terminology, but I think that
22 is what it contained, roughly: that there was no
23 activity planned by the Stickies.
24 Q. Was he making a distinction between what had been
25 planned by the Stickies and what actually happened, can
1 you remember?
2 A. I do not -- I am just trying to remember the context of
3 it, to be fair. I do not -- the way he delivered it to
4 me was that they had not planned any military --
5 Q. Did he use the word "planned," can you remember?
6 A. I, I could not tell you. That is my language as such
7 that I ...
8 Q. Can we go, please, to page KI2.15 on the left and KI2.17
9 on the right. Do you recognise these two documents,
10 Mr Ingram?
11 A. The ones on the left-hand side are questions which were
12 posed to me by Counsel for -- Clarke, McCartney,
13 I think. The ones on the right were notes which were
14 taken off a tape that somebody typed up, a member of --
15 a journalist staff typed up, I believe. But I have to
16 see the original on that one.
17 Q. Do you recall receiving a series of questions?
18 A. I do, yes, yes.
19 Q. And what happened; did you dictate an answer to them?
20 A. Yes, I did. I received that list of questions via
21 a journalist, Mr Clarke, and he forwarded them to me and
22 as you can see it is quite a big list and I did not have
23 my PC working at the time, so I put them on to an audio
24 tape and then it was transcribed by one of the
25 secretaries.
1 Q. One of Mr Clarke's secretaries?
2 A. Or somebody who works for the Sunday Times.
3 Q. Do you know where the tape is now?
4 A. I do not, no.
5 Q. As far as you know, is Mr Clarke the last person to have
6 had the tape?
7 A. Either that or Greg McCartney, I do not know.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 Questioned by MR MACDONALD
10 MR MACDONALD: Mr Ingram, my name is MacDonald, I represent
11 some of the families, if I could ask you just a few
12 questions, please.
13 Could I direct you first of all to KI2.2,
14 paragraph 5 of your first statement. You refer there to
15 the fact that one of the projects that you undertook was
16 in relation to Bloody Sunday, and you have answered some
17 questions in relation to that. It has been pointed out
18 to you that Y, Officer Y, implies that there was no such
19 report written by you, queries are raised about where it
20 could be filed.
21 What is the situation exactly? Are you in any doubt
22 that you did write a report or undertake a project in
23 relation to Bloody Sunday, as a result of which there is
24 a written document?
25 A. I am in no doubt and if you read his -- he actually does
1 admit that we did undertake that type of project. Just
2 because he does not actually recollect -- he would not
3 have been involved in the booking in and I certainly did
4 not need to go to him to ask permission to undertake the
5 project and it was not something which was out of the
6 way to do.
7 So I do not take issue with his testimony.
8 Q. But insofar as he implies there was no such report
9 written by you, what is the situation?
10 A. Well, that is -- I think you have got to come to expect
11 that. We obviously have a difference of opinion.
12 Q. Is it a difference of opinion?
13 A. Well, I stand by my statement and presumably he will
14 stand by his.
15 Q. Where would such a report have been filed by you?
16 A. Well, the report would -- goes to the SO2 and, which
17 I am sure I did show it to him because I would not have
18 undertaken it without showing it to him -- it would then
19 have come in and basically it would have been put into
20 a four-drawer cabinet and in the passage of time it
21 would have been archived, unless, excuse me, it was
22 destroyed.
23 LORD SAVILLE: May I interrupt you, because I think you are
24 a little too far away from that microphone for everybody
25 to hear.
1 A. Sorry. What happens basically is, more or less as
2 Officer Y has outlined, when basically we are running
3 out of space in the -- it was a series of portakabins,
4 the office space, it was very limited.
5 Now, underneath that was also another row of
6 portakabins and we had access to another overflow, but
7 sheer -- from the space point of view, we did use to
8 archive a lot of material.
9 Q. If you were given access to these cabinets, to these
10 storage spaces, would you be in a position to find such
11 a report, do you think?
12 A. Well, I would need access to the MoD form 102, that
13 would be the easiest way of finding documents.
14 Q. If you received the co-operation of the Ministry of
15 Defence and the other intelligence agencies, do you
16 think you could find your report on Bloody Sunday,
17 assuming it has not been destroyed?
18 A. I would certainly have a look -- well, even if it has
19 been destroyed -- the way to answer that,
20 Mr MacDonald: they could answer whether the documents
21 were still live, as in the document register was still
22 live. If they answered in that period, the document
23 register is still live, then I think you would have
24 a fair chance that you would be able to locate any
25 document, for that matter.
1 Q. You have indicated that you have helped the Stevens
2 Inquiry in finding documents that previously had not
3 been supplied voluntarily by the Ministry of Defence.
4 Have you been invited by the Ministry of Defence to help
5 them find this report or, indeed, any of the other
6 documents that you have referred to concerning
7 Bloody Sunday?
8 A. The straight answer to that is: no.
9 Q. Would you be prepared to help them if they invited you
10 to do that?
11 A. I would be prepared to help the Inquiry.
12 Q. As a matter of interest: have you been invited by the
13 Inquiry to help to search for this report and in
14 relation to other documents?
15 A. I did make the offer in the year 2000.
16 Q. Has that offer been taken up?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Do you know why?
19 A. No.
20 Q. KI2.4, paragraph 8 of your statement, you say there that
21 you recall that there was information of intelligence
22 value received prior to the march from both Official and
23 Provisional IRA agents that there was no intent to
24 undertake military activity during the march.
25 You know that has been queried by Z. He says, in
1 a paragraph that you have been referred to, that he
2 cannot remember seeing anything like this in the files.
3 A. We will agree to disagree.
4 Q. You are quite sure that there was information of that
5 nature?
6 A. Yes. I mean, is he suggesting that a march like that,
7 given the range of agencies which were available,
8 nothing would have been generated prior to the march?
9 It is just not a sustainable position.
10 Q. What he says exactly is at KZ1.5, paragraph 10. You
11 were shown the first part of this, in which reference is
12 made to the proposition that there was intelligence of
13 that nature. You see at the end, in the last sentence?
14 A. The low level agents.
15 LORD SAVILLE: I think it is the last sentence.
16 MR MACDONALD: "I cannot remember seeing anything like this
17 type of intelligence on any file held at FRO(North)."
18 Does that undermine your confidence in any way that
19 there was intelligence of that nature?
20 A. No, no, not on the file, because, as the officer has
21 already pointed out, I am talking about their -- which
22 is the files, not the person, the agent's files, do you
23 understand what I am saying? There is a distinction
24 there.
25 Q. If we go back to your statement, KI2.4, paragraph 8. In
1 this sentence that I have just indicated, you refer to
2 the document that you have seen which led you to have
3 the distinct impression that there were no shots fired
4 at the troops prior to the troops opening fire?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Is that still your --
7 A. That is still my -- that would still be my overall
8 assessment of the documents that I saw. In
9 particular -- the impression that I got there was
10 speaking deliberately to Mr Heggarty.
11 Q. Essentially Mr Ingram, as you will know, the families'
12 case, as far as this matter is concerned, is that first
13 of all the IRA planned to stay away from Bloody Sunday
14 and take no part in any hostile activity against the
15 Army. Would the intelligence documents that you saw
16 support that case?
17 A. That would be my overall view of documents. Now, there
18 were contradictory documents and I have made that clear
19 in the statements. But the general thrust of my
20 impression of reading those documents, would be as
21 I have reported.
22 Q. Would you expect that where there is a multiplicity of
23 documentation generated by a multiplicity of sources
24 that there would be occasional conflicts?
25 A. Of course there would, yes, and that is why you have
1 a grading system.
2 Q. Your overall impression is that the documentation you
3 saw supports the families' case to the effect that the
4 IRA planned to stay away from the march on
5 Bloody Sunday?
6 A. That would be my overall view of documents.
7 Q. The families' case is also that the Army opened fire at
8 unarmed marchers prior to any shots being fired by any
9 civilian gunman. Is that case supported by the
10 documentation that you saw?
11 A. Well, again, distinctly from Mr Heggarty that was more
12 or less the words that he would use.
13 Q. Is it just limited to what you heard from Mr Heggarty?
14 A. No.
15 Q. That you formed this impression?
16 A. There was one other PIRA agent at that time, so ...
17 Q. Specifically in relation to Mr McGuinness,
18 Martin McGuinness, this is a reference at the top of
19 paragraph 8 and the suggestion that he was involved in
20 firing a weapon on Bloody Sunday; is it still the case
21 that your recollection, based on the material you saw,
22 is that there is no material to support that view, that
23 he fired on Bloody Sunday?
24 A. That is true.
25 Q. In connection with him: would there have been
1 a personality card index file?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you have access to that?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If there had been any intelligence suggesting that he
6 had fired the first shot or any shot on Bloody Sunday,
7 would you have expected that sort of material to be in
8 his personality card index file?
9 A. I would, but I would go further than that, Mr MacDonald.
10 Do you remember or have cause to remember Operation
11 Taurus?
12 Q. Sorry, I do not?
13 A. Operation Taurus was an RUC-inspired investigation
14 shortly after the Cook report, do you remember Roger
15 Cook?
16 Q. I remember the individual, yes.
17 A. Roger Cook did a hatchet job on Mr McGuinness and there
18 was an RUC investigation -- there was a secret
19 investigation but it was subsequently made public. That
20 was -- they gathered all the relevant material to try
21 and put forward a prosecution against Mr McGuinness.
22 Now, I have not seen Operation Taurus but presumably
23 if they had evidence from a paid agent that he did fire
24 the first shot on that day, that material would also be
25 recorded within Operation Taurus. I would suggest that
1 you get Operation Taurus to see --
2 Q. Again, it may seem a silly question: do you think
3 Mr McGuinness's personality card index file still
4 exists?
5 A. I would imagine so.
6 Q. Do you think there would be any reason to destroy parts
7 of it relating to the early parts of his activities?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Do you know where that sort of file would be stored?
10 A. Well, it would actually be duplicated but there would be
11 a number of personality files. For instance, the local
12 unit may have one, you know, the local battalion, there
13 may well be in 8 Brigade, there certainly would be one
14 in Headquarters Northern Ireland, and then he would have
15 a general one on the computer.
16 Q. If the Ministry of Defence co-operated, would there be
17 any difficulty, do you think, in providing such a file
18 to the Inquiry, if it sought it?
19 A. I would not think so.
20 Q. At the bottom of KI2.4, paragraph 9, you referred there
21 to agents working for the Security Forces and the fact
22 that the civil rights march was a major event with
23 a reasonable lead-in period, that is to say, agents from
24 all parts of the 32 counties would have been asked to
25 attend:
1 "To illustrate this point, agents from Belfast and
2 other areas of both the north and south travelled to
3 both participate and act as eyes and ears for the
4 Security Forces."
5 Just to clarify the position: I had understood when
6 I first read that you were referring to agents working
7 for the Security Forces, in the sense of officers of the
8 Security Forces?
9 A. As in an agent provocateur, as in an officer -- they are
10 called operators, let us use that distinction.
11 Q. Are we talking here about agents in the sense of
12 informants? (Indistinguishable)
13 A. That is exactly right.
14 Q. Does this term not cover agents in the sense of officers
15 employed by --
16 A. No, that would never be a terminology that would be
17 used.
18 Q. These are agents who were private civilians who had
19 given information or other forms of assistance to the
20 Security Forces. Do you know roughly how many agents
21 would have been present in Derry on Bloody Sunday; are
22 we talking about one or two or a dozen or more?
23 A. I would have -- I could give you an accurate reflection
24 if I am allowed to as to the level of -- numbers in
25 Derry during that period, roughly that period.
1 Q. Unless there is any objection?
2 LORD SAVILLE: There does not seem to be at the moment,
3 Mr MacDonald, I should get in while you can.
4 MR MACDONALD: Could you answer that quickly?
5 A. Probably in the region of -- the lower end of the figure
6 14, high end of the figure 20.
7 Q. That is in Derry alone.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Would there have been a similar number from Belfast or
10 more?
11 A. Actually, on the march I would not have thought there
12 would be anywhere near that much.
13 Q. These were people who would have been --
14 A. I am not saying that all those were on the march.
15 Q. Yes, I understand that. Are these people who would have
16 been taking part in the march itself?
17 A. There would have been a number of -- I would have
18 expected, as I think I make clear in my statement, that
19 would have been an SOP, that would be ...
20 Q. The expectation is that they would have been required to
21 provide reports back to their handlers about what had
22 taken place and what they had seen and heard?
23 A. That is right.
24 Q. Do you know whether there were any such reports
25 generated?
1 A. There was.
2 Q. Did you see any of those reports?
3 A. I think I have mentioned that previously.
4 Q. And those are among the documents that allow you to form
5 the general impression that you have formed about what
6 took place?
7 A. I think if you refer to Officer Y -- sorry, Z, he does
8 make reference to -- references in the contact files
9 and, as I was asking Mr Roxburgh, if those documents
10 have been delivered.
11 LORD SAVILLE: To make sure I understand: Mr Ingram, when
12 you were discussing this paragraph with Mr Roxburgh
13 a little earlier, you explained that you had thought it
14 was a good idea to disguise the fact that the agent
15 reports that you had seen were exclusively from Belfast.
16 A. Yes.
17 LORD SAVILLE: When Mr MacDonald asked you the question
18 whether you had seen any reports from these people, am
19 I right in understanding this: yes, you did, those from
20 Belfast?
21 A. And from Derry, sir.
22 LORD SAVILLE: And Derry.
23 A. And from Derry.
24 MR MACDONALD: When you talk about Martin McGuinness and
25 perhaps other high profile individuals being under
1 surveillance or put under surveillance during the march,
2 would they have been put under surveillance by these
3 agents that you refer to in this paragraph or by other
4 people?
5 A. No, no, no, it would not be as in -- sorry, it would not
6 be as in an agent, no, you would not ask an agent ...
7 Q. Who would carry out that function?
8 A. That would be a specialist unit.
9 Q. Were there such specialist units operating in Derry on
10 Bloody Sunday?
11 A. As you know yourself, the resource is augmented by those
12 troops which are on the top there.
13 Q. Apart from those troops at the observation posts --
14 A. As I say, unless I saw the operational orders I would
15 not normally (inaudible) but I would not imagine they
16 would be included. But the documents that I saw would
17 have suggested that there was surveillance.
18 Q. You have referred earlier in your evidence to the
19 existence of specialist units of whatever name or
20 description. The Inquiry has received evidence from
21 General Sir Peter de la Billere to the effect that the
22 SAS was not operating in Derry on Bloody Sunday and
23 there were no special forces operating in Derry, as far
24 as he was aware, on Bloody Sunday. Can you accept that?
25 A. Do I accept it? I take him at his word, other than the
1 surveillance aspect of it.
2 Q. When you say, "other than the surveillance aspect" --
3 A. The document that -- obviously Mr McGuinness was under
4 surveillance. I too -- as I have explained, that it was
5 carried out by a specialist unit. I have no knowledge
6 that that was so, as in that there was a unit deployed,
7 but I took it -- my understanding, having seen that
8 document, that there was. But I would accept his word,
9 if he says there was not.
10 Q. Do you know that the RUC --
11 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Ingram, I am told that the lady who is
12 taking down what you are saying is finding difficulty.
13 Could I ask you to bring that microphone even closer to
14 you.
15 MR MACDONALD: You know that the RUC has a specialist
16 surveillance unit.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Do you know whether they had such a specialist
19 surveillance unit in 1972?
20 A. I do not know that.
21 Q. Do the Army have specialist surveillance units?
22 A. They do.
23 Q. Do they come under any particular branch of the Armed
24 Forces?
25 A. They do now. I could not comment during that period.
1 Q. Without saying what branch they may have come under in
2 1972, are you in any doubt that there would have been
3 specialist surveillance units?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Available to the Army as part of the Army Armed Forces
6 in 1972?
7 A. I would have no doubt that was available.
8 Q. Did you see any photographs generated by any agents or
9 surveillance units?
10 A. I personally did not, no.
11 Q. You have said that original source reports are never
12 destroyed. It has been pointed out to you that has been
13 denied on the part of Z. Is there any doubt in your
14 mind that important original source reports are
15 preserved?
16 A. I think, I think I have illustrated Mr Heggarty's case,
17 where he was temporarily stood down. Now, if you had
18 destroyed that file you would have had a void when he
19 was eventually reconfigurerated.
20 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Ingram.
21 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD
22 LORD GIFFORD: I am Anthony Gifford. I appear for the
23 family of James Wray.
24 I want to ask you only about one series of documents
25 which I am not sure you have been able to see. If you
1 have not, I am going to ask that you be given time to
2 see them. The first such document is at KJ4.44. This
3 is a letter, bearing the date 27th January, from David.
4 You know David is the Director of Intelligence at the
5 time?
6 A. I do, sir.
7 Q. Johnston, who is the head, I believe, of Special Branch.
8 It purports to enclose a copy of the signal. I turn
9 over to KJ4.5. That is a copy of a signal bearing the
10 date 27th January. The better transcription of the
11 words in the signal appears at KJ4.48 --
12 LORD SAVILLE: Perhaps you could just help Mr Ingram in
13 explaining from -- if there is necessary -- anything
14 else on that document.
15 LORD GIFFORD: I will come back to it. I just wondered if
16 he had seen it in his preparation for today.
17 A. I have not.
18 Q. I know some other questions will be asked. I think it
19 would be fairer if these documents, together with two
20 others, be shown to the witness -- I should have
21 given -- I gave notice very belatedly this afternoon, it
22 had not occurred to me before --
23 LORD SAVILLE: What quantity of documents have you in mind?
24 LORD GIFFORD: The linked documents, which are KJ4.69 and
25 KJ4.73, they are the James and Julian file notes which
1 reference to the David signal. That is the only area
2 about which I want to ask this witness.
3 LORD SAVILLE: What do you want us to do; rise for a minute
4 or two or ...
5 LORD GIFFORD: Either to rise or to take other questions.
6 I do not know whether there are other questions of any
7 length.
8 LORD SAVILLE: I think it is probably quickest if we simply
9 rise so these documents can be shown to Mr Ingram and
10 then come back as soon as we possibly can.
11 MR ROXBURGH: If that course is going to be taken, might
12 I suggest it would be helpful, before the Tribunal
13 rises, if a brief explanation is given to Mr Ingram of
14 what the other two documents are so that he knows what
15 he is looking at.
16 LORD SAVILLE: I think that would be an excellent idea. Can
17 you do that, Lord Gifford?
18 LORD GIFFORD: If one looks at the document on file, that is
19 a document signed by James. You know who James is,
20 officer of the Security Service at the time.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. That is dated 31st January. There is a linked document
23 at KJ4.69 and page 70, signed by Julian; and you know
24 who Julian is?
25 A. I do, sir.
1 Q. The evidence from Julian is that these were notes for
2 the file, written up on 31st January, noting down
3 intelligence received from a source known as Observer C
4 on 26th January; the details in these two notes for the
5 file are, to a large extent, replicated in the signal
6 which I first referred to at KJ4.45.
7 The questions I will be asking is to whether, in the
8 course of your examination of the available material in
9 the 1980s, you saw these documents or anything like them
10 and there may be questions following from that?
11 A. Okay, sir.
12 LORD SAVILLE: We will rise for a few moments.
13 (2.10 pm)
14 (A short break)
15 (2.20 pm)
16 LORD GIFFORD: Mr Ingram, now you have had a chance to read
17 them properly, can you help us as to whether any of the
18 documents you have now been shown were among the
19 material which you were able to see in your service in
20 the early 1980s?
21 A. They may have been, sir, I could not be definitive about
22 that.
23 Q. You say, if we can go to page KI2.4, in paragraph 8,
24 that you can recall that:
25 "... there was information of intelligence value
1 received prior to the march from both the Official and
2 Provisional IRA agents that there was no intent to
3 undertake military activity during the march."
4 You will have seen that in that signal there is
5 a reference to the source expecting that the IRA will
6 use the crowd as cover?
7 A. Yes, sir.
8 Q. Are we to understand that there was intelligence both
9 ways or do you simply not remember?
10 A. I do not remember seeing that specific piece. That is
11 not to say that there was not there, I am not doubting
12 its authenticity, but on the balance of my understanding
13 of the files, the material for and against, it would
14 appear to me that there was more -- that there was not
15 going to be any activity on the day.
16 Q. In the file you have seen, there may have been reports
17 such as this information that the IRA would use the
18 march, but a lot more reports that it would not?
19 A. Yes, sir.
20 Q. That is your assessment?
21 A. That would be my assessment. But the one thing I do
22 have a problem with, sir, is the actual layout of this
23 document.
24 Q. I was going to come to that. Is that the document
25 KJ4.45, the signal?
1 A. It is, sir, yes.
2 Q. Can we look at that, please. What have you in mind in
3 relation to the layout?
4 A. I find it very difficult, I have to say, to read the
5 first covering, which is the signal, which is fine,
6 there is no problem at all.
7 Now, am I to understand that that is the note file
8 that has been --
9 Q. What I can tell you: all that we know, Mr Ingram, is
10 that this signal was disclosed by the RUC, attached to
11 the letter on KJ4.44, and no other copy of it has been
12 produced from any source, apart from the RUC, and you
13 will see that the letter has annotations from officers
14 of the RUC.
15 The actual text of the signal is at KJ4.48. You
16 have been able to read it, have you?
17 A. I have read that. It is more the notes, the file notes
18 that I --
19 Q. Can we go to those. The first in time is clearly
20 KJ4.73?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can I ask you -- what is your problem?
23 A. Is Observer C a new agent?
24 Q. What the evidence has been is that Observer C was
25 a well-trusted agent who gave a great deal of
1 information and who is also the source referred to in
2 the signal and he is in Derry?
3 A. Is he an Army agent?
4 Q. He was an agent originally run by the Army and taken
5 over by the Security Service?
6 A. And Observer B?
7 Q. B does not come into this particular document; B in fact
8 was an agent who did not live in Derry but visited
9 frequently.
10 A. Okay --
11 Q. C was said to be the main agent in Derry.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. First of all, did your material, the material that you
14 looked at, include documents such as the one we see on
15 the screen?
16 A. Yes, that type, but the notes on the file would, would
17 only -- would be relevant only to the agent's file and
18 not -- and certainly would not have been distributed as
19 part of the signal, if that is what is being suggested.
20 Q. No, no. I am thinking of what you were able to look at
21 in the material which you reviewed when you did your
22 project?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. That would have included these notes for the file?
25 A. That sort of thing, yes.
1 Q. Would it also have included the signals of the type that
2 we see on KJ4.45?
3 A. Yes, um. You see, I do not actually see any Registry
4 stamp for these documents, though.
5 Q. That may be, Mr Ingram, because if you go back to
6 KJ4.44 --
7 LORD SAVILLE: This is the copy that went to, as far as we
8 can understand it, went to the RUC, so you would not get
9 that stamp on it, would you?
10 A. Well, they would have their own Registry document, sir,
11 but this is -- are they saying this has been sent from
12 8 Brigade to the RUC?
13 LORD GIFFORD: No. This has been sent --
14 A. Headquarters Northern Ireland.
15 Q. Headquarters Northern Ireland to 8 Brigade, but this
16 particular copy has been sent, under cover of a letter?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. To the RUC at Special Branch?
19 A. That is what I am saying, sir, with all due respect,
20 that that document there would be booked into the Army's
21 MoD form 102. It would then be given a receipt which
22 would then be enclosed within it and then, once the RUC
23 received that document, they would then despatch the
24 receipt back, because the Army is still the originator
25 of that document, and they would want to know where that
1 document is being stored; does that make sense?
2 Q. Let us try and piece it together: what we anticipate the
3 evidence will be from the sender, although we do not
4 have a statement from him on this matter, is that he
5 would have sent this document on KJ4.45, as a cable to
6 8 Brigade and that a copy retained by him in Lisburn
7 would then have been sent, with the letter on KJ4.44, to
8 Special Branch, and delivered in some way that we do not
9 quite know?
10 A. Okay, well, let me just stop you there, sir. When that
11 document is originated, whoever has originated it, it
12 does not matter if it is going to the RUC or not, it has
13 still been -- a document has been conceived and once it
14 is complete it is entered into a MoD form 102 and the
15 point I am making is: I cannot see the Registry stamp on
16 it.
17 Q. You would expect to see on this cable a Registry stamp.
18 Whereabouts would you see it?
19 A. I would see it on the covering letter for that document.
20 Your KJ4.44, I need supporting documents, I cannot see
21 any Registry stamp on there.
22 Q. By "Registry," you mean what exactly?
23 A. I mean if that is an authentic document, and it is
24 obviously in existence today, because you have got it
25 here, then I would want to see the MoD form 102 and then
1 the MoD form 102 would lead you to more information.
2 And it must have a stamp on there to tell you, ie where
3 on the file it has been stored, so it will have a folio
4 number, and it will also tell you what volume the MoD
5 form 102 and --
6 Q. Pause a moment, because this may be very important.
7 Bear in mind, please, we have received no copy of this
8 document, either from Ministry of Defence or from the
9 Security Service or from any other source, except the
10 RUC, and you have referred to certain procedures. Are
11 you sure that those procedures that you are referring to
12 would have been in operation in 1972?
13 A. I am, sir. I think Mr Harding actually makes that very
14 clear in his, his statement to the Inquiry.
15 Q. The MoD form 102, what are you referring to exactly?
16 A. Well, that is the Registry document, sir. When that
17 document is originated it takes a life upon itself and
18 it is a secret document and must be accounted as for
19 manual (inaudible) security.
20 The relevance for that, sir, obviously that document
21 is still in existence, because you have it here, or you
22 have a copy of it. Now that would tell you -- would
23 lead you then on a paper chase back to the live Registry
24 and Sod's law would be that the next document alongside
25 it would also be relevant, I would imagine, to this
1 Inquiry.
2 Q. And that original document, bearing a Registry number,
3 must, must it not, have been filed and be in existence
4 today?
5 A. In Headquarters Northern Ireland.
6 Q. In Headquarters Northern Ireland, if that is a genuine
7 document?
8 A. If that is a genuine document.
9 Q. The Registry number would go on the letter to the RUC?
10 A. Well, the logical place to put the -- the actual
11 covering letter is also a title "secret." Now -- so
12 that means that that document is a secret document, so
13 you would expect to see one of one, two -- if it is
14 a four-page document, one of four, two of four, three of
15 four and four of four and then it is accounted as
16 a four-page document.
17 If you look at Mr Harding's testimony, he actually
18 outlines, in good detail, as to the workings of a MoD
19 form 102.
20 Q. Is this right, in addition to there being a Registry
21 stamp and reference on the letter, you would also expect
22 there to be a Registry stamp and reference on the cable,
23 on the signal, bearing in mind that that signal
24 originally went to 8 Brigade commander?
25 A. Not necessarily so, because in -- Headquarters Northern
1 Ireland is defence here. If that was drafted up as it
2 was -- now this is, I presume -- you see, this has been
3 stamped "Comsen", which I presume is Headquarters
4 Northern Ireland and it has been despatched to
5 8 Brigade.
6 Now, on receipt in 8 Brigade you would have -- they
7 would have had to have entered this into their MoD form
8 102. Now, when the signals sent this, they could have
9 done it one of two ways. Either the entry and then
10 destroy it immediately if it was not going to be
11 retained on the file -- but the normal course of events
12 is that that copy would be retained for a period,
13 therefore there would be an entry in an MoD form 102.
14 Q. That would be both a copy retained by 8 Brigade?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And a copy retained at headquarters?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. So this document, the one on KJ -- both these documents
19 are, in your mind, incomplete in that they do not have
20 the references that you would expect them to have?
21 A. That would be an accurate reflection, yes. As I say,
22 there could be a possible explanation for the signal if
23 it was not to be retained and they just sent this to
24 Headquarters 8th Brigade. But immediately upon receipt
25 in Headquarters 8th Brigade, that document would then be
1 entered into their MoD form 102, or Headquarters
2 Northern Ireland could possibly have an explanation as
3 to why they have not. But it would be unusual.
4 Q. What we noted, and no doubt you noted, was that the
5 notes for file were only written up after the event, on
6 31st January, when they refer to intelligence which is
7 meant to be advance intelligence, about the event on
8 30th January?
9 A. I have to say, sir, I did not know that, but I would
10 take your advice there.
11 Q. Is it common for notes of this kind, in your experience
12 of these documents, to be written up after the event to
13 which they are relating?
14 A. Not if you have communicated that information to the
15 commander and the commander has then forwarded it to his
16 subordinate commander. It would have to be written up
17 and appraised accordingly; it would not be done post the
18 event.
19 Q. It would have to be written up before the event to which
20 it is referring?
21 A. It would, sir, yes.
22 Questioned by MR O'DONOVAN
23 MR O'DONOVAN: Mr Ingram, my name is O'Donovan, I represent
24 OIRA 1 to 5. It has been your evidence to this Tribunal
25 that you did see documentation which indicated that
1 Mr McGuinness had, in effect, been the subject of
2 targeted surveillance.
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Do you consider it likely that other persons, for
5 instance those known to be active within the Official
6 IRA, would have been likely to have been subjected to
7 similar surveillance on the day?
8 A. Yes, from -- but not as intense as -- yes, from the
9 close observation positions, yes. If they were
10 prominent paramilitaries, then you would expect that
11 troops would have recognised them and taken action
12 accordingly.
13 Q. The product of the surveillance or observation would
14 have then found its way back to the documentation which
15 you later perused; is that right?
16 A. That would be right, sir, yes.
17 Q. And similarly, in respect of, if we call them prominent
18 members of the Official IRA, there would also, would
19 there not, have been reports from agents and observers?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Similarly, those observations, reports would have found
22 their way back on to the files which you considered?
23 A. Yes, sir. But the actual location of people is also an
24 helpful aid when you are debriefing. Now, I do not
25 actually know that that was carried out. If I was
1 debriefing somebody and I had the benefit of a log where
2 people were at certain points and you was trying to
3 recreate what had happened, you would obviously use
4 that.
5 Q. As part of the study which you undertook, you would have
6 given consideration to that body of information about
7 the activity of prominent members of the Official IRA,
8 would you not?
9 A. I cannot say I personally did, no.
10 Q. You see, you have informed this Tribunal that you have
11 made an overall assessment of what happened on the day?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Presumably part of that assessment would have been the
14 activities both of the Provisional and the Official IRA?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 Q. It must follow then, must it not, that the information
17 that you considered and weighed really was to the effect
18 that the Official IRA, on the day, were not operating in
19 accordance with any preconceived offensive plan?
20 A. Yes, that would be a fair comment.
21 Q. Thank you. I wonder if you can help me with this: it
22 must be the case that the surveillance teams who were
23 present on the day were armed; were they not?
24 A. I do not know that for a fact, sir, but I would imagine
25 they were.
1 Q. I wonder if you can give an estimate to the Tribunal of
2 approximately how many of those individuals would have
3 been present in the centre of Derry on the day;
4 I appreciate you were not there, but from your perusal
5 of the documentation and your experience, can you help
6 with that?
7 A. It would be a guesstimate, sir.
8 Q. I appreciate that.
9 A. I would not think less than eight, ten.
10 Q. But maybe double that?
11 A. Maybe.
12 Q. If I can move to another subject, please: would I be
13 right in thinking that part of the intelligence activity
14 is to discover, for instance, if a known member of the
15 Official or the Provisional IRA had in fact left the
16 Derry area; in other words, he was no longer around?
17 A. That is right, sir, yes.
18 Q. In your experience, if a Derry Republican had been
19 killed in a conflict with the Armed Forces, do you think
20 that is an event which you would have expected to see
21 a report on?
22 A. You would, sir, and certainly the Republican community
23 would celebrate -- not celebrate, but they would honour
24 their dead.
25 Q. Yes, I mean, that is one of the aspects of this Inquiry
1 is that you are dealing with a very small community in
2 Derry, of Republicans?
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. Consequently, if a Derry Republican had been killed on
5 Bloody Sunday and then buried in the Irish Republic, it
6 is not really realistic, is it, to think that that could
7 have been done and missed?
8 A. I think anybody who was disposed to that would probably
9 be thinking that Santa Claus was still coming at
10 Christmas time.
11 Q. I do not think I need take that any further, thank you,
12 Mr Ingram.
13 Questioned by MR GLASGOW
14 MR GLASGOW: Mr Ingram, I am right on the other side of the
15 room. My name is Glasgow. I represent a large number
16 of the soldiers who were present on the day and it is on
17 their behalf that I want to ask you just about two
18 matters.
19 Firstly, about what they did on the day itself and,
20 secondly, on what they did before or after the day in an
21 intelligence capacity?
22 A. Okay, sir.
23 Q. The soldiers that I am concerned with, many of whom have
24 already given evidence, either orally like you or in
25 writing, because I think it may have been thought that
1 what they said was not seriously in issue, were the
2 intelligence officers of the resident battalions; do you
3 understand --
4 A. I do, sir, yes.
5 Q. Are you saying that you saw any document or indeed any
6 photograph that recorded or indicated that those
7 soldiers, soldiers of the resident battalions, the
8 intelligence officers of 8 Brigade or the resident
9 battalions, had had any particular targets under
10 surveillance on the day, or just that somebody did?
11 A. It would be a -- the intelligence section within the
12 local unit would be, as a normal course of events,
13 involved in both photography and also regular briefing
14 of the troops on their requirements, that is sightings.
15 Now, to answer your question in specifics: I do not
16 know whether that -- the local unit of that day was
17 responsible for that surveillance; I would assume that
18 that was the case.
19 Q. If it is only assumption --
20 A. It is.
21 Q. I take it no further than this, because the Tribunal has
22 heard, just for example, from the surveillance officer
23 of the Royal Anglians, whose name was Conder -- we know
24 his name -- and he specifically was asked about this,
25 and a soldier who held the same position for the
1 22 Light Air Defence, both of whom told the Tribunal
2 that they had not been aware of any surveillance that
3 was to be kept on Mr McGuinness or that he was to be
4 photographed.
5 So far as you are concerned, you know of nothing
6 that would contradict that as far as those individuals
7 are concerned?
8 A. I will answer that: no, I do not.
9 Q. When you told us, you told the Tribunal about your
10 belief that there would have been observation from the
11 walls on individuals and specifically on Mr McGuinness;
12 was that too a matter of informed assumption on your
13 part or did you see some document or were you told
14 something that indicated that people had been taking
15 photographs or observing individuals, including
16 Mr McGuinness, from the walls?
17 A. I think I actually saw a specific reference to the
18 masonic and the walls.
19 Q. So you believe that you saw some document that indicated
20 that somebody was observing or photographing or both?
21 A. Both.
22 Q. From the walls?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. The second matter is the general role of the resident
25 intelligence officers at the time. Whatever the
1 position with RUC documents and specifically
2 Special Branch forms, are you saying that you saw any
3 document that indicated that intelligence officers
4 attached to resident battalions, the soldiers on the
5 ground, were handling agents in Londonderry at the time?
6 A. They were, sir, yes, absolutely 100 per cent.
7 Q. I do not want to debate it or challenge it further than
8 this, just so the Tribunal knows the extent to which it
9 is in issue. The Tribunal has heard from the
10 intelligence officer of 8 Brigade, whose reference --
11 perhaps you should see it, it is C1803.3.
12 Would you mind taking it from me, Mr Ingram, this
13 is, I think, the third page of the statement of the
14 intelligence officer from 8 Brigade?
15 A. Sir, it may well be helpful if I just elaborate why, and
16 it is slightly different to how I actually delivered it
17 to you, and that is: each (inaudible) battalion supplies
18 a local handler. He is then trained. At that point in
19 time, he went back to Ashford and undertook a course.
20 He then returns back. He still works out of that
21 environment, but he does not report back -- in theory --
22 back to his commander, ie the local unit, he reports
23 back to the brigade chain. But he is still a local --
24 if you take the Royal Anglians, who actually have a very
25 good history in unit handling.
1 Q. You will understand, and everyone else will, Mr Ingram,
2 that I am not challenging at all on what you have known
3 when you took up your position as lance corporal doing
4 this type of work. But it may be important for the
5 Tribunal to know what you are alleging was done by
6 people who have already given evidence but who were not
7 challenged on this because nobody knew what was going to
8 be said.
9 A. I accept that sir, yes.
10 Q. I am sorry about the elaborate way of putting it, but
11 that is why I am trying to do the job I have to do on
12 their behalf.
13 Could you look at paragraph 9 in the middle of the
14 page. What the intelligence officer of 8 Brigade said
15 in terms, it has not been challenged, is:
16 "I have been asked whether 8 Brigade got information
17 from informants. We did, although it was generally low
18 grade, non-specific general information of more
19 relevance to the troops on the ground. 8 Brigade did not
20 run its own agents at this time."
21 Stopping there, the other intelligence officers have
22 in effect said much the same thing for the other
23 regiments?
24 A. Okay.
25 Q. Are you questioning that? Are you saying that that is
1 untrue or simply that you do not know and that you
2 assumed that they were running agents?
3 A. No, what he is saying, from his understanding, is
4 accurate. What you have to understand is that the local
5 intelligence officer has no need to know. What he is
6 saying, effectively, is that what information he has
7 been given has been graded in a similar position as
8 I have explained earlier. It is a sort of need-to-know
9 basis.
10 Now the local IO has no real need for any knowledge
11 of any source information. If that information is going
12 to be exploited, which it obviously was during that
13 period, then if the IO needed to told, he would be told.
14 He is treated very similar to a mushroom; he is kept in
15 the dark and fed on shit, until you need to use him.
16 Q. I am sure that is very entertaining and will feature
17 well in somebody's book. The question I was asking you,
18 Mr Ingram, is whether or not you were challenging the
19 truth of what this officer says, in the last sentence
20 that I read:
21 "8 Brigade did not run its own agents at this time."
22 I wanted the Tribunal to know whether or not, for
23 what it is worth, your testimony was that that was
24 untrue; what is it, is that true or untrue?
25 A. That is not an accurate statement, but he may well be
1 making that from a position of ignorance.
2 Q. When you reviewed the files that you say you saw, your
3 general overview, to use your own words, the first
4 answer you gave to the Tribunal this morning was that
5 your overview was that there had been no hostile fire
6 and that the Army had overreacted; is that right; is
7 that what you meant to say?
8 A. Is that what I actually said?
9 Q. Yes, that is why I wanted you to have the opportunity to
10 comment on it; did that put it a little higher than you
11 meant?
12 A. It did a little bit, yes.
13 Q. We need not turn it up, today, page 30 and 31. As
14 I say, your actual answer to my learned friend
15 Mr Roxburgh's question:
16 "Question: So far as the overview is concerned,
17 what was the overview you derived from reading those
18 documents?"
19 And you said:
20 "Answer: That there had been no hostile fire and
21 that the Army had overreacted."
22 You went on to say that a large number of
23 casualties, some had been taken across the border.
24 Would you like to rephrase that answer?
25 A. I will rephrase that, I will take the opportunity of
1 rephrasing that, and say that my overview was that there
2 was no intent by the paramilitary -- well, by any
3 civilian parties and that -- I will still rely on: the
4 soldiers overreacted.
5 Q. The second half of your answer, that your overview
6 included the conclusion that a large amount of
7 casualties, some of which had been taken to hospitals
8 across the border, including agents; you stand by that,
9 do you?
10 A. Well, I think I explained that by saying that the agents
11 actually were involved in the transportation.
12 Q. In the handling, but that part of it is still accurate?
13 A. It is still accurate, yes.
14 Q. The last matter, is this: you tell the Tribunal, but by
15 l means look at it, if you like, at KI2.7. Of course
16 you shall see it, 2.7 at the top of the page, which is
17 part of your paragraph 13, that you are concerned that
18 the Inquiry should be given full and complete
19 information to enable it to examine and report on the
20 events of Bloody Sunday.
21 That was a sincere wish; was it?
22 A. I hope so.
23 Q. If that is right, Mr Ingram, why did you not approach
24 this Tribunal directly; why did you decide to take
25 a roundabout route, if I may put it like that?
1 A. I think the Tribunal will tell you privately that I had
2 very good reason for that, which reasons that you are
3 obviously not aware of.
4 Q. If I am in ignorance it may be right I am kept there,
5 I often am.
6 If we look at the final paragraph of Mr McCartney's
7 very helpful note, KI2.12 -- we must not be misled by
8 the date at the top, I think that is the date when he
9 very kindly ran this off his computer so the Tribunal
10 could see it. This is an attendance note of
11 a conference with you that lasted, as we see, one and
12 three-quarter hours --
13 A. It was a telephone conversation.
14 Q. The very last thing that you apparently said to him was
15 that you suggested that you would be prepared to meet
16 with Counsel for the family on a confidential basis?
17 A. And, again, there is very good reason.
18 Q. All I wanted the Tribunal to know is: why you were
19 choosing, if you can properly answer this question
20 without infringing anybody else's safety or rights, why
21 you were offering to meet Counsel for the family on
22 a confidential basis and not simply doing what the vast
23 majority of other people have done and go to the
24 Tribunal to tell them the truth?
25 A. Well, let me just -- if I may, I will take the
1 opportunity, in so much within the parameters that
2 I can.
3 My details were leaked to this Inquiry by
4 a Special Branch officer and when I was arrested under
5 the Official Secrets Act in relation to other matters,
6 I then was in the process of helping Mr McCartney.
7 Now, given personal circumstances, of which the
8 Inquiry are well aware, I was reluctant to actually be
9 here today; this was not my wish to be here, and I do
10 not mean that as in any, um, derogatory way to the
11 families, because I am more than happy to be here today.
12 But from a personal point of view, this is not good for
13 me.
14 However, I was persuaded by the Inquiry, on the foot
15 of some legal action that if I did not -- and that is
16 why I am here today, sir.
17 Q. When you had that conversation and offered to meet the
18 Counsel to the families on a confidential basis
19 in April 2000 --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- had you in fact already approached the Tribunal
22 yourself, because if that is the position I have
23 misstated it and I must correct it?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Because that appears to have been indicated by Mr McCann
1 in his newspaper article, that you had approached the
2 Tribunal in February?
3 A. I do not know the dates. We had been in -- basically
4 what happened was: Mr Clarke did an article in the
5 paper, which was brief and to the point, which was that
6 basically I do not think all the documents would have
7 discovered up under discovery and from that I think the
8 Inquiry wrote to Mr Clarke and -- trying to seek
9 information.
10 In the intervening period I was arrested and,
11 contrary to any agreement they had with the police, they
12 leaked the details to the Inquiry and the Inquiry then
13 contacted my legal advisors.
14 Q. All I was asking, and I hope there is nothing improper
15 in this, Mr Ingram: had you already spoken to the
16 Inquiry before you telephoned the families' lawyers and
17 offered to meet them confidentially?
18 A. The answer to that is a straight: no. I spoke to the
19 families --
20 Q. First?
21 A. And let me explain why. My intent was not to give
22 formal evidence because of my personal circumstances,
23 nevertheless I wanted to help the families.
24 Q. I am sure that is right and I do not doubt your desire
25 to help the families at all. But you should have the
1 opportunity, I think, of just dealing with the newspaper
2 articles, because they may be wrong. You very kindly
3 produced them for us at KI2.37. What we were told in
4 those articles -- there are three of them, but they are
5 almost identical, the second paragraph:
6 "The man, known to the media as 'Martin Ingram', met
7 with lawyers for the Tribunal under Lord Saville three
8 months ago."
9 That would indicate that you had met the Tribunal at
10 the end of February. I think on what you are saying
11 that must just be a mistake?
12 A. No, I think that is actually accurate. I think -- I do
13 not imagine I would have said I had met with them if
14 I had not met with them. I am sure the Inquiry will
15 tell you when and where we met -- they will not tell you
16 where, but will tell you when.
17 Q. Again, the Tribunal will know the position, but
18 I thought it right you should have the opportunity of
19 dealing with it.
20 A. No, I think --
21 Q. Mr McCartney's note, you see, indicates that the first
22 contact you had was on 7th April when you were offering
23 to meet the Counsel for the family on a confidential
24 basis, whereas you yourself are very properly exhibiting
25 a newspaper article -- in face three newspaper
1 articles -- which would indicate you had already met the
2 Tribunal lawyers in February.
3 I wonder whether you could help the Tribunal just to
4 clear up that apparent inconsistency?
5 A. Although Mr McCartney may not remember, I did actually
6 speak to Mr McCartney a considerable period before --
7 LORD GIFFORD: My question was: is it not a different year?
8 The newspaper article is 2001 and the McCartney notes
9 are 2000.
10 MR GLASGOW: I am very grateful, that may clarify. Does
11 that help?
12 A. That helps a lot, sir.
13 Q. The newspaper we have on the screen is 2000. I am
14 afraid I have not got a date on mine, but it is 2001.
15 Thank you very much.
16 A. Does that --
17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr Ingram, yes, it does indeed.
18 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH
19 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Roxburgh, do you have any information on
20 dates and so on in relation to Mr Ingram approaching or
21 being approached by this Inquiry?
22 MR ROXBURGH: No, I do not have dates to hand about that
23 very early stage, I am afraid.
24 May we have on the screen, please, KJ4.44.
25 Mr Ingram, I want to ask you a few final questions about
1 the documents that you were shown by Lord Gifford.
2 First of all, this one, which, as we can all see, is
3 a letter dated 27th January 1972, addressed to DH
4 Johnston of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, it is signed
5 "yours sincerely, David".
6 We do not use the surname of the person who wrote
7 the letter, again for security reasons. But may I ask
8 you, this: do you yourself know who it is who wrote this
9 letter; down the identity of that individual?
10 A. I think I do, yes.
11 Q. What is your understanding of the position that that
12 individual held at the time?
13 A. If it is who I think it is as such, he was in control of
14 intelligence.
15 Q. Do you know what organisation he worked for?
16 A. Do you mean what regiment or corps?
17 Q. Is it your understanding that he was an Army officer?
18 A. No, that is what I was asking, that is the point that
19 I was trying to come to. I think he is a civilian; is
20 he not?
21 Q. Yes, a Security Service Officer?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, would a Security Service Officer, albeit one
24 working at Headquarters Northern Ireland, have been
25 obliged to follow MoD Registry procedures in relation to
1 his correspondence?
2 A. Well, if that document was to turn up on a tip in
3 Lisburn and it is the Headquarters Northern Ireland
4 Lisburn, County Antrim, then I think there would be
5 questions to be asked.
6 Q. What is the answer to my question?
7 A. The answer to the question is: yes, he would need -- he
8 could not send a secret document out in the second class
9 post.
10 Q. No doubt he could not, but that is not quite the same as
11 asking whether or not he would have had to fill in an
12 MoD form 102 in relation to this correspondence?
13 A. With respect, Mr Roxburgh, what control would you have
14 over that document if you did not have any, any Registry
15 documents to --
16 Q. There may have been Registry documents of one kind or
17 another. I am simply asking for the moment whether he
18 would be obliged to follow MoD Registry procedures?
19 A. I think you would have to ask him yourself, I do not.
20 Know.
21 Q. We can do that.
22 A. Good.
23 Q. Let us assume that the document was registered in the
24 Registry at Lisburn. Would it necessarily follow that
25 a Lisburn Registry stamp would appear on the copy of the
1 document that was sent to the RUC?
2 A. No, it would have the RUC one on it, but you would then
3 send the receipt back to acknowledge that you have
4 received that correspondence. Therefore, the MoD form
5 102, in Headquarters Northern Ireland, would acknowledge
6 that they have received that document back. So that
7 safe custody has been recorded.
8 Q. Can we go on to page KJ4.69, please. Perhaps we had
9 better have KJ4.70 alongside it. This, as we can see,
10 is a "note for file." It is signed Julian?
11 A. You see the redacted in the top right-hand corner, that
12 may well be the Registry information.
13 Q. It may be?
14 A. It may be the key that you are looking for, Mr ...
15 Q. So far as this document is concerned, do you appreciate
16 that this is a document written by a Security Service
17 officer?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And it is a note for his file?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 Q. Would you ever have seen documents that Security Service
22 officers wrote for their files?
23 A. No. When I said I had seen documents similar to this --
24 but I could not say that I have seen that document.
25 Q. Would you ever have seen any file note written by
1 a Security Service officer for his file in the
2 Security Service?
3 A. Yes, I would. The joint intelligence research officer
4 regularly wrote papers on file notes; he is a serving
5 security officer, but what -- I know what you are
6 saying, that there is a distinction and the answer to
7 your question is: no.
8 Q. Is the distinction that the -- that the JIRO was an
9 officer who was based at Lisburn and you were working
10 closely with him, so you may have seen some of his
11 documents?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. But you would not have seen file notes written by
14 London-based Security Service officers in relation to
15 agents they were handling?
16 A. No, you would not.
17 Q. Thank you very much. I have no more questions.
18 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Ingram, it is the Chairman again. Thank
19 you very much indeed for coming here to give evidence,
20 thank you.
21 We will start again tomorrow at 9.30 and tomorrow,
22 of course, we will have evidence by video.
23 MR ROXBURGH: Sir, may I say in relation to Wednesday, we
24 have Officer Y and Officer Z in the morning and we have,
25 in order to fill the afternoon, brought forward
1 Soldier S, who was due to give evidence on Thursday, so
2 he will start on Wednesday afternoon and continue into
3 Thursday, as may be necessary.
4 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you very much.
5 (3.05 pm)
6 (Proceedings adjourned until 9.30 am
7 on Tuesday, 13th May 2003)
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1 INDEX
2 PAGE
3 MR MARTIN INGRAM (affirmed) .................. 1
4 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH .................... 1
5 Questioned by MR MACDONALD ................... 115
6 Questioned by LORD GIFFORD ................... 129
7 Questioned by MR O'DONOVAN ................... 141
8 Questioned by MR GLASGOW ..................... 145
9 Questioned by MR ROXBURGH .................... 157
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