1 Tuesday, 23rd November 2004

2 (9.35 am)

3 MR CLARKE: I turn now to the specific issues raised by the

4 evidence of events in Sector 4 and begin with the

5 question of why the Anti-Tank Platoon ceased firing at

6 the Kells Walk wall and moved to Glenfada Park North.

7 The main areas in question are the following: was

8 a ceasefire ordered before the Anti-Tank Platoon left

9 the Kells Walk wall? Was an order given to move into

10 Glenfada Park, and if so who gave it? Why was this

11 order given and why did individual soldiers believe it

12 was given? If there was no such order, why did certain

13 soldiers take it upon themselves to move into

14 Glenfada Park?

15 The suggestion that a ceasefire order was issued to

16 the Anti-Tank Platoon while they were still at the

17 Kells Walk wall, rests primarily on the testimony and

18 recollection of Soldier 027. Although the detail of his

19 account has changed from hearing a shout in 1972 to

20 receiving a radioed order from Major Loden in 1975, the

21 fact that an order was given and then repeated,

22 according to him, is one of the few common elements

23 running through the evidence that he has given.

24 With the possible exception of INQ635, no other

25 member of the Anti-Tank Platoon has given evidence of


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1 hearing or being made aware of a ceasefire order while

2 they were at that wall. The Tribunal might feel that

3 even if it were to conclude that such an order had been

4 given, it should not be retrospectively interpreted to

5 mean that no member of the platoon was permitted to open

6 fire in any circumstances from that moment on.

7 In relation to the order to move into

8 Glenfada Park North from the Kells Walk wall, the

9 Tribunal is faced with two areas in which some of the

10 soldiers' evidence is discrepant and at least

11 potentially contradictory. The first question is: who

12 gave the order to go into Glenfada Park North? Both

13 Soldier E and Soldier 119 told Lord Widgery that they

14 were responsible and it does not seem easy to reconcile

15 their accounts. Soldier F's evidence to Lord Widgery

16 supports Soldier E's account.

17 The second question is what was happening in front

18 of the Anti-Tank Platoon at the time that they moved

19 forward at the Kells Walk wall. Soldier E said in 1972

20 that he ordered the deployment in Glenfada Park North in

21 order to cut off a group of rioters. Soldier F gave

22 complementary evidence in his first RMP statement, but

23 did not refer to the 30 to 40 rioters that he mentioned

24 there again. His later evidence -- and it is for the

25 Tribunal to judge whether this was merely supplementary


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1 to rather than contradictory of his earliest account --

2 was that he saw two or three men, one of whom was

3 carrying an object that looked like a rifle, move from

4 the rubble barricade. Soldier 119 told Lord Widgery and

5 the RMP that he ordered the deployment to apprehend

6 a man who had fired a low velocity weapon from the mouth

7 of the car park. Soldier H's evidence cannot be easily

8 summarised, but in 1972 he seemed to state that either

9 just before or just after he moved from the Kells Walk

10 wall he saw at least one youth throw a nail bomb before

11 running down the alleyway between Glenfada Park North

12 and Columbcille Court.

13 The significance, if any, of these differences

14 between the soldiers' accounts of what they saw at the

15 time of the order are for the Tribunal to judge. It may

16 be that some or all of the alleged activities which

17 I have referred to were happening at the time when the

18 order was given. Alternatively, the Tribunal might

19 conclude that the difficulties, or if they feel them so

20 to be, the contradictions within the Anti-Tank Platoon's

21 evidence demonstrate that there was no clear reason to

22 enter Glenfada Park North and that various members of

23 the platoon had fashioned their evidence to provide

24 a retrospective justification for their movements.

25 The next question is what was happening in


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1 Glenfada Park. The most visible activity in the park in

2 the period immediately preceding the arrival of the

3 first soldiers was the movement of the fatally wounded

4 Michael Kelly, who had been carried from the rubble

5 barricade where he had been shot to the southern gable

6 end of the eastern block of the park where he was

7 attended by civilians and given the last rites by

8 Father, as he then was, Denis Bradley.

9 He was then lifted again and carried into

10 Glenfada Park North proper. The group carrying him

11 moved first to the north and then west towards the

12 alleyway that led to Abbey Park. The Tribunal have

13 heard various suggestions to explain this change of

14 direction and it is for them to decide if there is

15 sufficient evidential basis to draw any conclusion upon

16 it.

17 May we have on the screen P642. Ciaran Donnelly

18 took two photographs, P642 and then may we have P643,

19 showing the movement of the group carrying Mr Kelly

20 across the courtyard. Mr Donnelly's evidence was that

21 he left Glenfada Park through the northwest corner prior

22 to the arrival of the soldiers, but at a time when

23 people were shouting that the Army was coming. This

24 would suggest that P643, which we see on the screen now,

25 was taken very shortly after the arrival of the soldiers


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1 and that is supported by the accounts of several of

2 those who are shown in the photograph. The tenor of the

3 evidence of the group carrying Mr Kelly is that as they

4 approached the entrance to the Abbey Park alleyway, they

5 saw or became aware of soldiers entering the opposite

6 corner of the complex. Most of the group dropped

7 Mr Kelly, leaving Joseph Donnelly, the man who is shown

8 loosening his tie on the front right of the group in the

9 previous photograph and apparently using it to treat

10 Mr Kelly in this photograph, P643, leaving him to carry

11 Michael Kelly into the alleyway.

12 Whilst those carrying Mr Kelly made their way across

13 Abbey Park, a significant number of civilians remained

14 at the southern gable end of the eastern block,

15 a position in which many of them were later to be

16 arrested. The numbers in this area fluctuated as people

17 passed into and through Glenfada Park. Some -- for

18 example Jack Nash, Lawrence Connor and Denis Irwin --

19 moved from Rossville Street or Columbcille Court, of

20 whom some passed into Glenfada Park South. Others --

21 such as Hugh Duffy, John Porter, Matthew Connolly and

22 Gerry Doran -- preceded Ciaran Donnelly or the group

23 with Mr Kelly through the northwest or southwest

24 corners.

25 Meanwhile people were seeking shelter at various


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1 points within Glenfada Park. In addition to those at

2 the gable end, some took cover behind the cars in the

3 southeast corner. Another group appear to have broken

4 into a flat on the eastern side of the complex. Three

5 people at least hid in gardens in the southwest corner,

6 two of them, Oliver Green and Gary English, probably

7 went into the garden belonging to the Doyle family, who

8 allowed a number of people, including Nell McCafferty

9 and her companions, into their home at 59 Glenfada Park.

10 There is some evidence that a number of people,

11 armed with weapons or explosive devices, were part of

12 this general movement into and away from Glenfada Park.

13 The Tribunal, in the light of the submissions of the

14 Aitken and Lawton teams, will be aware of the civilian

15 and paramilitary evidence that relates to the possible

16 presence at some stage in Glenfada Park of:

17 (a) at least two members of the Official IRA who

18 have admitted to carrying a .303 rifle into

19 Glenfada Park, where, on their account to this Inquiry,

20 they dumped the weapon in a locked car.

21 (b) two youths close to the garages at the northern

22 end of Glenfada Park who, Michael Quinn believed, were

23 in possession of at least one nail bomb.

24 (c) a man who had fired or revealed a handgun on

25 Rossville Street, and who might subsequently have fled


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1 into Glenfada Park North.

2 (d) other individuals who, according to the evidence

3 of some witnesses, might have been in possession of

4 weapons or nail bombs.

5 We review the evidence about paramilitary activity

6 in this sector in a separate report and it will

7 obviously be necessary for the Tribunal to endeavour to

8 reach a view as to whether any relevant activity took

9 place at any relevant time.

10 Indeed, the Tribunal might wish to ask itself the

11 following questions in relation to this body of

12 evidence: first, is the civilian evidence of

13 paramilitary or armed activity sufficiently credible to

14 warrant further examination? Secondly, does the

15 civilian account relate to any military evidence,

16 bearing in mind any geographical, chronological and

17 physical similarities or difference? Thirdly, is there

18 any evidence that the activity concerned influenced the

19 movement or action of the soldiers who entered

20 Glenfada Park North?

21 Even if only the first of these questions receives

22 a positive response, there are two overlapping issues

23 the Tribunal might then wish to address. First, does

24 the evidence suggest that the specific paramilitary or

25 armed activity considered was part of a wider operation


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1 and, if so, does this cast any doubt on the veracity of

2 some or all of the paramilitary witnesses who have

3 denied that such an operation took place. Secondly, was

4 any armed activity so apparent, either at the time or

5 subsequently, that it is reasonable to suppose that

6 paramilitary and civilian witnesses to this Inquiry have

7 concealed evidence to this effect. The range of

8 possible conclusions are reflected in the submissions of

9 the interested parties.

10 At one end is the contention that paramilitary

11 activity is wholly insignificant to the circumstances in

12 which the casualties in either Glenfada or Abbey Park

13 were shot; at the other lies the proposition that the

14 evidence of civilian and paramilitary witnesses is so

15 unreliable as to what was really happening that it is

16 not possible for the Tribunal to come to any firm

17 conclusions as to the events that occur there.

18 If the evidence of Michael Quinn is accepted, a man

19 was or appeared to have been shot in the leg in

20 Glenfada Park prior to the arrival of the soldiers

21 there. The Tribunal might feel that the question as to

22 who that man was and whether or not he had in fact been

23 shot remains as perplexing now as it has heretofore.

24 So far as the scene in Glenfada Park North as the

25 soldiers arrived is concerned, the evidence of the


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1 soldiers themselves was that they were faced with some

2 or all of the following: firstly, two gunmen who were

3 running east towards the rubble barricade from the

4 southwest corner of Glenfada Park North, one or both of

5 these was shot; that is the evidence of Soldier G.

6 Secondly, they were faced with at least two nail

7 bombers who were also in the southwest corner. At least

8 two were shot and a youth who subsequently picked up an

9 unexploded nail bomb was also wounded, but managed to

10 run out of the area; that is the evidence of Soldiers F

11 and H.

12 Thirdly, the evidence of Soldier E was of a crowd of

13 40 or 50 rioters at the southern end of the complex and

14 who included at least one person who was both a nail and

15 a petrol bomber, who was subsequently shot.

16 On the civilian evidence the soldiers would have

17 seen probably at least 30 people close to the entrance

18 to the Abbey Park alleyway. These would have included

19 the men who had been carrying Michael Kelly and Joseph

20 Donnelly, who still was doing so. Others, such as

21 Gregory Wild, George Hillen, Donncha MacFicheallaigh,

22 and probably also Jim Wray, who had been on the

23 periphery of that group, and some who ran across the

24 courtyard from the eastern or southeastern sides of the

25 complex, for example Michael Quinn, Patrick McLaughlin


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1 and Don Boyle.

2 Then a far smaller group who began to run from the

3 southern gable of the eastern block. These included

4 William McKinney and Joe Mahon. Patrick McGinley,

5 probably tried to move with them, but was prevented from

6 doing so by Barry Liddy. Patrick O'Donnell also ran,

7 but on seeing people fall in front of him, thought

8 better of it and ran for cover behind a fence on the

9 eastern side. Other civilians also dived for cover.

10 Robert Wallace jumped behind a car as he ran from the

11 gable end, while John McCourt probably grabbed

12 Malachy Coyle and pulled him into a garden on the

13 southwest corner.

14 Any analysis of the position is complicated by

15 a consideration of the internal discrepancies and

16 inconsistencies of the two bodies of evidence that

17 I have extremely briefly summarised. When considering

18 the military witnesses the Tribunal will have to assess

19 whether the disparities between the accounts of the

20 soldiers result solely from their different perspectives

21 and interpretations and, if not, which if any of the

22 accounts can be considered reliable. The Tribunal will

23 have to consider whether any changes in the accounts

24 that an individual soldier gave indicate confusion or

25 collusion on his part or the imperfections of the


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1 statement-taking process.

2 Areas of the civilian evidence may also be

3 considered problematic. The accounts of many of the

4 witnesses at the mouth of the car park suggest that the

5 three casualties who were left lying in Glenfada Park

6 all ran in an isolated group from the southeast corner;

7 a somewhat different picture from the accounts of those

8 who recall a man falling at the back of a large group

9 that were pushing to get into the Abbey Park alleyway.

10 The testimony of the OIRA volunteers to this Inquiry as

11 to their movements and their possession or

12 non-possession of weapons is inconsistent with what some

13 of the same witnesses allegedly told the journalist,

14 John Barry and Gerard Kemp in the days and weeks

15 following Bloody Sunday.

16 A final layer of uncertainty is added by

17 a consideration of photograph. May we have it on the

18 screen, P428. This was initially attributed to Fulvio

19 Grimaldi whose name was on the back of it. It comes

20 from the Sunday Times archive. But the evidence he has

21 given of his movements suggests this cannot be correct

22 and no other photographer has emerged as a likely

23 candidate for having taken it. The scene captured looks

24 (in general terms) how a photograph of

25 Glenfada Park North, taken when the first soldiers


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1 entered, might be expected to look. A relatively large

2 mass of civilians in the southwest corner and at the

3 southern gable of the eastern block, a few people

4 running or beginning to run from east to west and others

5 apparently seeking cover on the periphery of the car

6 park.

7 The position of at least one of the cars -- the one

8 closest to Rossville Street -- and even some of the

9 debris and marks on the road and the pavement, further

10 the impression that this photograph was taken on

11 Bloody Sunday, as does its presence in the Sunday Times

12 archive, and the marginalia "sheltering in Glenfada as

13 the Paras advance," and several witnesses have given

14 evidence by reference to this photograph as an image of

15 what occurred on the day.

16 But McCartney & Casey have observed the position of

17 the barbed wire fence at the bottom of the frame

18 presents difficulty with this interpretation. In P428

19 the fence appears to be drawn back leaving the barricade

20 open, so that there is a substantial space between the

21 barricade and the kerb. However, may we have on the

22 screen P636. In P636, and more obviously, may we have

23 P637, taken shortly after Michael Kelly had been shot,

24 the fence appears to be closed, that is to say the rest

25 is immediately adjacent to the kerb. It appears in that


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1 position when what appears to have been the Anti-Tank

2 Platoon moved forward of the Kells Walk wall. May we

3 have on the screen P1202, which is a snap from video 48

4 and appears to have the fence across the gap and later,

5 may we have P1186, it appears to be closed when

6 Alex Nash can be seen in position at the rubble

7 barricade. If that assessment photographs is correct,

8 the logical probabilities would seem to be: firstly,

9 that the fence was opened at some time between

10 Michael Kelly falling or possibly the Anti-Tank Platoon

11 moving from the Kells Walk wall, in time for photograph

12 P428 to have been taken, but was then closed again

13 before the footage of Alexander Nash at the rubble

14 barricade. This seems somewhat unlikely and there is no

15 positive evidence to suggest that it happened.

16 A second possibility is that P428 was taken at some

17 point earlier or later in the day when the fence was

18 open. The problem with this proposition is that there

19 is no evidence to suggest that people gathered at the

20 gable end and southwest corners of Glenfada Park -- but

21 not on the adjoining part of Rossville Street -- in the

22 numbers and urgent manner shown in P428 at any other

23 point of the day.

24 A third possibility is that P428 was taken at a time

25 when the soldiers had arrived at the gable wall and


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1 began arresting people. McCartney & Casey suggest it

2 might be possible to discern a soldier's helmet at the

3 southeast corner, though for my part I confess I find it

4 difficult to do so, but in any event this would seem

5 inconsistent with the timing. One would not expect the

6 soldiers to get to the southeast gable until after the

7 initial shooting, which probably left Jim Wray dead.

8 The numbers at the gable end appear to be too great in

9 comparison to the number who were arrested there, even

10 allowing for some who got away, and no-one gives

11 evidence of so disordered a scene when the soldiers

12 arrived at the gable end.

13 As I understand them, McCartney & Casey appear also

14 to suggest that the group in the southwest corner

15 included those who removed the bodies from the park, but

16 the evidence suggests that this was done after those at

17 the gable end had been arrested and when the park was

18 almost empty. The last possibility that I have so far

19 been able to envisage was that P428 was not taken on

20 Bloody Sunday at all, despite the fact that there is

21 much in the scene to suggest that it was. Given the

22 matters to which I have referred, the Tribunal might be

23 wary of basing any conclusions which are wholly or

24 largely dependent on an interpretation of this

25 photograph.


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1 If however they are convinced it must show the

2 approximate moment at which the Anti-Tank Platoon

3 entered Glenfada Park North, they will wish to consider

4 whether or not the figure shown in the centre of the

5 photograph is carrying something that might be a weapon

6 and whether, in turn, this might relate to the evidence

7 of the OIRA witnesses who have admitted being present in

8 the area.

9 In the light of the difficulties of the evidence in

10 this sector, the Tribunal might wish to examine the

11 likely or probable sequences and locations in which

12 soldiers fired and civilians fell. The order in which

13 the soldiers arrived does seem to be something that can

14 be established. Soldiers F and G very probably entered

15 first, and on Soldier G's account to Lord Widgery, he

16 was ahead of F, his pair. The tenor of their evidence

17 and that of Soldier H is that they both opened fire

18 shortly after entering the courtyard, F towards the

19 south or southwest, G slightly to the west of him. This

20 might have happened before or as the next members of the

21 platoon, Soldiers E and H, entered Glenfada Park. They

22 also took up positions in the northeast corner and

23 Soldier H claimed to have fired in a similar direction

24 to Soldier F, towards the south or southwest of the

25 complex. Soldier E stated that he fired into the


15






1 southeast corner.

2 The precise order and chronology of the late

3 arrivals in Glenfada Park is harder to ascertain.

4 Soldiers J, 027 and 119 all claimed at various points to

5 have witnessed shooting there, but it is unclear what

6 shots they saw, if any. Most significantly, the

7 Tribunal must seek to assess whether Soldier 027 was an

8 eyewitness to the firing in Glenfada Park, as is

9 suggested in his very different 1972 and 1975 accounts,

10 or whether he arrived after at least the initial burst

11 of firing, as might be thought from a reading of the

12 evidence of his platoon commander, Soldier 119, to

13 Lord Widgery.

14 Many civilians give accounts of seeing a small group

15 of soldier arrive in the northeast corner of

16 Glenfada Park. In this sense their evidence is

17 compatible with the sequence apparent from the military

18 evidence. Several of these, perhaps most notably

19 Mr Friel and Mr Mahon, refer to seeing the lead soldier

20 firing several shots from the hip, possibly in a fan

21 motion. This was something that was denied by all of

22 the soldiers who were asked about it and which does not

23 easily fit with the accounts of G and H, supported by

24 some civilian testimony, for example the contemporary

25 accounts of William Kelly and William Ward, of firing


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1 from positions behind a vehicle at the northern end of

2 the car park. At the same time firing with a small

3 fan-like movement might account for the spread of deaths

4 and woundings in the southwest quadrant of the park.

5 Our submissions suggest that it is possible, and

6 perhaps likely, that Joe Friel was the first civilian to

7 be shot. He was running from the east towards the

8 entrance to the Abbey Park alleyway and was struck

9 a glancing blow across his chest within a few metres of

10 the entrance. He managed to stumble out, probably with

11 assistance from Patrick Bradley and Eugene McGillan. As

12 none of those witnesses mention seeing other casualties

13 in their way, it may be reasonable to surmise that

14 Jim Wray at least had not fallen at that point.

15 Michael Quinn and Jim Wray might well have been shot

16 next. Mr Quinn was hit in the face further to the east,

17 very close to the entrance of the Abbey Park alleyway.

18 He told this Inquiry that immediately after he realised

19 he had been hit, he saw a man who he now thinks was

20 Jim Wray, falling just in front of him and to his right.

21 If Mr Wray was shot while standing it is likely that

22 this happened at about this time. There is reason to

23 think, albeit tentatively, that William McKinney and

24 Joe Mahon, who might have been hit by the same bullet,

25 were shot after Mr Friel and not before Mr Quinn and


17






1 Mr Wray. Several of those who ran from the east side of

2 the car park, including Mr Quinn and Mr Friel, but also

3 Patrick Bradley, George Hillen and Don Boyle might

4 reasonably have been expected to have seen Mr Mahon and

5 William McKinney fall if the two of them had done so

6 before these witnesses reached the Abbey Park alleyway.

7 That they did not may suggest that Mr Mahon and

8 William McKinney fell behind them, possibly at the same

9 time as, or after Mr Quinn had been shot and he,

10 Mr Boyle and Mr Hillen, had seen a man who they thought

11 was Jim Wray fall in the southwest corner.

12 Patrick O'Donnell was shot on the eastern side of

13 the park after aborting his attempt to run towards

14 Abbey Park in response to seeing people fall in front of

15 him. He was hit in the right shoulder, possibly by

16 a ricochet. This evidence would suggest that he was

17 shot after one or all of Messrs Wray, William McKinney

18 and Mahon.

19 The timing of the injury sustained by

20 Danny Gillespie is extremely difficult to establish. If

21 the Tribunal were to accept the evidence of those

22 civilian witnesses who claim to have seen a soldier

23 firing a number of shots from the hip in a fan movement

24 as he entered Glenfada Park, then they might conclude

25 that these are the shots that struck Mr Friel, Mr Quinn


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1 and possibly Mr Wray. This would require up to three

2 rounds, fired increasingly close to the southwest corner

3 of the courtyard. This is most easily associated with

4 the evidence of Soldier G. Upon this hypothesis -- it

5 is a big if -- it would then be probable that either F

6 or Soldier H shot one or both of William McKinney and

7 Mr Mahon and that Soldier E shot Mr O'Donnell.

8 There are, however, a number of possible objections

9 to this approach which can perhaps be expressed by

10 a series of questions. Firstly, how reliable is the

11 civilian evidence that soldiers fired from the waist and

12 in a fan motion? Secondly, was Mr Wray shot once,

13 twice, or not at all when he was on his feet? Was

14 Mr Quinn hit by a ricochet or a bullet that had passed

15 through Mr Wray? How many shots did Soldier G fire in

16 Glenfada Park North as opposed to the other shooting

17 incidents in which he has admitted, or is claimed to

18 have been involved? Why should the Tribunal disregard

19 all the military evidence to the effect that no soldier

20 fired from the hip?

21 The Tribunal will, I fear, need to assess all of

22 these matters and more when considering this scenario in

23 relation to each of the individual casualties. The

24 Tribunal will, I suggest, need to see if it is able to

25 answer the following questions: firstly, was the


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1 casualty shot deliberately and justifiably because he

2 was a legitimate target. In the case of the casualty

3 hit by Soldier G, this would mean that he was armed with

4 a weapon. In the case of those shot by Soldiers F and

5 H, it would mean that he was in possession of nail

6 bombs.

7 Secondly, was the casualty shot deliberately, but

8 under the mistaken belief that he was either in

9 possession of a weapon or a nail bomb?

10 Thirdly, was he shot accidentally by a soldier

11 aiming for a legitimate target close by or, fourthly,

12 accidentally by a soldier aiming at someone who he

13 mistakenly believed was a legitimate target. Fifthly,

14 was he shot deliberately and without any justification

15 or, sixthly, by chance when a soldier fired, either

16 recklessly or negligently, without a legitimate or even

17 identified target. This includes the possibility that

18 a soldier fired a shot or shots to clear the area or in

19 panic or even by accident.

20 In the cases where a question of mistaken belief

21 arises, the question will also arise as to whether the

22 firer had any good reason to entertain that belief.

23 The several permutations that I have set out arise

24 in relation to each shot that struck a casualty,

25 although they can perhaps be more simply expressed by


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1 asking whether the firer hit the person he intended to

2 hit or somebody else, whether the person he intended to

3 hit (whether or not he in fact did so) was doing that

4 which justified him being shot and if not, did the firer

5 believe that he was, and was that belief based on any

6 reasonable grounds.

7 With the exception of Soldier 104's evidence of an

8 alleged conversation with Mr Friel, in which the latter

9 is said to have admitted to be in possession of

10 a weapon, something Mr Friel has fiercely and

11 consistently denied, there is no evidence that any of

12 the known casualties were involved in any illegal or

13 threatening activity at the moment at which they were

14 shot. The tenor of the civilian evidence is that none

15 of them around them were either. It is for the Tribunal

16 to decide in each case whether this was accurate.

17 The view that the Tribunal takes as to whether there

18 was any relevant paramilitary activity in Sector 4 at

19 all, and if so the extent and detail of that activity,

20 will be central to those considerations.

21 I turn then to the case of Jim Wray. His case of

22 unique in that it is alleged he was shot as he lay on

23 the ground in the southwest corner of

24 Glenfada Park North. He was certainly hit by two

25 separate bullets, both of which would have been fatal,


21






1 given the medical facilities available at the time.

2 However, the circumstances in which this occurred are

3 a matter of acute controversy. The logical

4 possibilities are that he was shot twice whilst standing

5 or falling or that he was shot once causing him to fall

6 and then for a second time while he was on the ground or

7 that he was shot twice whilst he lay upon the ground.

8 The medical and forensic evidence does not allow for

9 any of these possibilities to be disregarded. May we

10 have on the screen, please, E2.75. What is referred to

11 in our closing submissions as "wound 1" was caused by

12 a bullet entering the right side of Mr Wray's back, the

13 higher of the two entry wounds, and exiting at the left

14 shoulder. That wound was shored, meaning that pressure

15 at or close to the point at which the bullet left the

16 body caused a zone of abrasion where the averted skin

17 pushed against a firm surface. Dr Shepherd's opinion,

18 which he repeatedly and clearly explained was

19 a subjective one, was that the amount of pressure

20 required to produce the "shoring" of this wound was such

21 that Mr Wray's shoulder would have to have been in

22 contact with or close to a hard surface, a proposition

23 that is most easily explained by the fact that he was

24 lying on the ground when he received this wound.

25 Dr Carson and Dr Di Maio disagreed, believing that the


22






1 same "shoring" effect could have been caused merely by

2 the tightening of Mr Wray's clothing as he lent or fell

3 forwards.

4 The other wound, which is referred to in our

5 submission as wound 2, although this should not be taken

6 to indicate that it was necessarily inflicted after

7 wound 1, was caused by a bullet entering Mr Wray's back

8 at a lower point and exiting 5.5 centimetres below the

9 angle of the scapula on the left side of his back. Of

10 interest here is the accompanying damage to Mr Wray's

11 jacket. Mr O'Callaghan concluded that the bullet that

12 caused wound 2 probably first passed through the

13 interior lining of Mr Wray's jacket -- may we have

14 F4.3 -- at the lowest point marked on the F4.3, then

15 passed through the exterior at the middle point marked

16 on the same photograph before entering Mr Wray's body.

17 After exiting it caused further damage to the left seam.

18 If Mr O'Callaghan is correct, then it appears that

19 Mr Wray's jacket was folded upwards at the back so that

20 the interior lining on the lower right side was exposed

21 at the moment when he was shot. Mr O'Callaghan's

22 preferred explanation was that this probably occurred as

23 Mr Wray lay on the ground. May we have F4.28.4. The

24 alignment shown in this figure shows one possible

25 arrangement of the jacket but not the body at the time


23






1 when Mr Wray was hit. However, Mr O'Callaghan accepted

2 that his interpretation of the damage to the jacket did

3 not preclude the possibility that Mr Wray was standing

4 in a position such as that shown in -- may we have

5 F4.11 -- at the time when he was hit.

6 When assessing the medical and forensic evidence,

7 the Tribunal will wish to take into account the similar

8 tracks of the two bullets that passed through Mr Wray's

9 body. Both Dr Shepherd and Dr Carson thought these

10 might indicate Mr Wray was shot twice in quick

11 succession from the same weapons or weapons that were

12 fired close to one another. Dr Carson's preferred

13 interpretation was that the first bullet struck Mr Wray,

14 caused wound 2, the lower wound, and this caused him to

15 fall or bend forward, tightening the clothing around his

16 left shoulder, at which point he was hit by the bullet

17 that caused wound 1. This, Dr Carson believed,

18 explained both the slight divergences in the tracks of

19 the wound and the "shoring" of exit wound 1. The

20 evidence of Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan taken as

21 a whole indicates that their preferred explanation was

22 that Mr Wray received both wounds as he lay on the

23 ground. However, none of the experts were prepared to

24 discount alternative possibilities and Dr Shepherd's

25 final comment on the debate was that these matters could


24






1 not be decided on the pathology alone and instead must

2 be settled with reference to eyewitnesses.

3 Taken on its own, such civilian evidence strongly

4 indicates that Mr Wray was shot at least once whilst on

5 the ground. Eight contemporary witnesses have given

6 evidence that is easily interpreted as suggesting as

7 much and another, John Carr, gave an account that was

8 broadly compatible. A further nine witnesses to this

9 Inquiry have given similar testimony. With a few

10 notable exceptions such as John Porter and Joe Mahon,

11 most of the civilian accounts indicate that Mr Wray was

12 shot once whilst standing; that he fell at the southwest

13 corner of Glenfada Park North and that he was then shot

14 for a second time, possibly after speaking and trying to

15 raise his upper body.

16 When assessing the reliability of these accounts,

17 the Tribunal will no doubt consider a number of possible

18 qualifications. Firstly, as to what significance should

19 be placed on the discrepancies between the various

20 witnesses' accounts, especially on such fundamental

21 issues as to how many times Mr Wray was shot and if and

22 how he moved while on the ground. Second it may wish to

23 ask whether the problems of received memory and the

24 folklore, if such it is, surrounding the death of

25 Jim Wray affects the evidence of these witnesses.


25






1 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, can the evidence

2 of the civilians be reconciled with the pathology of

3 Mr Wray's wounds.

4 The argument here is that if either or both of

5 Mr Wray's wound were inflicted as he was lying on the

6 ground, then the bullet track would suggest Mr Wray had

7 turned so that his right side was facing upwards, or

8 that he was shot from a very acute angle, suggesting

9 that the firer was low to the ground or some distance

10 away. There are, therefore, three potential variables.

11 Firstly, the orientation at which Mr Wray was lying when

12 he was hit. Secondly, the distance from which the shot

13 was fired. Thirdly, the height from which the shot was

14 fired.

15 Joe Mahon has given vivid evidence to this Inquiry

16 of seeing a soldier shoot Mr Wray twice as he stood over

17 him, in a position -- may we have AM18.12 -- similar to

18 that shown in AM18.12. It was the opinion of

19 Dr Shepherd that if Mr Mahon's recollection was

20 accurate, then Mr Wray would have to have been lying at

21 an angle of approximately 45 degrees with his right side

22 raised at the time that he was hit. The civilian

23 evidence suggests that any movement made by Mr Wray was

24 very gradual and certainly not of that order of

25 magnitude. However, if the soldier was further away or


26






1 holding his rifle lower, then it might be possible to

2 reconcile the civilian evidence of Mr Wray's movements

3 to the pathology of his wounds. It is for the Tribunal

4 to decide whether they are satisfied that such

5 a resolution is first possible and, second, likely.

6 Dr Carson was of the view that for this to be so, the

7 soldier's rifle would have to be near to the ground.

8 No soldier has admitted shooting a man who was lying

9 on the ground, or -- with the possible exception of

10 Soldier 027 -- to seeing one of his colleagues doing so.

11 If the Tribunal concludes Mr Wray was shot twice

12 whilst he was on his feet, then the questions that

13 I considered earlier in relation to the sequence and

14 circumstances of firing in Glenfada Park must be posed

15 in relation to both of those shots, but if the Tribunal

16 think Mr Wray was shot once or twice as he lay on the

17 ground, it would follow no effort has been made by the

18 soldier or soldiers responsible to explain or justify

19 that fire and the Tribunal might have no difficulty in

20 inferring that this was because there was no such

21 justification.

22 In those circumstances, it is possible that any of

23 the soldiers who have admitted to firing in

24 Glenfada Park North -- and indeed even those who have

25 not -- could have shot Mr Wray as he lay on the ground.


27






1 Nine possible permutations are examined in full in our

2 written submissions and cannot usefully be rehearsed

3 here, but the Tribunal might feel upon this hypothesis

4 the more likely candidates would be Soldier G (as he

5 moved to the southwest corner of Glenfada Park North)

6 and Soldier H (as he might have fired a single shot

7 a short time after the initial burst of fire, from

8 a position at the northern end of the courtyard).

9 I turn now to the events in Abbey Park. In the

10 aftermath of the events in Glenfada Park, Soldier F

11 advanced along the eastern flank of Glenfada Park North

12 to the gable end, from where he has admitted firing

13 across Rossville Street. He was joined there by Private

14 Longstaff and other soldiers and together they arrested

15 a large number of the civilians who were present in the

16 area. The Tribunal will need to consider whether this

17 action was justified and the arrests lawfully made and

18 properly conducted.

19 Soldier G advanced along the opposite flank.

20 McCartney & Casey have suggested that Soldier H moved

21 with him. According, however, to Soldier H's evidence

22 to Lord Widgery, he pulled further back to the northeast

23 corner and proceeded to fire 19 shots in succession

24 against a sniper who appeared and reappeared. Even if

25 the Tribunal does not accept his evidence on this point


28






1 and, in his evidence to this Tribunal, he accepted,

2 I think, that it could not be right, it might feel that

3 there is insufficient evidence to support McCartney &

4 Casey's submissions as to his movements. Further, the

5 most compelling civilian evidence, including that of

6 Joe Mahon, who was lying injured on the southern side of

7 Glenfada Park at the time, suggests that only one

8 soldier moved into or near the Abbey Park alleyway and

9 there is no military evidence to suggest that this is

10 incorrect.

11 In the Abbey Park alleyway, a number of civilians

12 who had fled from Glenfada Park were taking cover.

13 These included Gerard McKinney and his brother-in-law,

14 John O'Kane, who were either at the gable end of the

15 western block, or just around the corner in a garden

16 looking on to Abbey Park. Gerard Donaghy appears to

17 have been nearby.

18 On Mr O'Kane's evidence, which is supported in whole

19 or in part by a number of other witnesses (such as John

20 Carr, William O'Reilley, Maureen O'Doherty, Charles

21 Meehan and Gerard McCauley), he, Mr Donaghy and Mr

22 McKinney began to move away from the area after they had

23 seen a youth -- almost certainly Jim Wray -- lying on

24 the ground close to the entrance to the Abbey Park

25 alleyway. It is likely that they walked a little way


29






1 north before crossing the pavement toward the

2 cobblestones -- may we have AO48.10.1 -- before crossing

3 the pavement towards the cobblestones at the position of

4 the man on the right of AO48.10.1 and then turning south

5 towards the shallow steps that lead up towards

6 Abbey Street, Frederick Street and the Little Diamond.

7 As Mr McKinney and Mr Donaghy were about to cross

8 the steps, Mr O'Kane, who was behind them, said he saw

9 Mr McKinney reach out to prevent Mr Donaghy from running

10 ahead. Mr McKinney then turned towards Glenfada Park

11 and stopped, possibly because he saw a soldier at the

12 entrance to the alleyway. The Tribunal may feel that

13 the combination of detailed civilian testimony and the

14 forensic evidence of Mr McKinney's wounds suggest that

15 he then raised his hands in the air, possibly said

16 something to the effect of "no, no" and was shot, the

17 bullet entering 15 centimetres below his left armpit and

18 exiting on the right-hand side of his back. He fell

19 into or near the position in which he is shown in

20 a number of photographs, such as, and may we have P693.

21 There is less evidence regarding the position and

22 actions of Gerard Donaghy at this time, but that which

23 there is might suggest that he was on a higher step than

24 Mr McKinney and possibly slightly behind him. On some

25 accounts he also raised his hands. He too was fatally


30






1 shot, the bullet entering the right side of his abdomen

2 and lodging in his spine.

3 There is, however, a significant quantity of

4 civilian testimony that places one or both of

5 Mr McKinney and Mr Donaghy in different positions at the

6 time that they fell. It is for the Tribunal to decide

7 whether they feel that these disparate and often

8 problematic accounts are sufficiently compelling to

9 challenge the reconstruction I have just made, either by

10 presenting an alternative plausible version of events,

11 or by casting sufficient doubt on all theories to

12 suggest that none can be established with a satisfactory

13 degree of certainty.

14 The Tribunal must need to rely on civilian witnesses

15 in this regard as there is no military evidence that can

16 explain how any civilians came to be shot in Abbey Park

17 and no soldier has at any time offered any justification

18 for firing therein. The Tribunal might draw the

19 inference that this was because there was no

20 justification for the shot or shots that killed

21 Mr McKinney and Mr Donaghy. The civilian evidence is

22 that neither of them was engaged in an activity that

23 made them an objectively or subjectively legitimate

24 target and there is no evidence of paramilitary activity

25 taking place around them at the time when they were


31






1 shot. Indeed, if there had been, one would ask why

2 could not the soldier who shot them say as much. It is

3 possible that he was surprised by the sudden appearance

4 of Mr McKinney and that this was compounded by the

5 movements in which Mr McKinney raised his hands, but if

6 so, he was not even prepared to suggest that this

7 afforded any justification for shooting him.

8 If the Tribunal are convinced that only one soldier

9 moved into Abbey Park, then they might have little

10 difficulty in concluding that this was Soldier G. Not

11 only is he the only soldier to have admitted to being in

12 the southwest corner of Glenfada Park, he was seen

13 either on his way to or coming back from this position

14 by Soldier 119 and the bullet was removed from

15 Mr Donaghy's body was identified by Dr Martin as having

16 come from his rifle. Such a conclusion may also be

17 consistent with Mr Mahon's account of seeing a blond

18 soldier moving through the Abbey Park alleyway, since G

19 was blond and with what appears to be the inadvertent

20 admission made by G at the Widgery proceedings.

21 The Tribunal will wish to consider whether

22 Mr McKinney and Mr Donaghy were hit by the same bullet.

23 On the whole more civilian witnesses believe that the

24 men were hit with separate rounds, but the fact that

25 a damaged bullet was recovered from Mr Donaghy's body


32






1 might suggest that it had been slowed and distorted as

2 it travelled through that of Mr McKinney. We consider

3 in our submissions the possibility of that being so in

4 the light of the strong submission that the Tribunal has

5 received that it is not. If the Tribunal feel one round

6 did strike both men, it raises the possibility that

7 Mr Donaghy was shot inadvertently by the soldier

8 concerned. This might be supported by Mr Mahon's

9 recollection of a soldier returning from Abbey Park and

10 shouting that he had got another one.

11 After Mr McKinney and Mr Donaghy fell, a number of

12 civilians ran towards them. Robert Cadman, Sean

13 McDermott and Gerald McCauley approached from the north,

14 and Evelyn Lafferty, a Knight of Malta, and Hugh Leo

15 Young ran from the south. There is considerable

16 civilian evidence to suggest that at least one shot was

17 fired towards Mrs Mahon, as she was to become, and

18 Mr Young. This struck the ground between them and might

19 have singed Mrs Mahon's trouser leg. Again, there is no

20 military evidence to explain this and there is nothing

21 in the accounts of any of the civilians to suggest that

22 the shot was justified in any way. The Tribunal will

23 need to decide whether they are satisfied that a shot or

24 shots were fired and, if so, by whom. On the last

25 point, the Tribunal might again feel that Soldier G is


33






1 the most likely candidate, although there is some

2 civilian evidence of other soldiers being present,

3 either in the lee of the Abbey Park alleyway or further

4 to the north on the fringes of Columbcille court. If

5 a shot or shots was fired, they join the list of

6 unexplained firings.

7 If Soldier G fired the shots that killed

8 Gerard McKinney and Gerard Donaghy and the shot that

9 came close to Evelyn Mahon, the problems that

10 I indicated yesterday as to the imbalance between G's

11 admitted and his accrual shots necessarily increases.

12 I then deal with the aftermath. Mrs Mahon and

13 Mr Young continued to run to the casualties in

14 Abbey Park after the incident in which a shot may have

15 been fired at them. A number of other civilians joined

16 them in attending to Mr McKinney and Mr Donaghy. At

17 first no gunshot wound was found on the former and so

18 Mr Cadman and Sean McDermott proceeded to treat him for

19 a suspected heart attack. Mr Donaghy was quickly

20 carried into the Rogans' house, 10 Abbey Park.

21 Evelyn Mahon, Sean McDermott and others then went

22 towards Glenfada Park North where they could see other

23 casualties. It is the evidence of a significant number

24 of these civilians -- including Mrs Mahon -- that when

25 she first appeared into Glenfada park a shot was fired


34






1 in her direction, striking the ground close by.

2 However, there are other witnesses (such as John

3 McLaughlin, Eddie Shiels and Leo Day), who were within

4 this group or close to it, who do not recall that

5 happening. The details and nuances of these accounts

6 defy summary and the Tribunal will no doubt consider all

7 of them before deciding what they can conclude about

8 this incident.

9 The civilian evidence suggests that the group who

10 ran into Glenfada Park did so as the Anti-Tank Platoon

11 were withdrawing from the area and after those who had

12 been arrested at the gable end had been escorted into

13 Columbcille Court. The military evidence as to the

14 sequence of events is not wholly clear, but the Tribunal

15 might not think this to be a matter of great

16 significance. In any event, the three known casualties

17 in Glenfada Park North were carried into houses in

18 Abbey Park. The photographic and video evidence shows

19 Mr Mahon was helped out first, probably by Leo Day of

20 the Knights of Malta, and Eddie Shiels and others, and

21 that William McKinney and Jim Wray were carried out

22 together a little later.

23 The Lawton and Aitken teams have given a number of

24 examples of where in their submission there may be

25 evidence of unknown casualties in Glenfada. It is for


35






1 the Tribunal to decide whether any of these are

2 compelling or convincing or whether they are more likely

3 to indicate a confused account of a known casualty or

4 simply an erroneous recollection. If the Tribunal finds

5 there were unidentified casualties in the area, they

6 must decide whether this should be associated with

7 paramilitary activity and whether this affects their

8 assessment of the events in Sector 4, either by

9 indicating that the soldiers were faced with threats

10 that justified their opening fire or as a factor that

11 cast doubt on the reliability of the civilian evidence

12 as a whole.

13 As I mentioned earlier, unknown casualties cause

14 further difficulties in attempts to match the soldiers'

15 evidence of the shots that they fired, and the hits that

16 they claimed, with the amount of people that appear to

17 have been killed or injured.

18 The final area of controversy relating to Sector 4

19 is that surrounding the discovery of nail bombs in

20 Gerard Donaghy's pockets at the Royal Anglian Regimental

21 Aid Post under the Craigavon Bridge.

22 Once inside the Rogan house, Mr Donaghy was examined

23 by Dr Kevin Swords, who said that he opened his trousers

24 and raised his shirt. Several civilians have given

25 evidence of seeing people search Mr Donaghy's pockets


36






1 for identification and of doing so themselves, although

2 this evidence is at points contradictory and

3 inconsistent, and which we have tabulated in an appendix

4 to our report on Gerard Donaghy and the nail bombs.

5 The Tribunal may feel while it is probable that

6 a number of civilians touched or were close to

7 Mr Donaghy in the Rogans' house, it is probable that

8 none of them actually looked into the pockets where the

9 nail bombs were later found.

10 Dr Swords, whom unfortunately the Inquiry was not in

11 a position to call to give oral evidence, recommended

12 that Mr Donaghy be taken to hospital and to avoid delay,

13 Raymond Rogan fetched his car, a white Cortina with

14 a red stripe, and Mr Donaghy was carried to it. Hugh

15 Leo Young, who assisted in this, climbed into the back

16 of the car as well, and he and Mr Rogan drove off with

17 the intention of reaching Altnagelvin.

18 The car was stopped at barrier 20 in Barrack Street,

19 which was manned by 7 Platoon, B Company of the First

20 Royal Anglian regiment. Just in front of them was

21 another Cortina driven which CIV1, and containing the

22 injured Joe Friel. Soldiers approached this car first,

23 and one of the passengers appears to have run off.

24 A baton round was fired, but the exact circumstances in

25 which this occurred are in dispute.


37






1 The remaining uninjured civilians were removed from

2 the two cars and soldier drove them through the barrier.

3 It was around this time that Soldier 104, who was by now

4 driving CIV1's Cortina, claims to have been told by

5 Mr Friel that he, Mr Friel, had been in possession of

6 a weapon when he was shot. The Tribunal will note that

7 Soldier 104 -- who did not give oral evidence to this

8 Inquiry and who failed after a time to co-operate with

9 it -- did not mention this alleged confession to anyone

10 else at the time, despite being joined in the car by

11 Police Constable Alexander Malone and speaking to at

12 least one other RUC officer (Police Constable Detective

13 Constable McVeigh) in Barrack Street. He told

14 Lord Widgery only that he "may have" mentioned it to an

15 RUC officer on his way out of the Regimental Aid Post.

16 Soldier 150 got into Mr Rogan's car. It appears

17 that he, Soldier 135, Soldier 145 and RUC Sergeant Keyes

18 all looked at Mr Donaghy as he lay in the rear seat

19 before the car left Barrack Street, but none of these

20 men noticed nail bombs on his person.

21 In his statement to the Royal Military Police,

22 Soldier 104 did give evidence of seeing these devices at

23 barrier 20, but on his account he did not tell anyone

24 about them, even though another soldier subsequently

25 drove the car away. In his Widgery evidence he


38






1 retracted this account and stated he did not look into

2 Mr Rogan's Cortina until he got the Regimental Aid Post.

3 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, he seems to

4 revert to his first statement, suggesting that he had

5 been pressurised by Sir Basil Hall, as he was to become,

6 to give the evidence he did to Lord Widgery. The view

7 that the Tribunal take of this matter will no doubt be

8 shaped in part by their assessment of the reliability if

9 any, of Soldier 104 as a witness and the plausibility of

10 his account and in part by the evidence of his

11 colleagues in 7 Platoon as to the events at barrier 20.

12 While these do not absolutely prohibit the possibility

13 that Soldier 104 looked into Mr Rogan's car before

14 getting into the other Cortina, there are problems in

15 fitting that inspection into the sequence of events, if

16 this was indeed the case.

17 Soldier 150 appears to have driven the car

18 containing Mr Donaghy first, and briefly, to the company

19 headquarters in Henrietta Street, and then to the

20 Regimental Aid Post. It is likely he arrived there at

21 some point between 1636 and approximately 1645. The

22 analysis that we make in our submission is that the car

23 with Gerard Donaghy in it was probably only at barrier

24 20 for less than five minutes, although the Tribunal

25 will note that the submissions made on behalf of the RUC


39






1 officers involved put the time as longer.

2 Soldier 150 has given evidence of quickly checking

3 Mr Donaghy's pulse before the medical officer,

4 Soldier 138, arrived at the car. Again, Soldier 150 did

5 not notice any nail bombs in Mr Donaghy's pockets. The

6 medical officer then conducted a preliminary

7 examination, in which, among other things, he lowered

8 his head to look along Mr Donaghy's chest in order to

9 check his breathing. After satisfying himself that

10 Mr Donaghy was no longer alive, he moved off to treat

11 the other casualties -- Joe Friel and Patrick

12 Campbell -- who had been driven to the Regimental Aid

13 Post. The medical officer noticed no nail bombs in his

14 pockets.

15 Soldier 150 then moved the car a short distance, and

16 apparently left the vehicle.

17 The sequence of events that followed is a matter of

18 considerable debate. The Tribunal will have to consider

19 which of the following might have occurred next.

20 Firstly, did the medical officer return to the car and

21 conduct a second examination on Mr Donaghy in an

22 unsuccessful attempt to establish the cause of death?

23 If so, how detailed was this examination and was it as

24 he was about to begin or perhaps in the course of this

25 second examination that he was made aware of the


40






1 presence of nail bombs in Mr Donaghy's pockets, and

2 stopped his position accordingly? This is the account

3 that appears in his RMP statement. Could we have on the

4 screen B1844, where he says, in the last paragraph:

5 "After transferring the two injured persons to

6 hospital, I returned to the dead body to try and

7 determine the cause of death. It was then that I heard

8 that there was some sort of explosive device on the

9 body, so I decided not to move the body for closing

10 examination until it had been cleared by the ATO. After

11 the ATO had examined the explosive devices, which turned

12 out to be four nail bombs, the body was transported

13 direct to the mortuary."

14 That is quite different to the account that he gave

15 to Lord Widgery, which was to the effect that he learnt

16 of the nail bombs five minutes after carrying out the

17 second examination, which itself lasted for several

18 minutes.

19 The second question is whether an RUC officer

20 discovered the nail bombs either before, during or after

21 the medical officer's possible second examination. If

22 so, which officer did so, and can the conflicting

23 accounts of who was the first person to find the nail

24 bomb be reconciled to the Tribunal's satisfaction.

25 Thirdly, did an RUC officer, a member of the


41






1 Royal Anglian regiment or conceivably some other person,

2 approach the car, plant four nail bombs on Mr Donaghy in

3 a matter of, at most, minutes, and then either claim to

4 have found these or disappear from the scene to allow

5 someone else to discover them?

6 Whatever the course of events, it appears that the

7 nail bombs had been revealed by 1650 because at that

8 time a bomb disposal officer was requested by the

9 Regimental Aid Post. Soldier 127 duly arrived and,

10 according to his evidence, removed four nail bombs from

11 Mr Donaghy's clothes, two from his jeans pocket and two

12 from the lower or side pockets of his jacket.

13 There are thus three broad possibilities that can

14 explain how the nail bombs came to be, by this stage,

15 upon his person. Each of them has, as I indicated in

16 opening, associated problems. The first is that the

17 nail bombs were at all material times on his person and

18 he had been in possession of them before he was shot.

19 The second is that the bombs were planted on him at

20 barrier 20 or conceivably in Henrietta Street. The

21 Tribunal may think this is the least likely scenario.

22 Thirdly, that the nail bombs were planted on him at

23 the Regimental Aid Post, either by RUC officers or

24 members of the Royal Anglians, or a combination of the

25 two.


42






1 A considerable number of factors of differing levels

2 of relevance bear on this question. These include

3 firstly, how visible the nail bombs would have been, if

4 they had been present, to different witnesses and at

5 different times, especially considering the evidence

6 regarding the state of Mr Donaghy's clothing at

7 different times and the problems associated with

8 interpreting the minimal photographic evidence that is

9 available.

10 Secondly, what might be the motives that members of

11 either the RUC or the Royal Anglians could have had in

12 planting the nail bombs on a casualty shot by 1 Para.

13 Thirdly, the extent to which it is possible to

14 construct a coherent sequence of events from the police

15 testimony. We addressed this question at some length in

16 our submissions in a way that is not readily easy to

17 summarise.

18 Fourthly, the question arises as to why any planter

19 would have risked planting four nail bombs when one

20 would have had the same effect.

21 Fifthly, the significance, if any, of Mr Donaghy's

22 association with the Fianna, his companions on the day

23 and the evidence of Paddy Ward.

24 Sixthly, the question arises as to where either

25 Mr Donaghy or the person or persons who planted the nail


43






1 bombs could have obtained these devices or the materials

2 to make them.

3 Seventhly, there is the forensic evidence regarding

4 the bullet that passed through one of the pockets in

5 which a nail bomb was later found.

6 Eighthly, the doubts which have been raised by

7 Madden & Finucane as to the procedures adopted by the

8 RUC in the aftermath of the discovery of the nail bombs.

9 In opening this case I observed that the evidence on

10 this issue was paradoxical. On the one hand several

11 witnesses saw, examined, attended to and accompanied

12 Gerard Donaghy prior to his arrival at barrier 20,

13 including Mr Young, who was in very close proximity to

14 him in the car. It seems difficult to believe that all

15 of them either failed to notice any of the bombs or,

16 having noticed them, were content to leave them on

17 Mr Donaghy's body, despite the risks, both physical and

18 penal, in doing so. It seems difficult to believe that

19 the police or the Army at Barrack Street had four nail

20 bombs with them there, planted them on Mr Donaghy during

21 a short interval of time and then sent Soldier 150 off

22 with the body and the nail bombs without telling him.

23 Lastly, it seems difficult to believe that four

24 bombs were planted at the Regimental Aid Post, although

25 there would have been a limited opportunity to do so.


44






1 Although the unsatisfactory nature of the testimony of

2 the police and the medical officer did not assist any

3 analysis, it is still not easy to explain how such an

4 operation would have been conducted in the time

5 available, why, and by whom. But if everything that is

6 difficult to credit is rejected, the end result is that

7 there were never any nail bombs on Gerard Donaghy at

8 all, when there plainly were. It is for the Tribunal to

9 decide what conclusions it feels able to reach as to

10 what probably happened or perhaps as to what is least

11 unlikely to have happened.

12 I turn now to the events in Sector 5.

13 LORD SAVILLE: I think it might be a convenient moment, if

14 we are moving from one sector to another, to take

15 a short break.

16 (10.45 am)

17 (A short break)

18 (10.55 am)

19 MR CLARKE: Could we have on the screen P438. My learned

20 friend Mr Richard Harvey has been good enough to tell me

21 either I have misread or he has mistyped, probably the

22 former, the figures 428 as opposed to 438, which is the

23 photograph that is now on the screen. The point that is

24 made in their submissions is that it may be possible in

25 this photograph, not in P428, to see the helmet of


45






1 a soldier walking along the west side of Glenfada Park

2 towards the southwest corner; insofar as I understood

3 there to be a reference to P428, I appear to have been

4 mistaken.

5 Secondly, I think a moment ago I referred to

6 a Police Constable Alexander. His full name was Police

7 Constable Alexander Malone; Alexander is not his

8 surname.

9 I turn then to the events in Sector 5 where, as we

10 know, there were wounded in the area between Block 2 and

11 Joseph Place Patrick Campbell and Daniel McGowan and two

12 men were killed in the same area, Patrick Doherty and

13 Bernard McGuigan. Only F has admitted to firing shots

14 in this sector. He says that he fired two shots at

15 a man with a pistol.

16 Those who represent the families of those who were

17 killed and the wounded in this sector submit that

18 Soldier F fired more shots than those to which he has

19 been prepared to admit, that he fired them without

20 justification and that in so doing he wounded Patrick

21 Campbell and Daniel McGowan and killed Patrick Doherty

22 and Bernard McGuigan.

23 The Lawton team on Soldier F's behalf submit that he

24 was not responsible for all four shootings, but

25 recognise that "it is possible that one or both of the


46






1 rounds that he fired struck directly or indirectly one

2 or two of the known dead and wounded."

3 They maintain that Soldier F fired two shots at

4 a man firing a pistol in the area around the bottom of

5 the Fahan Street steps. Unless two shots killed four

6 people it appears that a greater number of shots were

7 fired into this sector than have so far been admitted.

8 The submission --

9 LORD SAVILLE: Two shots hit four people is it, or killed?

10 MR CLARKE: Wounded two and killed two.

11 The submission of the Lawton team, Madden & Finucane

12 and Barr & Co is that more than one soldier fired shots

13 into the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place. I turn

14 to consider the order in which individuals were shot in

15 this sector.

16 It seems generally agreed that the likely order in

17 which individuals were shot is: Patrick Campbell, Danny

18 McGowan, Patrick Doherty and Bernard McGuigan. There is

19 a great deal of evidence from witnesses who were

20 watching from the windows of Block 2 or positioned in

21 the alleyway behind Joseph Place, which indicates that

22 Patrick Campbell was the first person shot, followed by

23 Danny McGowan and then Paddy Doherty.

24 Patrick Campbell was wounded at some point on the

25 route from the south gable of Block 1 to the rear of the


47






1 Joseph Place Flats. He suffered a gunshot wound to the

2 left buttock and the bullet lodged in his abdomen. It

3 itself was never recovered, but X-rays showed a slightly

4 distorted, but apparently intact bullet with appearances

5 consistent with a~7.62 millimetre bullet.

6 Daniel McGowan sadly died on 28th January 2004. He

7 made a statement to this Inquiry, but ill health

8 prevented him from giving oral evidence. There are

9 inconsistencies between the various accounts given by

10 him in the weeks and years following Bloody Sunday which

11 make an analysis of the route that he followed on that

12 day somewhat problematic. What is consistent and

13 unchallenged is that he was shot whilst assisting an

14 already wounded Patrick Campbell towards the Joseph

15 Place alleyway.

16 He himself was shot on the inner side of the right

17 calf by a bullet which fractured both the right tibia

18 and fibula and exited on the outer side of the leg. It

19 would seem in all probability that he was shot close to

20 the entrance of the Joseph Place alleyway rather than,

21 as he believed, the Fahan Street steps.

22 Patrick Doherty made his way through the gap between

23 Blocks 2 and 3 and was shot on the south side of Block 2

24 as he was crawling along the open ground making for the

25 Joseph Place alleyway. Barney McGuigan had remained at


48






1 the south gable of Block 1 and at some point he stepped

2 out and was shot in the back of the head. It is likely

3 that he was, therefore, the last casualty in Sector 5,

4 although there is less direct evidence on this question.

5 What evidence there is comes from Fulvio Grimaldi

6 who gave evidence both to Lord Widgery and to this

7 Tribunal, that on reaching the southeast corner of the

8 gap between Blocks 2 and 3, he saw Patrick Doherty

9 already turned on his back and then saw Barney McGuigan

10 falling as he was shot. According to his evidence, he

11 then took -- may we have on the screen -- EP26.18,

12 apparently just after he saw Mr McGuigan fall. The

13 Tribunal will note that by this time, at any rate, there

14 are no soldiers or civilians who can be seen at the

15 gable of the east block of Glenfada Park North.

16 There remains a question as to whether

17 Barney McGuigan had anything in his hand when he moved

18 away from the south gable wall of Block 1. Desmond

19 Doherty & Co assert that he was holding a piece of white

20 cloth in his hand at the time that he was shot. The

21 Lawton team submit that this is not necessarily correct

22 and that many witnesses have said that Mr McGuigan had

23 nothing in his hands.

24 The majority of the evidence from those who saw

25 Mr McGuigan before he was shot does appear to indicate


49






1 that when he moved out from the gable he was either

2 waving a handkerchief or cloth or had his hands in the

3 air.

4 Desmond Doherty & Co and the Lawton team submit that

5 Bernard McGuigan left the gable wall to go to the

6 assistance of an injured man to the southeast and that

7 this injured man must have been Patrick Doherty.

8 We have considered at some length in our submissions

9 those witnesses whose evidence goes to this matter.

10 That evidence is not all consistent, in that it suggests

11 that he moved from the gable either in order to move to

12 better cover, or to stop the shooting or, in one case,

13 to assist the wounded on the rubble barricade, or to

14 assist the man who must have been Patrick Doherty lying

15 to the southeast between Block 2 and Joseph Place.

16 The first question for the Tribunal in this sector,

17 and a central one, is whether Soldier F was in fact

18 firing at a man with a pistol. His admission that he

19 fired two shots which hit a man with a pistol in the

20 area south of Block 2 was first made in a statement

21 taken by Lieutenant Colonel Overbury on

22 19th February 1972.

23 Considered together with his evidence to

24 Lord Widgery, Soldier F's contemporaneous account was

25 that he was moving along the western side of the eastern


50






1 block of Glenfada Park North when he heard pistol shots

2 coming from "the area of the wall at the far end of the

3 Rossville Flats," which is how it is put in his Overbury

4 statement or "in the direction of the Rossville Flats,"

5 which is how it appears in his written statement to

6 Lord Widgery.

7 He took up a position at the southwest corner -- may

8 we have on the screen P8 -- of the eastern block of

9 Glenfada Park North, although it appears at the

10 southeast corner in his Widgery statement and saw, he

11 says, a man with a pistol in a half-crouching position

12 turning in the direction of Joseph Place. His account

13 was that this man was the only person in the area from

14 which the shots had come; that he shouted "there's a

15 gunman" to Soldier G and then fired two aimed shots at

16 the man, who fell to the ground. His marked-up

17 photograph, which we see on the screen, shows the

18 position of the man with the pistol and being close to

19 the retaining wall between Joseph Place and Block 2 of

20 the flats.

21 He had fired past a group of people who were being

22 arrested at the eastern gable end of Glenfada. He then

23 proceeded to arrest these civilians with other members

24 of the Anti-Tank Platoon, including Soldier G. During

25 his oral evidence to Lord Widgery, Soldier F said for


51






1 the first time that his target had been firing the

2 pistol when he first saw him. No member of Anti-Tank

3 Platoon who was or may have been in Glenfada Park at the

4 relevant time, that is to say Soldiers E, G, H, J, 119,

5 027 and INQ23, describes hearing pistol shots. Soldier

6 G's evidence to Lord Widgery corroborated the account

7 given to Soldier F, to the extent that he said he heard

8 Soldier F shout a warning of a gunman and saw him fire

9 one or two shots in an easterly direction from

10 a kneeling position. Soldier G placed Soldier F at the

11 southeast corner of Glenfada Park.

12 The most significant evidence in relation to the

13 gunman engaged by Soldier F comes from Soldier 227,

14 a lieutenant in the 22nd Light Air Defence Regiment,

15 deployed on the day at the Charlie observation post on

16 the city walls. His account, first given to the Royal

17 Military Police on 2nd February 1972, is of seeing three

18 paratroopers appear at the south gable of

19 Glenfada Park North, the east block. Two proceeded to

20 arrest a group of civilians at the gable; the third

21 paratrooper knelt by the lamppost at the southwest

22 corner of the gable. Soldier 227 said that he then

23 heard pistol shots, saw the third paratrooper fire two

24 aimed shots towards what Soldier 227 described in his

25 Widgery oral evidence as "my low and my right". He then


52






1 saw a man who he later identified as Bernard McGuigan

2 fall to the ground near the gable of Block 1. It seems

3 very probable that Soldier F was the paratrooper seen to

4 fire by Soldier 227.

5 That evidence of Soldier 227, however, raises

6 a number of issues. The first is whether the

7 paratrooper fired in response to pistol shots.

8 Barr~& Co submit Soldier 227's contemporaneous evidence

9 about the pistol shots is conflicting and contradictory

10 and that the incidents of a set of pistol shots and

11 a paratrooper firing are not necessarily linked.

12 Soldier 227's current recollection was that he could

13 no longer be certain in his mind that these two

14 incidents were linked. His evidence to this Tribunal

15 was that he heard pistol shots before he saw any

16 paratroopers in Glenfada Park, but he accepted in his

17 oral evidence that his 1972 evidence indicated that his

18 hearing of pistol shots seems to occur at or around the

19 time that he saw the kneeling paratrooper.

20 The Tribunal will therefore have to consider whether

21 Soldier 227's evidence, in particular his

22 contemporaneous evidence, can support the conclusion

23 that the paratrooper whom he saw fired in response to

24 the pistol shots of which he spoke, or whether there was

25 a gap in time between the two incidents.


53






1 The second question is where did the pistol shots

2 heard by Soldier 227 come from? In his contemporaneous

3 statements, his oral evidence to Lord Widgery and his

4 written statement to this Inquiry, Soldier 227 described

5 the pistol shots he heard as having come from the area

6 of the Rossville Flats, but he did not see who fired

7 those shots. As I have said, when he gave oral evidence

8 to the Widgery Tribunal, he first used the phrase "to my

9 low and right" when questioned by Mr Gibbens about the

10 line of fire of the paratrooper positioned in

11 Glenfada Park North. He told Mr McSparran (for the

12 families) that the SLR shots he had seen fired from the

13 corner of Glenfada Park were directed "from what I could

14 see, at the man with the rifle to my low and to the

15 right."

16 In the statement taken by Eversheds, Soldier 227

17 said that this must have been an error from

18 a stenographer, since had he given this answer, he would

19 have expected counsel at the Widgery Tribunal to have

20 questioned him about it. The Tribunal may consider had

21 he said "at the man with the pistol to my low and to my

22 right" he could also have expected questions.

23 In any event, in oral evidence before this Tribunal

24 it was put to Soldier 227 that his response at Widgery

25 should have been "at the man with the pistol to my low


54






1 and to the right" and that this was a reference to the

2 pistol shots he had heard. In answer to that

3 Soldier 227 said that he understood what was being put

4 to him, but did not appear positively to agree that his

5 answer -- that the transcript should have read "at the

6 man with the pistol to my low and to the right", or

7 expressly to confirm that his answer to Mr McSparran was

8 a reference to pistol shots that he heard. The Tribunal

9 may have to consider whether this is simply a semantic

10 question of wording or something different.

11 He was then asked to mark on a map the area that he

12 would have been referring to when he used the phrase "to

13 my low and to my right" in answer to Mr McSparran and he

14 marked with a yellow arrow and may we have, B224.0036,

15 as the area in question.

16 Barr & Co and Madden & Finucane submit that this

17 evidence from Soldier 227 contradicts his evidence to

18 the Widgery Tribunal, which was simply to the effect

19 that the pistol shots were from the area of the flats.

20 Barr & Co go further and submit that Soldier 227's

21 evidence amounts to an invention on his part, that the

22 paratrooper was engaging a man with a pistol in the area

23 that he marked, although this was not put in terms of

24 Soldier 227.

25 The Lawton team submit that this evidence shows that


55






1 Soldier 227 placed the location of the pistol shots that

2 he had heard in close proximity to the location where

3 Soldier F placed a man with a pistol.

4 The Tribunal will need to consider whether

5 Soldier 227's evidence on this point amounts to him

6 identifying the area that he believed he was referring

7 to when he answered Mr McSparran's question in 1972 and

8 whether his answer to Mr McSparran in 1972 does amount

9 it him pinpointing the location of Soldier F's target by

10 hearing the sound of the pistol shot, or whether the

11 extent of his evidence on this matter is that he could

12 say no more than that the pistol shots had come from the

13 area of the flats.

14 If the Tribunal concludes that Soldier 227's

15 evidence places the pistol shots he heard in the area

16 that he marked, then that is consistent with the

17 evidence of Soldier F. If the Tribunal conclude that

18 his evidence is not sufficiently specific to indicate

19 that he was able to pinpoint the location of Soldier F's

20 target, it will have to consider alternative

21 possibilities as to where these pistol shots could have

22 been fired from.

23 One possibility is that they were the shots fired by

24 Father Daly's gunman, although this seems unlikely since

25 the shooting of Bernard McGuigan happened significantly


56






1 later, according to the bulk of the evidence, than the

2 firing of any shots by OIRA 4.

3 Another possibility is that they were the shots

4 heard by Soldier U and fired, on his evidence, from the

5 Rossville Street doorway to Block 1.

6 Then the question arises as to what firing there was

7 from Glenfada Park North. The question for

8 determination is whether there was more than one soldier

9 who fired shots in Sector 5. If so, how many of them,

10 and who they were, apart from Soldier F, who is known.

11 There are a number of members of the platoon who

12 would have been in a position to see Soldier F, and any

13 other soldier, fire from Glenfada Park North either to

14 the southeast or the south.

15 Aside from the account given to Lord Widgery by

16 Soldier G, no other member of the platoon, either in

17 a contemporaneous statement or in evidence to this

18 Tribunal, said that they heard Soldier F shout out

19 a warning to the effect that there was a gunman there,

20 or saw or were aware of Soldier F firing shots from the

21 south gable of the eastern block across

22 Rossville Street. No member of the Anti-Tank Platoon,

23 including Soldier F, has told this Tribunal that they

24 saw or were aware of another soldier or soldiers apart

25 from Soldier F firing shots across Rossville Street


57






1 towards the area between Block 2 and Joseph Place or in

2 a southerly direction, or have said that they recollect

3 seeing bodies in the area to the south of Block 2 or

4 that they fired shots either into the area below Block 2

5 or in a southerly direction, or that they learnt after

6 the day that Soldier F had fired more than two shots or

7 that some other soldier, apart from Soldier F, had fired

8 shots to the area below Block 2 or in a southerly

9 direction.

10 It would appear to follow that if the Tribunal

11 concludes that Soldier F was not the only soldier to

12 fire in or around Sector 5, there must have been an

13 effort on the part of some one or more members of the

14 Anti-Tank Platoon to cover the reality of what happened

15 in this sector.

16 I now turn to the position of the soldiers on the

17 city walls. Of the nine soldiers who were positioned on

18 the walls in the relevant area, four gave

19 contemporaneous accounts of seeing a soldier fire one or

20 two shots in Sector 5. I have already considered the

21 evidence of Soldier 227, referring to seeing

22 a paratrooper kneeling by a lamppost at the southwest

23 corner of Glenfada Park, firing two shots in short

24 succession in a line parallel to the front of the south

25 side of Block 2 and seeing Bernard McGuigan fall.


58






1 Soldier 040 was positioned with Soldier 134, in the

2 attic of 3 Magazine Street. In his contemporaneous

3 accounts he described seeing two or three paratroopers

4 arrest civilians standing at the southern end of

5 Glenfada Park. Those arrested were then escorted into

6 Glenfada Park and Soldier 040 saw a paratrooper kneel at

7 the corner of the gable with his rifle pointed in the

8 direction of Soldier 040, that is to say towards the

9 Fahan Street steps.

10 The paratrooper then fired one shot at a man who was

11 somewhere between the paratrooper's position and

12 Soldier 040's own location. The contemporaneous

13 accounts are inconsistent as to which corner of the east

14 block of Glenfada Park North the paratrooper knelt at

15 and as to whether the paratrooper was alone.

16 The target is described as facing northwest towards

17 the paratrooper and was, according to the various

18 accounts given by Soldier 040, either "waving his arms",

19 the way in which he described it in his first RMP

20 statement, or "holding his arms above his shoulders with

21 his fists clenched", the way he described it in his

22 second RMP statement.

23 Soldier 040 saw the man fall when the paratrooper

24 fired. The Tribunal will want to consider the possible

25 identity of this person and whether he was, firstly,


59






1 a known casualty in Sector 5 -- the shot would have been

2 directed towards an area where the four people whom we

3 know were shot in Sector 5 were shot, but there is no

4 evidence that any of these three casualties behaved in

5 the manner described by Soldier 040.

6 The second question is whether he was the man with

7 the pistol targeted by Soldier F or, alternatively, an

8 unknown casualty or whether Soldier 040 is mistaken in

9 his account that the man he saw waving his arms was

10 actually struck by the paratrooper's round.

11 Soldier 040 then saw a body on the ground. The

12 location of that body, taken with other details set out

13 in his accounts, indicates that the body which he saw on

14 the ground must have been that of Patrick Doherty.

15 So far as Soldier 134 is concerned, it seems

16 probable that this soldier saw the same paratrooper as

17 his colleague Soldier 040. According to his

18 contemporaneous accounts, Soldier 134 saw a number of

19 civilians arrested in Glenfada Park and escorted away.

20 He then saw a paratrooper kneel down by a lamppost and

21 fire a single round in the direction of 134, that is to

22 say towards the Fahan Street steps. Although

23 Soldier 134 believed that he saw the paratrooper's

24 target, it seems apparent from his evidence that he did

25 not see anyone actually shot. He did see a body on the


60






1 ground which, given other details in his contemporaneous

2 statement, is likely to be the body of Patrick Doherty.

3 He said that subsequent to this he heard further

4 shots and saw another man fall near the gap between

5 Blocks 1 and 2. He did not see who fired the shot which

6 hit this man, but he saw another body on the ground at

7 this time. It is possible that this is a reference to

8 Bernard McGuigan and Hugh Gilmore. If that is right, it

9 would indicate that the paratrooper whom Soldier 134 saw

10 fire did so before Bernard McGuigan was shot and in the

11 direction of the area where Patrick Doherty's body was

12 photographed lying.

13 Lastly, I come to the position of Soldier 030. He

14 was positioned on the platform and he is the only one of

15 these four 22 LAD soldiers who did not see civilians

16 being arrested in Glenfada Park, or did not recall doing

17 so. In his contemporaneous accounts, he describes

18 seeing a paratrooper fire a single round in his

19 direction, that is to say towards the Fahan Street

20 steps. Soldier 030 had previously seen, he said, the

21 same paratrooper fire three rounds towards the southwest

22 corner of Glenfada Park North. He told the

23 Widgery Tribunal the paratrooper did not change position

24 between firing three rounds in Glenfada Park and then

25 one round towards the area between Block 2 and


61






1 Joseph Place. He put the position of the soldier at

2 "somewhat to the right of the last tree in the centre

3 [of Glenfada Park North] on the southern end." He told

4 Lord Widgery that he had not seen a paratrooper fire

5 from the location in which Soldier F had put himself.

6 He said that he did not see the paratrooper's target,

7 but did subsequently see a body on the ground. The

8 position of that body, together with other details given

9 by him, indicates that this was in all probability the

10 body of Patrick Doherty.

11 A comparison of these accounts provided by those

12 members of the 22 LAD who were positioned on the city

13 walls indicates that they did not witness all the events

14 that occurred in Sector 5. Some of the interested

15 parties have made criticisms of these witnesses as to

16 the details contained in their accounts and, in the more

17 general sense, in relation to events in Sector 5, in

18 that it is said they have not revealed the full extent

19 of the firing that they would and should have seen.

20 Whether that is so will be for the Tribunal to

21 determine.

22 The evidence that we do have from these four

23 military witnesses is that they each saw a single

24 paratrooper, although their accounts differ in the

25 detail. It will be for the Tribunal to decide whether


62






1 Soldiers 030, 134 and 040 saw the same paratrooper,

2 notwithstanding that Soldier 030 put him in a different

3 position, or whether all four soldiers saw the same

4 paratrooper firing, albeit that there are discrepancies

5 between their accounts, or whether Soldier 227 saw one

6 paratrooper fire two shots, whilst Soldiers 040, 134 and

7 030 saw a different and unidentified paratrooper fire

8 one shot.

9 So far as civilian evidence is concerned, the

10 Tribunal has available to it evidence, either in

11 contemporaneous accounts, statements to this Inquiry,

12 oral evidence, or all of those, from eight witnesses who

13 saw a soldier fire a shot which hit one of the known

14 casualties. With one exception, that casualty is

15 Bernard McGuigan. The exception is Mary Quigley, who,

16 we discussed in our submissions, describes seeing

17 a soldier fire two shots at a person who appears to be

18 Patrick Doherty. I do not propose to deal with the

19 details of these accounts, which are considered at some

20 length in our written submissions.

21 There are discrepancies and inconsistencies in some

22 of these accounts which may limit the value which the

23 Tribunal can place on each account. What is important

24 to note is that these witnesses, including those who saw

25 other soldiers at the same time, in the same way as the


63






1 soldiers on the walls, only describe seeing a single

2 soldier firing shots.

3 There is also evidence from a small number of

4 civilian witnesses of a soldier positioned in

5 Glenfada Park North, firing a number of shots from the

6 hip at an elevated angle and towards Joseph Place and

7 further to the south.

8 Denis Bradley has, in a number of accounts, and in

9 his evidence to this Tribunal, set out a recollection of

10 being arrested at the gable of the east block and

11 ordered into Glenfada Park. He was grabbed and pushed

12 off the pavement and on recovering his balance, found

13 himself next to a soldier who he said fired between four

14 and eight shots from hip level, firing at an elevated

15 angle.

16 He described these as not being aimed shots. They

17 were not directed towards the telephone box or towards

18 the south gable of Block 1, but towards the south. He

19 told the Tribunal that the firing was in the direction

20 of people on the pram ramp which leads up to the first

21 level of Glenfada Park South, in other words, there, or

22 slightly to the east of that pram ramp.

23 It is apparent from Mr Bradley's evidence that this

24 soldier had not been the first or among the first

25 soldiers to arrive at the gable end.


64






1 The majority of those civilians who were arrested in

2 Glenfada Park North do not give evidence of seeing

3 a soldier fire either aimed shots from the corner of the

4 gable or in the manner described by Denis Bradley. The

5 Tribunal may consider it likely that if others had seen

6 a soldier fire, they would have reported it and this may

7 suggest that the incident described by Father Bradley,

8 occurred after most of those arrested at the gable end

9 had either been escorted to the north end of

10 Glenfada Park or already moved into Columbcille Court.

11 George Irwin who was also arrested in Glenfada Park

12 appears to have seen the same soldier as Denis Bradley.

13 We only have a NICRA statement from him. That records

14 that Mr Irwin and Denis Bradley were probably the last

15 in the line of arrestees to be led away. Mr Irwin then

16 describes seeing a "tall soldier" who fired at least

17 three shots from the hip.

18 The Tribunal will need to consider how

19 a paratrooper, firing in the manner described by

20 Denis Bradley, if he did, was not seen by soldiers

21 deployed on the walls. Setting aside the possibility

22 that those on the walls had concealed evidence, the only

23 other explanations are that Denis Bradley was mistaken

24 in his recollection, or that the paratrooper seen by him

25 was in an area of Glenfada Park North which was dead


65






1 ground to those on the walls. If for instance the

2 soldier had been positioned immediately around the

3 southwest corner of the eastern block, on the western

4 side of the block, he might not have been visible to the

5 soldiers on the walls, but had he been positioned in

6 that area it would seem that his shots would not have

7 been directed towards the Sector 5, that is to say, the

8 area between Block 2 and Joseph Place.

9 In this respect the Tribunal also has the evidence

10 of Simon Winchester to the Widgery Tribunal of seeing

11 soldiers deployed, and I quote, deployed "along the

12 front of Glenfada Park." Mr Winchester was near the top

13 of the Fahan Street steps when he noticed, so he said,

14 a soldier standing "in front of Glenfada Park" fire

15 between four to six shots towards the gap between the

16 two blocks of Joseph Place.

17 Assuming that he is right about his location, it

18 would seem probable that he saw the same soldier as

19 described by Denis Bradley. From that location he would

20 have had a similar sight line to soldiers on the walls,

21 but arguably less clear as he was lower down. The

22 western side of the east block of Glenfada Park North

23 would also have been dead ground to him.

24 There is also the evidence of RM2, who appears to

25 have left the area before any casualties in Sector 5


66






1 occurred. His evidence to this Tribunal is that whilst

2 standing up against the Block 2 shops, he looked to the

3 northwest and saw a tall paratrooper standing alone and

4 wearing a red beret. That soldier, he said, fired two

5 elevated shots in a casual fashion from a rifle held at

6 the hip position. After firing the soldier moved north

7 up Rossville Street. He described the two shots as

8 being directed towards the northern block of

9 Joseph Place, rather than the open ground between

10 Joseph Place and Block 2.

11 The Tribunal will wish to consider whether this

12 incident could have occurred in the manner that he

13 described. It would seem unlikely that any member of

14 the Anti-Tank Platoon was wearing a red beret in

15 Glenfada Park. None of those present at the gable of

16 Block 1 give a description of a soldier behaving in the

17 manner described.

18 The upshot is that there is evidence of a soldier

19 firing up to eight shots at an elevated angle and

20 towards the northern block of Joseph Place and points

21 further south. The evidence of Denis Bradley and George

22 Irwin would suggest this occurred at a time when most of

23 those who were arrested at Glenfada had been escorted

24 away. The evidence of Soldier 227 is that he saw

25 Bernard McGuigan shot at about the time that arrests


67






1 were made at the gable and the evidence of Soldier F is

2 that he fired his two shots and then proceeded to arrest

3 those civilians at the gable end. The Tribunal may

4 conclude that the incident of what might be called

5 Denis Bradley's soldier, took place after

6 Bernard McGuigan, who was likely to be the last casualty

7 in Sector 5, was shot.

8 So far as the identity of this soldier is concerned,

9 we need perhaps to return to Soldier H. He, as we know,

10 maintained before Widgery that he had fired 19 shots at

11 a window in Glenfada Park, but when giving oral evidence

12 to this Tribunal, accepted that he could not have fired

13 these shots there. The submissions of the Duff team

14 address his evidence and provide an analysis of the

15 evidence in support of the proposition that H fired all

16 of those 19 rounds at a window in the vicinity of

17 Block 1.

18 A possibility for the Tribunal to consider is that

19 Soldier H fired aimed shots into the area to the south

20 of Block 2. A second possibility is that he was the

21 soldier seen by Denis Bradley and others firing shots

22 from the hip in a southerly direction. Soldier H put

23 his height as "six foot almost" and said that he was

24 wearing a respirator that day. None of those witnesses

25 refer to a soldier wearing a respirator and the Tribunal


68






1 has heard oral submissions from Sir Allan Green to the

2 effect that Soldier H could not have been the soldier

3 described by Denis Bradley and other witnesses as firing

4 shots from the hip.

5 I now turn to those civilian witnesses who saw more

6 than one soldier fire. The only witness who described

7 seeing more than one paratrooper fire shots in

8 Glenfada Park North and which were at least in part

9 directed at the southeast, was John Porter, then

10 a quartermaster sergeant in the Irish Army. He made

11 three statements in 1972, two to NICRA, one of which was

12 tape-recorded, one to Widgery, and he also gave oral

13 evidence to Lord Widgery. These accounts are

14 complicated and do not lend themselves readily to short

15 analysis.

16 In all three accounts Mr Porter describes watching

17 from a window in Abbey Park and witnessing two incidents

18 of groups of paratroopers firing. But when one examines

19 the three accounts, it is plain that they differ in

20 important details, such as the number of paratroopers

21 involved, the number of shots fired and the direction of

22 fire. The timing of these incidents change in relation

23 to other events witnessed by Mr Porter, such as his

24 seeing the body of Gerard McKinney, the shooting of

25 Gerard Donaghy and the arrival in Abbey Park of Evelyn


69






1 Lafferty.

2 Considered together, the accounts describe between

3 two and five paratroopers firing between nine and ten

4 shots. In his Widgery statement, Mr Porter said that

5 four of the shots had been directed towards the

6 northeast corner of Glenfada Park, suggesting that they

7 were fired within Glenfada Park. He changed that to the

8 Rossville Flats area in his oral evidence. On another

9 account he identified where these same four shots struck

10 within Glenfada Park.

11 What is consistent with his accounts is that there

12 are two bouts of firing. The first occurs before the

13 civilians at the gable end are arrested and the second

14 as they are being marched away. Mr Porter would have

15 had to be at the kitchen window of 7 Abbey Park in order

16 to have a line of sight into Glenfada Park North and to

17 the gable end at which civilians were arrested. It is

18 noticeable that no person who was arrested refers to two

19 bouts of firing (the second as they were being marched

20 away).

21 The Tribunal may find it significant that no other

22 person who was at the window in 7 Abbey Park, that is to

23 say including Brigitte O'Reilley, William O'Reilley and

24 Gerard Campbell, states they saw firing of the kind

25 Mr Porter describes.


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1 The Tribunal might conclude that given those factors

2 it cannot safely rely on the evidence of John Porter as

3 supporting the proposition of a number of paratroopers

4 firing close together and in a south to southeasterly

5 direction.

6 In respect of those witnesses who only saw a single

7 paratrooper fire, the Tribunal will wish to consider

8 whether their evidence is accurate of seeing only one

9 soldier; whether they simply failed to see another

10 soldier or soldiers who were firing at or about the same

11 time; and the Tribunal will need to assess whether the

12 evidence taken as a whole indicates that one paratrooper

13 alone fired aimed shots from the gable end or that

14 different paratroopers fired from that position at

15 different times; and to take a view as to the timing and

16 direction of the shots fired by Denis Bradley's soldier.

17 I then come to the issue as to who shot

18 Bernard McGuigan. On Day 376 of these proceedings,

19 Soldier F admitted to firing the shot which hit

20 Bernard McGuigan. The Lawton team in their submissions

21 describe that admission as "equivocal". There is

22 a reply to that contention from Desmond Doherty & Co.

23 The Tribunal will obviously have to decide what reliance

24 is to be placed thereon.

25 The Tribunal will also wish to consider the


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1 possibility raised by the Lawton team that another

2 soldier positioned out of the sight line of Soldier 227

3 may have shot Bernard McGuigan. The possibility

4 proceeds upon the basis, and I quote, that the "fact

5 that soldiers were firing simultaneously or nearly

6 simultaneously with one another pervades the civilian

7 eyewitness testimony." That submission, however, does

8 not explain how Soldier 227 was able to hear two

9 distinct shots fired by a Para, but failed to hear

10 a third shot fired by another unseen paratrooper, nor

11 does it consider whether a paratrooper, positioned in

12 what would be dead ground to those on the walls, would

13 have a line to fire towards the south gable of Block 1.

14 If the Tribunal does conclude that Soldier F fired

15 the shot which killed Bernard McGuigan, then it will

16 need to consider whether this was done unintentionally

17 or accidentally. This would imply that Mr McGuigan had

18 walked into the path of a bullet which Soldier F had

19 aimed at a gunman or alternatively, whether he was

20 unlawfully targeted and killed at a time when, most of

21 the evidence indicates, he was clearly unarmed and

22 waving a white handkerchief or having one or both of his

23 hands in the air. This would be contrary to Soldier F's

24 evidence that what he did was to aim his shot at a

25 gunman he saw towards the retaining wall between


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1 Joseph Place and Block 2.

2 So far as Patrick Doherty is concerned, he was

3 struck by a single round which entered his right buttock

4 and exited the body on the right side of the chest. The

5 track of that bullet ran from back to front at an angle

6 of 45 degrees to the horizontal plane and from left to

7 right at an angle of about 33 degrees to the coronal

8 plane.

9 A preliminary question for the Tribunal is that of

10 where the round which struck Patrick Doherty was fired

11 from.

12 Both the Lawton team and Barr & Co submit this

13 question can be answered with the resolution of one

14 issue, namely the direction in which Patrick Doherty was

15 moving at the time at which he was shot.

16 The Lawton team submit that an analysis of the

17 expert, photographic and witness evidence would suggest

18 that Mr Doherty would have taken the most direct route

19 and moved south from the gap between Blocks 2 and 3

20 towards the Joseph Place alleyway. The result would be

21 that his body would have been orientated so as not to

22 expose him to fire from Glenfada Park North and

23 specifically not to a shot fired by Soldier F.

24 In contrast, Barr & Co submit that an analysis of

25 the same categories of evidence suggest Patrick Doherty


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1 made his way under the canopy overhanging the parade of

2 shops on the ground floor of Block 2 after exiting the

3 gap between Blocks 2 and 3. Mr Doherty, they suggest,

4 would have moved some distance under the canopy and then

5 decided to cross over to the Joseph Place alleyway. The

6 result would have meant that his body was so orientated

7 as to make him a target for Soldier F.

8 The expert evidence is that the firer was "most

9 probably behind and within the 90-degree arc from

10 3 o'clock to 6 o'clock"; that was the opinion of

11 Dr shepherd. The Tribunal might, therefore, conclude

12 that the expert opinion is essentially neutral -- it

13 depends upon the orientation of Mr Doherty's body at the

14 precise moment when he was shot.

15 The Tribunal might take a similar view of the

16 photographs taken by Gilles Peress and Fulvio Grimaldi

17 of Patrick Doherty at the time when he had already been

18 turned on his back. Barr & Co submit these photographs

19 indicate Mr Doherty was to the west of the Joseph Place

20 alleyway when he was turned over on to his back, thereby

21 indicating Mr Doherty was travelling from the

22 Rossville Street direction. If we may have on the

23 screen P802, viewed in isolation a photograph such as

24 P802 may give that impression.

25 However, as we consider in our submission, as do the


74






1 Lawton team in theirs, it is clear from, for example,

2 may we have on the screen photograph P809, that Patrick

3 Doherty's head was lying approximately in line with the

4 Joseph Place alleyway, which would appear to indicate

5 that his body was further to the east than Barr & Co

6 appear to suggest in their submissions.

7 The resolution of this question depends, therefore,

8 on the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence of some 30

9 witnesses who saw Patrick Doherty moving on the south

10 side of Block 2 before he was shot or before he was

11 turned over on to his back. This evidence has been

12 extensively considered in our submissions and in those

13 of the Lawton team and Barr & Co and does not readily

14 lend itself to further summary. Suffice it to say, it

15 provides a basis for three possibilities that the

16 Tribunal will have to consider as to the line of

17 movement taken by Patrick Doherty after he emerged from

18 the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. That is to say, that he

19 moved in a direct line, moving south from the gap

20 between the two blocks towards the alleyway, as

21 submitted by the Lawton team, or alternatively, that he

22 turned and moved northwest along the south side of

23 Block 2 and some distance under the canopy and then

24 crawled out from underneath the canopy towards the

25 Joseph Place alleyway, as submitted by Barr & Co, or


75






1 possibly, thirdly, that he emerged from the gap between

2 Blocks 2 and 3, hugged the southern facade of Block 2

3 for a short distance, but did not move as far as the

4 eastern edge of the canopy, and then crossed the open

5 ground between Block 2 and Joseph Place.

6 The Tribunal may consider that the orientation of

7 Patrick Doherty's body at the time when he was shot,

8 does not depend merely upon the direction in which he

9 was heading, but also the possibility that he could have

10 changed the angle of his body at any time as he made his

11 way to the alleyway. There is evidence, for example,

12 that Mr Doherty was moving hesitantly, appeared to be

13 injured, and did not appear to be moving in a straight

14 line.

15 The Lawton team submit that the weight of evidence

16 is against Mr Doherty being shot from the direction of

17 Glenfada Park North. The Tribunal would then have to

18 consider the potential alternative sources of this

19 source.

20 The evidence makes it overwhelmingly probable, we

21 suggest, that he was shot on the south side of Block 2.

22 The autopsy evidence appears to indicate that the

23 proposition that a round fired from the city walls could

24 have struck Patrick Doherty is a near impossibility.

25 The evidence of Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan that


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1 the bullet which struck him left a visible bullet wipe,

2 rules out, we would suggest, the possibility that

3 Mr Doherty was struck by a ricochet from a bullet fired

4 from the north side of Block 2.

5 If the shot which struck him was fired by a soldier,

6 we suggest that the Tribunal may conclude that, in all

7 probability, the shot could only have come from the

8 direction of Glenfada Park North.

9 Dr Shepherd and Mr O'Callaghan could not identify

10 the type of weapon that caused the injury to Patrick

11 Doherty, and the Lawton team submit it is possible that

12 he may not have been hit by an SLR round. What is

13 certain is that Mr Doherty was hit from a shot fired

14 from a weapon capable of firing a bullet of sufficient

15 velocity as to pass through his body and cause

16 significant internal damage, including the fracturing of

17 bone, and the Tribunal may doubt the likelihood that he

18 was hit by something other than an SLR round.

19 In their submissions the Lawton team submit that

20 Mr McGuigan went to the assistance of Patrick Doherty

21 and that there must therefore have been a substantial

22 time gap between the shooting of Patrick Doherty and

23 that of Bernard McGuigan. In the reliance on the

24 evidence of Soldier 227, that he saw a paratrooper fire

25 two shots in immediate succession, within one and two


77






1 seconds, the Lawton team submit that Soldier F could not

2 have shot Patrick Doherty on that account.

3 The evidence that Mr McGuigan left the gable wall in

4 order to assist a man calling for help comes primarily

5 from Geraldine McBride. She has, in a number of

6 statements, recorded that as she was sheltering with

7 others at the gable end, she could hear a man "calling

8 out that he did not want to die." In her Widgery

9 statement she said that Mr McGuigan had said "I am not

10 going to let him die by himself. If I take my white

11 hankie they'll not shoot me."

12 As the Tribunal will have noted, Mrs McBride did

13 not, in her various accounts, identify the wounded man

14 calling out as Patrick Doherty, but her statement to

15 this Tribunal records "I think from what I learned later

16 that the man was Patrick Doherty".

17 The evidence of those witnesses who were located at

18 the eastern end of Block 2 is mixed. There is evidence

19 that Patrick Doherty called out something to the effect

20 of "I am shot again"; that is in the evidence of Charles

21 and Peter McLaughlin. However, some of the witnesses

22 who might have been expected to hear Mr Doherty calling

23 out, like Patrick Walsh, had no recollection of him

24 doing so. There is also evidence that as Patrick

25 Doherty was crawling towards the Joseph Place alleyway,


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1 people positioned in that alleyway, and watching from

2 Block 2, themselves called out to Mr Doherty.

3 Donna Harkin's statement to this Inquiry recorded

4 "I could hear Mr Doherty calling out, saying that he did

5 not want to be alone and needed help." She accepts that

6 she became hysterical after seeing him shot, and the

7 Tribunal may consider it significant that in her

8 contemporaneous account Mrs Harkin recalls speaking to

9 Mr Doherty before he was shot, but not hearing him

10 calling out for help afterwards.

11 We suggest that as a preliminary to this issue of

12 timing, the Tribunal will have to resolve whether

13 Bernard McGuigan left the gable to attend an injured man

14 and whether this injured man might have been somebody

15 other than Patrick Doherty.

16 If the Tribunal were to conclude that Patrick

17 Doherty was shot by a soldier and that that soldier was

18 Soldier F, it will need to consider whether Soldier F

19 targeted Patrick Doherty at a time when most of the

20 evidence indicates that he was crawling or slowly moving

21 in a crouch. In order to do so it would have to reject

22 his evidence that he aimed his shot at a gunman.

23 Alternatively, it will have to consider whether, if

24 he shot Patrick Doherty it is possible that he did so

25 accidentally or unintentionally on the basis that he


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1 aimed, as he says, two shots at a gunman. If

2 Bernard McGuigan was accidentally shot as a result of

3 walking "into the line of fire" he would have to be

4 walking in front of the bullet which Soldier F had aimed

5 at a gunman.

6 Bernard McGuigan was at the south gable of Block 1

7 and Patrick Doherty was in the open ground between the

8 gap between Blocks 2 and 3.

9 The gunman must, therefore, have moved in

10 a northerly direction from a position behind Mr Doherty

11 to a position behind Mr McGuigan.

12 Patrick Doherty must have crawled "into the line of

13 fire", ie in front of the first bullet which Soldier F

14 aimed at the gunman.

15 As to the issue as to who shot Patrick Campbell and

16 Danny McGowan, the fact that the bullet lodged in

17 Patrick Campbell's abdomen raises the possibility that

18 he was hit by a ricochet. The witness evidence suggests

19 that Mr Campbell was shot by an as yet to be identified

20 paratrooper positioned in Glenfada Park.

21 However, the Tribunal will wish to consider the

22 possibility raised by Madden & Finucane in their

23 submissions that he was shot by one of the twelve shots

24 fired by Soldier S through the gap between Blocks 1 and

25 2.


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1 As to the latter proposition, we have set out in our

2 submissions a number of factors to which the Tribunal

3 may wish to have regard in examining this possibility.

4 It seems probable that a paratrooper positioned at

5 Glenfada Park North shot Daniel McGowan.

6 The Tribunal will have to consider in relation to

7 the shooting of both Patrick Campbell and Daniel McGowan

8 whether that soldier was F or another and whether they

9 were targeted or shot accidentally or unintentionally.

10 I come then to the position of Soldier F. Prior to

11 his statement of 19th February taken by Lieutenant

12 Colonel Overbury, Soldier F had made four statements to

13 the RMP and one to the RUC. In none of these statements

14 did he mention firing two shots at a man with a pistol

15 positioned to the south of Block 2. He was questioned

16 about this discrepancy during the course of his oral

17 evidence at the Widgery Tribunal and his explanation was

18 that he had forgotten about the incident and that his

19 later recollection was prompted by being shown aerial

20 photographs.

21 Until he made his Widgery statement, Soldier G had

22 not mentioned seeing his pair fire.

23 Soldier F admits to firing 13 rounds on the day. In

24 his statement to Colonel Overbury, Soldier F

25 redistributed the sequence in which he fired these shots


81






1 from that given in his first RMP statement -- so

2 accounting for a shot at the rubble barricade and two

3 shots south of Block 2, which had not previously

4 featured in his account of his firing.

5 In his evidence to Lord Widgery, Soldier F said

6 "I mixed my rounds up," though when he gave evidence to

7 this Tribunal, Soldier F could not really explain the

8 reason for the difference in his contemporaneous

9 accounts.

10 Madden & Finucane and Barr & Co rely on that

11 redistribution to question the credibility of

12 Soldier F's evidence as to how and where he fired his

13 round and, as part of their submission, that Soldier F

14 fired more than two shots in Sector 5.

15 As the Tribunal will be aware, when he came to give

16 evidence to this Tribunal, Soldier F had little

17 recollection of the events of 30th January.

18 The Tribunal will, we respectfully suggest, have to

19 decide in relation to Soldier F whether, both to this

20 Tribunal and this Lord Widgery, whether he has lied

21 about the number of shots which he fired in Sector 5;

22 whether or not he has lied about seeing a gunman in

23 Sector 5 and aiming two shots at that gunman; whether or

24 not he and Soldier G invented corroborative accounts.

25 Specifically, that he lied in claiming the presence


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1 of a gunman in Sector 5, his own aiming of two shots at

2 that gunman and his unintentional killing of an unarmed

3 man slipped his mind during the giving of five separate

4 statements and it was only when he saw aerial

5 photographs of the scene that he realised he had shot

6 a man there, and whether or not his lack of current

7 recollection is genuine or otherwise.

8 Sir, I wonder if that might be a convenient moment.

9 LORD SAVILLE: Yes, can we start again at 12.40, please.

10 (12.00 pm)

11 (The Short Adjournment)

12 (12.50 pm)

13 MR CLARKE: Before I resume where I was proposing to reach

14 next, there are two matters from this morning. Could we

15 possibly have on the screen FS4.150. I said that my

16 learned friend Mr Harvey was good enough to tell me that

17 I may have misunderstood a point that was being made.

18 He was good enough to do so, but I think in fact, as it

19 appears wrong, because what appears at paragraph 5.39 of

20 the McCartney & Casey submissions was indeed the

21 proposition that there appear to be helmeted figures in

22 P428, "one standing out to the right near the gable end,

23 and two in the roadway; but the image is too blurred for

24 any certain conclusion," both the number and the

25 description of the photograph indicate that the point


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1 was being made by reference to P428, as I had supposed

2 and not P438 as my learned friend had erroneously

3 supposed I had been mistaken about.

4 The second matter I wanted to deal with, was

5 this: I was conscious when speaking this morning that

6 there was a passage which I was more than ordinarily

7 incoherent when I was addressing the question as to

8 whether it was possible for Soldier F to have

9 intentionally shot both Patrick Doherty and

10 Bernard McGuigan. The point that I was seeking to make

11 is that, in order for that to have been so, Patrick

12 Doherty would, on the assumption that he was shot first,

13 would have had to have crawled into the line of fire of

14 Soldier F's first shot and thereafter Bernard McGuigan

15 would have to have walked into the line of fire in the

16 front of the second shot, which would mean, upon the

17 assumption that the gunman, if there was one, was being

18 shot at on both occasions that he had been moving to the

19 north and would have the curious coincidence that, on

20 both of these occasions, two separate people had walked

21 into the line of a shot intended for someone else.

22 I was conscious that I was explaining that very lamely

23 earlier this morning.

24 I turn lastly in the topics to which I propose to

25 speak today because, although there is a significant


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1 amount of material in our submissions about arrests,

2 wherever they took place, I do not propose to say

3 anything about those today.

4 What I do propose to turn to is the position in

5 relation to both branches of the IRA. I want to record

6 the position about the extent of co-operation that the

7 Inquiry has received from Republican witnesses.

8 From 1999 onwards, the Inquiry attempted to trace

9 and contact a number of individuals believed to have

10 been members of the Provisional or Official IRA

11 in January 1972. At least seven responded at that time.

12 In early 2001 an approach was made to the Inquiry on

13 behalf of OIRA 1, 2, 3, 4,and 5. In June 2001, after

14 the Tribunal had made its ruling on intelligence

15 material and civilian witnesses, the Inquiry decided not

16 to make any further approaches to potential IRA

17 witnesses until the antecedents exercise required by the

18 Tribunal's ruling had been completed.

19 On completion of that exercise, in the summer 2003,

20 the Inquiry identified 82 individuals who were believed

21 to have been members of the Provisional IRA, Official

22 IRA or Fianna, in January 1972 and from whom the Inquiry

23 wanted to obtain statements or who had already made

24 statements. Of those 82, 51 co-operated with the

25 Inquiry, to the extent to which they were asked to do so


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1 although two of those who gave oral evidence declined to

2 make a statement to Eversheds and one failed to sign his

3 statement, having approved it.

4 Fourteen of them could not be found. Seventeen were

5 unable to assist for medical reasons, one of whom was

6 Red Mickey Doherty, who later died. One of them has

7 died. One failed to co-operate, but this appeared to be

8 because of his personal circumstances which themselves

9 led the Inquiry to conclude that there was no useful

10 purpose to be served in taking any further steps to

11 obtain his evidence, and one is Witness X.

12 The remaining seven of the 82 refused to co-operate.

13 One of those was PIRA 9. On 27th July the Tribunal

14 certified PIRA 9 to the High Court in Belfast for his

15 contempt in failing to obey a witness summons. Two of

16 the seven are resident outside the jurisdiction and the

17 other four were considered insufficiently important to

18 justify the issue of a witness summons.

19 I now deal with those Republican witnesses who have

20 provided evidence to the Inquiry. So far as the

21 Provisional IRA is concerned, 17 witnesses who admitted

22 to having been members of the Provisional IRA on

23 Bloody Sunday provided statements to the Inquiry.

24 Fourteen of them gave oral evidence. The witnesses

25 included those who were, in January 1972, the three most


86






1 senior members of the Provisional IRA in Derry, being

2 PIRA 24, who was the officer commanding the Derry

3 command staff, Martin McGuinness, the adjutant and

4 PIRA 17, the quartermaster. The witnesses also included

5 PIRA 23, who said that he was the officer commanding the

6 Creggan unit which was responsible for patrolling the

7 Creggan on the afternoon of Bloody Sunday and PIRA 8 who

8 said he was in charge of the Brandywell patrol that day.

9 So far as the Official IRA is concerned, every

10 member of the Official IRA's command staff provided

11 a statement. Those being OIRA 3, the officer commanding

12 the command staff; OIRA 4, the adjutant; Reg Tester, the

13 quartermaster; and OIRAs 1, 2 and 5, remaining members

14 of the command staff. Evidence was also given by

15 another five members of the Official IRA.

16 In addition the Inquiry obtained statements from six

17 witnesses who said that they were members of the Fianna,

18 either at the time of Bloody Sunday or in the weeks and

19 months leading to it. Among these six were two who each

20 claimed to have been the OC of the Provisional Fianna

21 in January 1992, Gerard O'Hara and Paddy Ward.

22 Statements were obtained from a further 14

23 individuals, whose links with the Republican movement

24 were thought to be relevant to some aspect of the

25 Inquiry's work and ten of those gave oral evidence.


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1 Some have alleged that members of both wings of the IRA

2 co-operated with the Inquiry at a late stage and to

3 a limited extent. Their submission is that the IRA's

4 conduct reveals an intention to orchestrate the evidence

5 of IRA members and to prevent the Tribunal from

6 discovering the full truth about IRA activities on that

7 day.

8 The Tribunal will be aware that the antecedents

9 exercise which involved the examination of thousands of

10 documents dealing with paramilitary activity was not

11 completed until August 2003. It was only after its

12 completion that the Inquiry approached paramilitary

13 witnesses who were thought likely to be able to give

14 relevant evidence. Several Republican witnesses had

15 approached the Inquiry before August 2003, but, as

16 I have indicated, the Inquiry decided to delay the

17 taking of statements from these witnesses until

18 completion of the antecedents exercise so that the

19 witnesses could be shown, at the statement-taking stage,

20 any material that was relevant to them.

21 Whilst it is undoubtedly true that many paramilitary

22 witnesses did not come forward of their own accord, the

23 vast majority of those who were approached by the

24 Inquiry co-operated once contact had been made. The

25 Inquiry's resources are limited and it took several


88






1 months for the statement-taking process to be completed.

2 The Tribunal might, therefore, consider the fact that

3 many IRA witnesses did not volunteer to give evidence at

4 an early stage, does not necessarily indicate they had

5 something to hide about their activities on

6 Bloody Sunday. It could reflect the fact their

7 Republican beliefs made them unwilling to co-operate

8 with the Tribunal established by the British Government

9 and perceived to be British, despite its international

10 membership.

11 The Tribunal may accept that certain witnesses whose

12 Republican involvement was not well-known were initially

13 reluctant publicly to admit to paramilitary activity

14 both because of fear of prosecution, based either on

15 ignorance of or lack of trust in the Attorney General's

16 undertaking or because of the risk of reprisals from

17 Loyalists and also because of the more general impact

18 that such public admission might have on their

19 livelihood, friends and family. The Tribunal will be

20 aware of the personal circumstances of some of the

21 witnesses, having been given such information privately

22 by many of those who sought anonymity.

23 The Tribunal has seen newspaper reports which,

24 in September 2003, alleged that the Provisional

25 Republican leadership had given clearance to former


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1 Provisional IRA members to co-operate with the Inquiry.

2 Witnesses who were asked about these reports denied that

3 they had been given permission to give evidence. The

4 Tribunal is also aware of further allegations that

5 Republicans were intimidated in an attempt to prevent

6 them giving evidence. The Tribunal has the evidence of

7 Liam Clarke who said he had been told that William

8 McGuinness and Raymond McCartney were instructing others

9 not to give evidence. Mr McCartney denied any knowledge

10 of intimidation of witnesses.

11 The Tribunal has also the evidence of witness 1, the

12 process server, who was told by the former OC of the

13 Provisionals, PIRA 24, that PIRA 24 had been ordered not

14 to co-operate. PIRA 24 denied that he had been

15 intimidated by anyone, although admitted telling Witness

16 1 he had been put under pressure not to give evidence.

17 He said he had been trying to gain the process server's

18 confidence in order to try to discover from him the

19 names of others whom the Inquiry was trying to approach.

20 In the light of that to which I have been referring,

21 the Tribunal will obviously wish to consider whether any

22 pressure was brought to bear on witnesses to discourage

23 them from giving evidence or whether efforts were made

24 by the Provisionals to control and manipulate the nature

25 of the evidence that witnesses were to give.


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1 I turn now to consider the evidence concerning

2 paramilitary activity on the day and propose to deal

3 firstly with the Fianna, then the Provisional IRA and

4 lastly the Officials.

5 So far as the Fianna is concerned, there was

6 a conflict of evidence among the witnesses as to

7 whether, at the time of Bloody Sunday, there was just

8 one Fianna or whether there were two groups, one with

9 links to the Officials and one linked to the

10 Provisionals. There was also a dispute as to the

11 identity of the leader, as I have already indicated.

12 The role of the Fianna is central to the evidence of

13 Paddy Ward.

14 The Tribunal, therefore, may wish to consider

15 whether there was only one Fianna or whether there were

16 two. Secondly, whether members of the Fianna or of each

17 of the Fiannas were Republican boy scouts or whether

18 they had a paramilitary role. Thirdly, whether members

19 of the Fianna or each Fianna had access to firearms or

20 nail bombs at the time of Bloody Sunday. Fourthly,

21 which of Paddy Ward or Gerald O'Hara was the leader of

22 the Provisional Fianna at the time. Fifthly, whether

23 the Fianna or either wing of the Fianna received

24 instructions from either wing of the IRA as to the

25 conduct of Fianna members on Bloody Sunday. Sixthly,


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1 whether Fianna members took part in any action against

2 the Security Forces on that day.

3 Gerard O'Hara's evidence was that the Fianna was

4 established in the early part of the 20th century as

5 a scouting organisation. Following the split in the

6 Republican movement (which occurred in December 1969)

7 the Fianna became affiliated to the Official

8 Republicans. However, in about October

9 or November 1971, the vast majority of the 15 to 20

10 Fianna members in Derry switched allegiance and formed

11 the Provisional Fianna, only three members did not

12 defect.

13 Intelligence material obtained from the Police

14 Service of Northern Ireland, at [INT1.317] appears to

15 support Mr O'Hara's account and indicates that the

16 Official Fianna was, at the very least, on the wane in

17 late January 1972. The Tribunal may think there is

18 strong evidence to suggest that Gerard Donaghy, an

19 admitted member of the Fianna, was a member of the

20 Provisional Fianna at the time of his death, although he

21 may well have been a member of the Official Fianna at an

22 earlier stage.

23 The evidence of all Fianna and IRA witnesses, with

24 the exception of Paddy Ward, was that Fianna members,

25 whether Official or Provisional, did not engage in


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1 paramilitary activity. Eddie Dobbins, a member of the

2 Provisional IRA, thought that Fianna members did find

3 dumps for the Provisionals and might remove arms from

4 those dumps in order to hand them to Provisional IRA

5 members. That was the extent of Fianna paramilitary

6 activity of which he gave evidence and even that was

7 contradicted by other witnesses. Paddy Ward's evidence

8 was that he, not Gerard O'Hara, was the OC of the

9 Provisional Fianna in January 1972. He said in essence

10 that the Fianna was closely linked with the Provisional

11 IRA and engaged in paramilitary activity. He told the

12 Tribunal that on the instructions of Martin McGuinness,

13 eight members of the Provisional Fianna, including Gerry

14 Donaghy, armed themselves with nail bombs on

15 Bloody Sunday, intending to reach the Guildhall Square

16 and then after the marchers had dispersed, to throw the

17 nail bombs at buildings in the area.

18 He gave further accounts to the Inquiry of his

19 activities on the day. He claims to have rescued

20 PIRA 9, a member of the Provisional IRA, by giving

21 covering fire which enabled PIRA 9 to escape from

22 a doorway in which he had become trapped, having been

23 spotted by British soldiers. He also said he had fired

24 at a British helicopter from the garden of his

25 girlfriend's parents' home. Before giving a statement


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1 to the Inquiry, Mr Ward spoke to the journalists

2 Liam Clarke and Kathryn Johnston. The account he gave

3 to them of the events of Bloody Sunday varied

4 considerably from the account he gave to the Inquiry.

5 The Tribunal will therefore have to decide the

6 amount of weight that can properly be given to his

7 evidence. The evidence of all witnesses other than

8 Paddy Ward is that Fianna members engaged in no

9 paramilitary activity on Bloody Sunday. Some of the

10 soldiers have submitted that the Tribunal should look

11 closely at the activities of the eight young men who

12 were Gerard Donaghy's companions on the day five of whom

13 went on to be convicted of paramilitary offences, one of

14 whom was the admitted OC of the Provisional Fianna and

15 one of whom, Jim Begley, now deceased, was said later to

16 have been accused, although not convicted, of IRA

17 membership.

18 The is no evidence to indicate that any of the group

19 of friends who claim to have been with Gerard Donaghy

20 during the march engaged in any form of paramilitary

21 activity on the day. It was not suggested to any of the

22 six who gave evidence that they did engage in such

23 activity. The only evidence to suggest that Mr Donaghy

24 took part or planned to take part in paramilitary

25 activity, other than the fact that he was found after


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1 his death to have nail bombs on him, comes from

2 Paddy Ward.

3 The Tribunal might, therefore, conclude, either that

4 Gerard Donaghy went on the march with a group of friends

5 who shared Republican sympathies but who intended to do

6 nothing and who did nothing other than march and, in the

7 case of at least some of them, throw stones.

8 Alternatively, that it is too great a coincidence for so

9 many young Republicans to have been on the march

10 together simply for companionship and that the members

11 of the group intended to attack or did attack the

12 Security Forces, the precise details of their planned or

13 actual activities being unknown; or that Gerard Donaghy

14 went on the march as alleged by Paddy Ward as one of

15 a group of Fianna members with the intention of throwing

16 nail bombs at buildings in the area of the Guildhall.

17 I turn then to the Official and Provisional IRA.

18 The Tribunal will wish to consider in the case of each

19 of these bodies, the size of the organisation on the

20 day, whether it gave assurances that its members would

21 not engage in paramilitary activity; what weapons were

22 available to its members and whether its members did in

23 fact engage in paramilitary activity other than that

24 which has been admitted and if so what effect if any

25 that activity had on the soldiers. They will want to


95






1 consider whether any such paramilitary activity caused

2 a soldier to open fire, hitting one of the known

3 casualties and whether any member of the organisation,

4 other than in the case of the Official IRA, Red Mickey

5 Doherty, was shot on the day and, if so, what happened

6 to that individual.

7 So far as the Provisional IRA is concerned, and its

8 size, various Provisional IRA witnesses gave different

9 figures for the membership of the Provisional IRA

10 in January 1972. Counsel to the Inquiry have attempted

11 to put together a "best fit" picture from all of the

12 available evidence and have concluded that there were

13 probably between 30 and 40 Provisional IRA volunteers in

14 the Bogside, Brandywell and Creggan at the time of

15 Bloody Sunday. Some of these may have been supporters

16 rather than men on active service. There were also

17 Provisional IRA units in the Waterside and Shantallow.

18 No evidence has emerged to suggest that members of the

19 latter units were present in the any paramilitary

20 capacity in the Bogside on 30th January.

21 So far as any assurances are concerned, the Tribunal

22 has heard a substantial amount of evidence which

23 indicates that the Provisional IRA did give assurances

24 that its members would not use the march as an

25 opportunity to attack the Security Forces. Evidence of


96






1 this comes from, amongst others, Martin McGuinness,

2 Brendan Duddy and Ivan Cooper. The Tribunal will wish

3 to take into account the evidence of the Provisional OC

4 PIRA 24, whose recollection was that no such assurances

5 were requested or given.

6 The Tribunal might take the view that he is likely

7 to be mistaken in this respect and, in any event, the

8 Tribunal may think that the essential question is not

9 whether the Provisionals promised to take no action, but

10 whether they in fact did so.

11 So far as orders is concerned, the evidence of the

12 Provisional IRA witnesses was that the volunteers were

13 to do nothing on the day of the march, with the

14 exception of those volunteers who were to patrol the

15 Creggan and Brandywell. There was some conflict on the

16 question of whether those volunteers who were to do

17 nothing were told they were to do nothing or simply were

18 not told anything at all. The Tribunal may take the

19 view that such conflicts reflect no more than inaccuracy

20 of recollection on the part of one or more of the

21 witnesses and again the critical issue is perhaps not

22 what the volunteers were told, but what they did.

23 So far as the availability of explosives is

24 concerned, Sean Keenan, who was too ill to give oral

25 evidence, said in his Eversheds statement that he was


97






1 the explosives officer of the Provisional IRA in Derry.

2 His evidence was that it was difficult for the

3 Provisionals to obtain military explosives. The

4 Provisionals only had gelignite and not much of that.

5 The explosives dump was separate from the weapons dumps

6 and its location was known only to him and one other

7 person, PIRA 17, the command staff quartermaster

8 confirmed that he was that second person.

9 Mr Keenan said that there were no explosives in use

10 on Bloody Sunday. He did not make any nail bombs or

11 give any bombs to anyone. PIRA 17's evidence was also

12 that no nail bombs were made or available to members of

13 the Provisional IRA on that day.

14 It is perhaps possible that members of the

15 Provisional IRA obtained nail bombs from another source,

16 but bearing in mind the tensions between the Official

17 and Provisional groups it seems unlikely that the

18 Officials at any rate would have supplied nail bombs to

19 members of the Provisionals.

20 Paddy Ward's evidence was that Provisional Fianna

21 members made nail bombs for use on Bloody Sunday,

22 assisted by Colm Keenan, a member of the Official IRA,

23 who provided the detonators. This evidence was

24 contradicted by all relevant Provisional IRA and Fianna

25 witnesses. If the Tribunal rejects Paddy Ward's


98






1 evidence, then it might conclude that no member of the

2 Provisional IRA was in possession of a nail bomb on

3 Bloody Sunday.

4 There is no reliable evidence before the Tribunal of

5 any other source open to Provisional IRA members, either

6 of nail bombs or of the gelignite needed to make them.

7 The Tribunal may speculate that individuals could have

8 obtained gelignite by theft or even purchase, but there

9 is no evidence from senior IRA men on either wing to

10 suggest their members had the opportunity to obtain

11 explosives in these ways.

12 I deal now with the question of weapons. The

13 Tribunal may regard this topic as one of crucial

14 importance. According to the evidence given by the

15 Provisional IRA members, certain weapons were under the

16 control of the Active Service Units in the Brandywell

17 and Creggan, of which PIRA 8 and Eddie Dobbins were

18 members. These weapons were not brought into the

19 Bogside until after the soldiers had shot all those

20 civilians known to have been shot. All other weapons

21 were under the control of the command staff

22 quartermaster, PIRA 17, and were not deployed on

23 Bloody Sunday. They were all placed in a dump on the

24 edge of the Bogside. If the Tribunal accepts that this

25 evidence is correct then it would follow that


99






1 Provisional IRA members were not responsible for any of

2 the firing in the Bogside to which members of the

3 Parachute Regiment say that they responded and that any

4 civilian seen in the Bogside with a gun was not a member

5 of the Provisional IRA.

6 If of course the Tribunal rejects any or all of this

7 evidence it will have to address the question as to what

8 weapons were in fact available to members of the

9 Provisional IRA and the uses to which those weapons were

10 put.

11 There are discrepancies between the evidence given

12 to this Inquiry about the dumping of weapons and the

13 accounts given or purportedly given over the years to

14 journalists by members of the Provisional IRA.

15 According to Philip Jacobson and Peter Pringle

16 Martin McGuinness told them in February 1972 that "arms

17 were not withdrawn," although he is also reported to

18 have told them that Provisional volunteers were banned

19 from carrying arms on the march and that none of the men

20 had defied the ban. Mr McGuinness told the Inquiry that

21 he did not recall that interview and maintained that all

22 weapons were placed in one dump. It is for the Tribunal

23 to determine where the truth of the matter lies.

24 So far as Provisional IRA activity on Bloody Sunday

25 is concerned, there is some, although not a great deal


100






1 of evidence, which suggests that members of the

2 Provisional IRA did engage in paramilitary activity on

3 the day. The principal sources of that evidence, are

4 these: firstly, the Security Service agent Infliction

5 who, in 1984, reported to his handlers that

6 Martin McGuinness had confessed, shortly after

7 Bloody Sunday, to having fired the first shot from the

8 Rossville Flats, using a Thompson submachine gun.

9 Secondly, the Sunday Times insight editor,

10 John Barry, who in 1972 recorded information apparently

11 given to him by Ivan Cooper, that Martin McGuinness,

12 PIRA 17 and George McEvoy had been in a house in

13 William Street, armed with Thompson sub-machine-guns.

14 Thirdly, the anonymous sources who told Liam Clarke

15 and Kathryn Johnston that Mr McGuinness had been in

16 Duffy's bookmaker's in William Street shortly before the

17 soldiers came into the Bogside and had fired a shot from

18 a Thompson sub-machine-gun.

19 Fourthly, the record of an interview conducted by

20 the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the early 1970s with a

21 man who told the police that on Bloody Sunday he had

22 seen Mr McGuinness with a Thompson sub-machine-gun under

23 his coat; that is at INT1.74. The name of that man is

24 known to the Inquiry, but for Article 2 reasons has had

25 to be concealed from the parties.


101






1 Fifthly, the evidence of Mr McGuinness and others

2 that a member of the Provisional IRA fired what

3 Mr McGuinness described as symbolic shots at the city

4 walls, well over an hour after the Army shooting had

5 ceased.

6 Sixthly, the evidence of Paddy Ward that

7 Mr McGuinness was involved in a plot to send Fianna

8 members armed with nail bombs into the area of the

9 Guildhall Square in order to throw those nail bombs in

10 that area after the marchers had dispersed. According

11 to Mr Ward, the plan was cancelled at the last minute.

12 Mr Ward made this allegation to Liam Clarke and Kathleen

13 Johnston and repeated it in evidence before this

14 Inquiry.

15 Much of this evidence is unsatisfactory since the

16 Inquiry has been unable to question most of those who

17 are reported to have made the allegations concerning

18 Mr McGuinness's activities. Of the two who did give

19 evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Cooper denied having given

20 any such information to John Barry and described the

21 account of the incident as "a total and utter

22 fabrication." Paddy Ward maintained that his account

23 was essentially true, while acknowledging that he had

24 given different versions of this plot and of other

25 events to Messrs Clarke and Johnston.


102






1 There is, of course, a substantial amount of

2 evidence which indicates that a civilian gunman did fire

3 during the course of the day. Some of this firing has

4 been attributed to the Official IRA and some not

5 attributed to either wing. The Tribunal will have to

6 consider the submissions of the soldiers who invite it

7 to infer that certain shots, in particular the early

8 shots at the Presbyterian Church, the Embassy Ballroom,

9 the city walls and the Old City Dairy were fired by

10 members of the Provisional IRA.

11 The Lawton team have also suggested that the

12 Provisional volunteers in the cars in the Creggan and

13 Brandywell may have been free to come into the Bogside.

14 They do not, as I understand it, suggest that they

15 actually did so during the time that the soldiers were

16 shooting the known casualties. The Tribunal will wish

17 to consider this submission. There is no evidence to

18 indicate that any of these volunteers did come into the

19 Bogside during this critical period.

20 Some of the soldiers invite the Tribunal to draw

21 inferences averse to the Provisional IRA from the

22 acknowledged presence of Provisional IRA volunteers in

23 sectors 3 and 4. It is admitted, for example, PIRA 14,

24 PIRA 26 and Colm Keenan were present at the rubble

25 barricade and PIRA 1 was arrested in Glenfada Park.


103






1 The Lawton team suggest there is something

2 surprising about the concentration of members of the

3 Provisional IRA in the area of the rubble barricade.

4 Another possibility is that members of the Provisional

5 IRA were likely to have been among those civilians who

6 resented most fiercely the presence of the British Army

7 in Derry and were likely to be among those shouting

8 defiance and throwing missiles, whether at barrier 14 or

9 at the rubble barricade. The fact that they were

10 present does not necessarily mean that they were armed.

11 So far as photographic evidence is concerned, the

12 Tribunal, in deciding whether members of the Provisional

13 IRA did engage the Parachute Regiment in the Bogside,

14 may wish to take into account the photographic evidence

15 which is available to it and which shows a number of

16 members of the Provisional IRA to have been present at

17 sectors 1, 3, 4 and 5. EP5.1 shows Sean Keenan in the

18 crowd at barrier 14. EP5.8.001 shows Pat Harkin, a

19 member of the Brandywell Unit, at the same barrier. It

20 also shows PIRA 25 trying to restrain the crowd.

21 The well-known photograph depicting Hugh Gilmore at

22 the entrance to the Rossville Flats also shows PIRA 26

23 and Colm Keenan at the doorway.

24 In photograph P837, two man standing to the south of

25 Block 2 of the Rossville Flats can be seen comforting


104






1 a third. The evidence is that the man in distress is

2 Pat Harkin and that the man on the left of him is PIRA

3 26. According to PIRA 26, Mr Harkin had become greatly

4 distressed on learning of the death of Patrick Doherty.

5 The photographs available to the Tribunal undoubtedly

6 demonstrate that members of the Provisional IRA were

7 present in the Bogside on the afternoon of

8 Bloody Sunday.

9 No photograph, however, shows any known Provisional

10 volunteer to be armed or engaged in any paramilitary

11 action. The Tribunal will have to determine whether any

12 of the evidence put before it enables it to identify any

13 paramilitary activity on the part of the Provisional IRA

14 in the Bogside and if it finds that any such activity

15 did occur, it will need to determine, to the extent that

16 it can, whether that activity may have led directly or

17 indirectly to the death or wounding of any known

18 casualty.

19 I then come to the position of the Officials. The

20 evidence of the Official IRA witnesses indicated that

21 there were between 20 and 30 members of the Official IRA

22 at the time of Bloody Sunday. The organisation appears

23 to have been headed by a command staff of six in Derry,

24 all of whom provided statements to the Inquiry and to

25 have been divided into two units, one in the Creggan and


105






1 one in the Bogside.

2 So far as assurances are concerned, there is a large

3 body of evidence which suggests that OIRA 9, the OC of

4 the Official IRA until his arrest on 28th January 1972

5 and Malachy McGurran, a leading member of the Official

6 Republican movement, gave assurances both to civil

7 rights leaders and to an intermediary to the effect that

8 the Officials would not take paramilitary action during

9 the course of the march. This evidence comes from,

10 amongst other people, OIRA 9 himself, Michael Havord and

11 Anthony Martin. Brendan Duddy's evidence was at the

12 request of Chief Superintendent Lagan, he approached

13 Malachy McGurran seeking assurances that members of the

14 Official IRA would not march and would not carry guns.

15 Mr McGurran's response was that people could not be

16 prevented from marching. However, he did give an

17 assurance that all guns would be removed. Mr McGurran

18 gave that assurance immediately and without consulting

19 others. He regarded the request as unnecessary since he

20 was confident that there would be no shooting.

21 Mr Duddy's evidence was that he relayed this

22 assurance to Superintendent Lagan. The Lawton team have

23 pointed to the fact that OIRA 3, the man who took over

24 from OIRA 9 as OC and other members of the command staff

25 do not, according to their evidence, seem to have known


106






1 anything about these assurances. They also rely on

2 Ivan Cooper who said that he approached two individual

3 members of the Officials, OIRA 1 and Red Mickey Doherty,

4 seeking assurances which he did not receive. However,

5 Mr Cooper also said that the two were not in a position

6 to give an assurance and that he learnt, through

7 indirect means, that the Officials planned to take no

8 action. The Tribunal will have to determine whether

9 assurances of some kind were given by senior members of

10 the Officials or not and if they were, whether the

11 Officials abided by the terms of any assurance that they

12 gave.

13 I then come to the question of orders. Official IRA

14 witnesses gave evidence that, in January 1972, all

15 volunteers were subject to the standing orders that they

16 could only fire on the Security Forces in "defence and

17 retaliation." These orders emanated from Dublin. The

18 Tribunal has heard a considerable amount of evidence

19 about the meaning of these standing orders. It was

20 common ground that retaliation could take place many

21 days after the action by the security force for which

22 revenge was being taken. The majority of the witnesses

23 conceded that the orders permitted them to fire at

24 a soldier in the street in Derry in retaliation for his

25 very presence as a member of the occupying forces.


107






1 There was a conflict of evidence on the question of

2 whether the orders permitted a volunteer to fire at

3 a soldier wherever he might be, or whether an Official

4 IRA volunteer could only fire if a soldier entered the

5 no-go areas. OIRA 1 and OIRA 2 thought the former,

6 OIRA 4 and OIRA 7 the latter.

7 OIRA 2 suggested that volunteers on Bloody Sunday

8 were subject to a revised form of the standing orders

9 brought into effect for the day of the march. His

10 evidence was that on Bloody Sunday the British Army had

11 to shoot first before any firing by Official IRA members

12 became permissible. He agreed that the following

13 account, apparently given on 3rd February 1972 by

14 Reg Tester to Philip Jacobson at ED20.30, accurately

15 reflected the position, where Mr Tester said, and

16 I quote:

17 "... staff officers decided to re-emphasise the

18 existing orders that Officials should only open fire on

19 the Army if they were shot at first, if the Army had

20 shot at other civilians, and in any case, never to open

21 fire in a crowd situation."

22 The evidence of the Official IRA witnesses was that

23 all weapons were removed from volunteers other than

24 a personal protection weapon left in the hands of

25 OIRA 4, a rifle in the possession of Red Mickey Doherty,


108






1 who was stationed in Barrack Street and the rifle

2 subsequently fired by OIRA 1. According to most of the

3 witnesses, the remaining weapons were placed in two

4 cars, one of which was stationed in Central Drive in the

5 Creggan and one in the Lone Moor Road. OIRA 3 explained

6 that the cars were positioned there because he thought

7 it possible that armed volunteers might be needed to

8 respond to an army incursion into the Creggan or

9 Brandywell. Reg Tester's evidence to which I will

10 shortly turn, was that some weapons were not placed in

11 the cars, but were left in dumps in the Creggan and

12 Bogside.

13 The Tribunal will wish to seek to determine the true

14 meaning and terms of the standing orders of defence and

15 retaliation, whether these standing orders were

16 applicable to Official IRA volunteers in Derry on

17 Bloody Sunday or whether a somewhat amended version of

18 the sort to which OIRA 2 and Reg Tester referred was in

19 force. Whether volunteers were deployed, as OIRA 3 said

20 that they were, and whether Official IRA volunteers

21 acted in accordance with the orders to which they were

22 subject that day.

23 I turn, therefore, to the question of explosives

24 available to the Official IRA on Bloody Sunday. The

25 Official IRA command staff quartermaster Reg Tester was


109






1 one of the first paramilitary witnesses to come forward

2 to the Inquiry. His evidence was that he was solely

3 responsible for the Official IRA's stock of Gelamex. He

4 said the Official IRA obtained gelignite once in a blue

5 moon. His evidence was that the Official IRA had no

6 explosives on Bloody Sunday and did not make up any nail

7 bombs. If the Tribunal accepts that evidence, then it

8 would seem that Official IRA volunteers could not have

9 obtained nail bombs from an Official IRA source. In the

10 absence of any evidence of other sources from which the

11 Officials could have obtained nail bombs or gelignite to

12 make them, the Tribunal might conclude that no member of

13 the Official IRA was in possession of a nail bomb on

14 Bloody Sunday.

15 The Tribunal will be aware that there is evidence,

16 both military and civilian, of the presence of nail

17 bombs in the Bogside on the afternoon of Bloody Sunday.

18 The Tribunal, when reaching a decision as to whether

19 nail bombs were present or not will wish to consider the

20 evidence of both Provisional and Official IRA witnesses

21 to the effect that none of their members had access to

22 nail bombs on the day.

23 I turn then to the question of weapons. Mr Tester's

24 evidence was that the Official IRA had more volunteers

25 than weapons and that both weapons and ammunition were


110






1 kept under close control. His initial evidence was that

2 all Official IRA weapons were taken to the Creggan

3 before the march and were loaded into two cars. Two

4 weapons were missing, a pistol allocated as a personal

5 protection weapon to the OC, OIRA 3 and a .303 rifle.

6 It was in his second statement that he added that the

7 second rifle allocated to Red Mickey Doherty was also

8 missing from his stores. When he gave oral evidence,

9 Mr Tester changed his account. He explained that the

10 weapons that were taken to the Creggan and placed in the

11 cars were those that were under his control. He

12 explained that the Bogside unit had its own arsenal for

13 which he was not responsible. He also said that weapons

14 which were in secure dumps in the Creggan and the

15 Bogside were left where they were on the day of the

16 march. The Tribunal has received no evidence, other

17 than that of Mr Tester, about the existence of these

18 dumps. The representatives of the Official IRA

19 witnesses invite the Tribunal to prefer the evidence on

20 this issue of the other members of the command staff,

21 all of whom said that all weapons, with the exception of

22 the three identified above, were taken to the Creggan or

23 to the Brandywell and the Creggan.

24 The Tribunal will have to decide whose evidence it

25 prefers. If Mr Tester's most recent account is right,


111






1 then it seems that members of the Official IRA might

2 have had easier access to weapons than initially seemed

3 to be the case. There is no evidence as to whether the

4 dumps to which Reg Tester referred were being guarded or

5 as to the number of people who knew of their location.

6 OIRA 7, who was not a member of the command staff, gave

7 evidence that the Official IRA's main arms dump was at

8 the shops at the Creggan. OIRAs 1, 2 and 3 all knew of

9 the location of the Columbcille Court dump from which

10 OIRAs 1 and 2 say that they obtained a .303 rifle on the

11 day. The volunteer who had placed the weapon there and

12 the supporter who, according to OIRA 3 managed the dump,

13 also knew of its location. The Tribunal may contrast

14 this evidence with that of Provisional IRA witnesses who

15 said that the location of Provisional IRA arms dumps was

16 a closely guarded secret. Although there is no direct

17 evidence concerning knowledge of the Creggan and Bogside

18 dumps (other than the one in Columbcille Court), the

19 Tribunal may feel able to infer that knowledge of the

20 location of Official IRA arms dumps was not similarly

21 restricted.

22 It is acknowledged by the Official IRA witnesses

23 that OIRA 1 fired a .303 rifle before the soldiers came

24 into the beside; that OIRA 4 was carrying -- and

25 fired -- a pistol in the car park of the flats, and at


112






1 the end of the day Red Mickey Doherty fired (posted as

2 a sniper in Barrack Street), fired at -- and was shot

3 by -- soldiers of the 1 Royal Anglian Regiment.

4 There is other evidence to suggest that more weapons

5 were available to -- and were used by -- Official IRA

6 volunteers on Bloody Sunday. The Official IRA witnesses

7 all deny that they were responsible for any paramilitary

8 activity beyond that which they have admitted.

9 Evidence that members of the Official IRA were

10 engaged in further paramilitary activity comes largely

11 from reports of notes written by journalists in 1972.

12 As to that, the following documents have been made

13 available to the Inquiry. Firstly, the galley proofs

14 which were to form the basis of an article, never

15 published, in the Observer on 6th February 1972. These

16 quoted the acting OC of the Derry Official IRA as saying

17 that most of the members were on the march and unarmed,

18 but that the following volunteers had been on duty, (a)

19 a marksman covering Rossville Street from the corner of

20 William Street and Rossville Street, (b) a marksman in

21 the Little Diamond, covering William Street, (c)

22 marksman covering Bishop's Street and Bligh's Lane, (d)

23 other volunteers, armed with sub-machine-guns, in cars.

24 The Observer quoted the acting OC as having said

25 that the Officials fired only one shot. That shot was


113






1 fired after the Army had finished shooting and was fired

2 at a soldier by "our man covering Rossville Street." It

3 is possible that this is an inaccurate reference to the

4 admitted shot that Reg Tester fired or attempted to

5 fire.

6 OIRA 3 told the Inquiry that he had no recollection

7 of having spoken to the Observer. The account in the

8 gallery proofs is largely inconsistent with the account

9 given by OIRA 3 and all other Official IRA witnesses as

10 to the deployment of volunteers on the day.

11 Secondly, there is an account written by

12 Murray Sayle and Derek Humphrey of the Sunday Times in

13 February 1972, again an account that was never

14 published, which is at M71.26. They reported that an

15 Official IRA man was posted in a burned-out building

16 opposite Richardson's factory. He was armed with a .38

17 pistol, although ordered to be unarmed and after the

18 shooting of Damien Donaghy, he fired a shot at the

19 soldiers on the GPO roof. Thirdly a similar account,

20 apparently attributable to Reg Tester, given to Messrs

21 Pringle and Jacobson of the Insight team on

22 3rd February 1972 and is at ED20.31. It is possible

23 that these two accounts are inaccurate reports of the

24 firing by OIRA 1 from Columbcille Court.

25 Fourthly, the Tribunal has an account written by


114






1 Vincent Browne in the Sunday Press, dated

2 6th February 1972, which stated, firstly, that the

3 Officials had an Active Service Unit of four men on

4 duty, all of whom were to be armed during the parade or

5 to have immediate access to arms should arms be needed.

6 Secondly, that a number of other Official IRA

7 volunteers were armed for their personal protection.

8 Thirdly, that Official IRA men did not open fire during

9 the initial part of the parade. By the time that "some

10 of them" did so, one man was dead and three were

11 injured.

12 Fourthly, it stated that reports that all Official

13 (and Provisional) weapons had been removed from the

14 Bogside to ensure that there was no unauthorised firing

15 were "only partly true."

16 Fifthly, when the second volley of British gunfire

17 occurred the four members of the active service unit

18 were immediately alerted. Two had already returned to

19 a maisonette at the Bogside to collect a couple of

20 rifles, while the other two, each armed with a .38

21 revolver moved into sniping positions on a street

22 corner.

23 Sixthly, one of the men at a street corner fired at

24 a soldier in William Street but missed. This was before

25 the paratroopers had come into the Bogside.


115






1 Vincent Browne, whose article this was, told the

2 Inquiry that he could not recall the source or sources

3 who provided this information to him, but assumed that

4 he had spoken to members of the Official and Provisional

5 IRA.

6 Next, PIN437 is a document that we saw yesterday, we

7 have seen many times, which John Barry, the editor of

8 the Insight team, believed to be, at least in very large

9 part, a note of an interview he had conducted with

10 OIRA 1 in 1972. That contains an account of

11 paramilitary activity with which the Tribunal is well

12 familiar and which I do not therefore propose further to

13 summarise at this juncture.

14 As I indicated yesterday and as is well-known,

15 OIRA 1 denied giving any interview to John Barry and

16 denied there was any truth in the information contained

17 in these notes. The Tribunal will have to decide

18 whether Mr Barry made an accurate note of information

19 that was given to him and whether that information was

20 true.

21 Similarly, the Tribunal is aware, and I referred to

22 yesterday, the article written by Gerard Kemp on

23 23rd April 1972, apparently based on an interview that

24 he had with OIRA 1 and which provides support for some

25 of the accounts that appear in PIN437.


116






1 Next, there is an account given by Tony Martin to

2 the Sunday Times in 1972, in which he said that an IRA

3 man had told him there were two rifles in a green

4 Avenger which was parked in Glenfada. OIRA 7, in

5 evidence to the Inquiry, thought he was probably the IRA

6 man to whom Mr Martin is referring, but denied that

7 there was more than one rifle in the car.

8 Next, there is another note written by John Barry,

9 apparently of an interview with Ivan Cooper. According

10 to that note, Mr Cooper told Mr Barry that OIRA 6 had

11 fired a revolver in Glenfada Park and had been "running

12 around mad with a pistol all afternoon" and had fired

13 very early. OIRA 6 and George McEvoy, who according to

14 the note had provided the information to Mr Cooper,

15 denied to the Inquiry that there was any truth in the

16 account. Mr Cooper denied having provided any of the

17 information contained in the note.

18 Then there is a note made by Philip Jacobson and

19 Peter Pringle of their interview in March 1972 with

20 Reg Tester, which is at S37, which included an account,

21 possibly not provided by Mr Tester, of an Official IRA

22 man firing two shots from the lane behind Joseph Place

23 up at the Walker OP. In giving evidence Mr Tester

24 denied any knowledge of such an incident.

25 The Tribunal has also heard other evidence of


117






1 Official IRA activity on the day, including that to

2 which I referred yesterday, of Kieran Gill. He, as the

3 Tribunal will recall, is the man who gives evidence of

4 OIRA 1 having admitted firing a shot from a revolver

5 around the door of the Rossville Street Flats. OIRA 1

6 denied either having fired such a shot or having told

7 Kieran Gill that he had done so.

8 There is a substantial amount of evidence to suggest

9 that armed Official IRA volunteers arrived in Westland

10 Street after the shooting by the soldiers was over. The

11 Tribunal may take the view that this evidence is of less

12 importance to it than evidence of earlier armed

13 activity, although it provides an indication of the

14 number of armed men available to the Official IRA on the

15 day.

16 I then pass to the position of Red Mickey Doherty.

17 He died in 2003 without having made a statement to the

18 Inquiry. The Tribunal is aware of the efforts made by

19 the Inquiry to obtain evidence from him and a summary of

20 those efforts was provided to the parties in a letter

21 from the assistant solicitor to the Inquiry, dated

22 20th April 2004. It is not suggested by any party that

23 Mr Doherty's shots caused any soldier of the

24 Parachute Regiment to open fire or that they in any way

25 caused or contributed to the injury or deaths of any


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1 known civilian, other than Mr Doherty himself. The

2 Tribunal may consider that the presence of Mr Doherty in

3 Barrack Street armed is most relevant to the question of

4 whether there was in the Bogside other armed members of

5 the Official IRA men whose existence has not been

6 acknowledged.

7 In support of the suggestion that there were other

8 armed men whose presence has not been admitted by other

9 official IRA volunteers, it could be argued that

10 firstly, Mr Doherty's presence in the Barrack Street and

11 Bishop Street areas is incompatible with the Official

12 IRA case that its armed volunteers were defending the

13 Creggan and Brandywell. Secondly, Mr Doherty appears to

14 have been given a weapon without the knowledge of the

15 command staff quartermaster [Reg Tester, Day414/42-44].

16 The weapon almost certainly came from the arsenal held

17 by the Bogside Unit. That arsenal clearly provided

18 a source from which other volunteers could also have

19 obtained weapons. There is also evidence in the form of

20 the reports made by journalists in 1972 of the presence

21 of Official IRA snipers other than those whose

22 activities have been admitted.

23 Against that proposition it could be said that

24 Mr Doherty was in a location from which he could observe

25 and fire upon troops attempting to enter the Brandywell.


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1 PIRA 8, whose task on the day was to patrol the

2 Brandywell, described Bishop Street as one of the

3 interfaces from which troops often tried to raid the

4 area. Mr Doherty fired at about 1640, a substantial

5 time after the soldiers had opened fire on the

6 civilians. It could be said that such firing is not

7 evidence of a plan on the part of the Official IRA to

8 open fire during the course of a peaceful march or the

9 immediate aftermath thereof. It is for the Tribunal to

10 determine the significance, if any, that is to be

11 attached to the presence of Mr Doherty in

12 Barrack Street. The Tribunal will also have to decide

13 whether further shots were fired by members of the

14 Official and Provisional IRA, other than those that they

15 have admitted. In doing so the Tribunal will no doubt

16 wish to take into account the evidence and submission of

17 the parties concerning the plans of both wings of the

18 IRA for the day, the access of IRA members to weapons

19 and the military and civilian evidence of the presence

20 of gunmen.

21 When considering the actions of the Official IRA,

22 the Tribunal may also wish to take into account the

23 suggestion made by Vincent Browne in the Sunday Press

24 article, which is at L171, and by others, that the

25 Officials needed to restore their prestige following


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1 criticism of their decision 12 days earlier to release

2 unharmed a soldier whom they had kidnapped, and secondly

3 of the possibility that pressure to restore prestige

4 either led the Officials to take aggressive action which

5 they now deny or to claim after the event that they had

6 done more to defend the Bogside than in fact they had.

7 I then turn to the question of civilian gunmen and

8 missing casualties. Many witnesses, both civilian and

9 military, have reported seeing on Bloody Sunday civilian

10 gun men who do not match the description of, or were not

11 in the same place as, those members of the Official or

12 Provisional IRA who were acknowledged to have fired

13 shots on the day. Also civilians carrying or throwing

14 nail bombs or petrol bombs and thirdly, casualties who

15 have never been identified, some of whom the witnesses

16 believed to be dead and some of whom the witnesses

17 thought to have been wounded.

18 Several parties, included among whom are now counsel

19 to the Tribunal, have compiled lists of the principal

20 sightings both of the civilian gunmen and bombers and

21 also of missing casualties. It will be apparent from

22 looking at these lists that in some cases sightings

23 listed separately as having been reported by two or more

24 witnesses are likely to be of the same incident or of

25 the same gunman or the same casualty, even if the two


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1 sightings were in different locations.

2 It will be for the Tribunal to determine, as far as

3 it can, how many of these reported sightings are

4 reliable and to form a view of the number if any of

5 unidentified gunmen and bombers who were present on the

6 day and of the number of dead or wounded individuals

7 whose names are not known. Soldiers who have given

8 evidence of firing at gunmen, nail bombers and petrol

9 bombers and in many cases of their belief they had hit

10 their targets, none of these civilian gunmen or bombers

11 has ever been identified.

12 The Tribunal may conclude, in many cases, that the

13 soldier or soldiers concerned did not hit a gunman or

14 bomber but hit one of the known casualties. In such

15 a case the Tribunal will have to go on to determine

16 whether the gunman or bomber was actually there and if

17 he was, to determine if he can, who he was or at least

18 to which wing of the IRA he belonged.

19 In other cases the Tribunal may conclude that the

20 soldier or soldiers hit no-one. The Tribunal may like

21 to take into account the evidence of INQ2225, a military

22 intelligence officer who said, and I quote:

23 "Troops tended to assume that when they fired their

24 weapons and saw targets move, that they had hit them.

25 When no evidence emerged of a body they assumed that


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1 they had hit the person and that the body had been

2 spirited across the border."

3 In other instances the Tribunal may conclude that an

4 unknown civilian was wounded or even killed. If the

5 Tribunal is satisfied that such a casualty did exist it

6 will have to endeavour to determine, if it can, where

7 the casualty was injured or killed; where the casualty

8 was hit by gunfire and if he was, whether it was likely

9 to have been Army gunfire. If the casualty was hit by

10 a soldier, the identity of that soldier. What the

11 casualty was doing, if anything, which caused him to be

12 shot. Whether he was a member of either wing of the IRA

13 and the reason for which the casualty, if alive, did not

14 seek medical aid and what is likely to have happened to

15 that casualty.

16 It is acknowledged by civilian and paramilitary

17 witnesses that medical treatment for wounded casualties,

18 both civilian and paramilitary, was available both

19 within the no-go areas and in the Republic. The

20 Tribunal has not however discovered any evidence to

21 suggest that any unidentified casualties were treated in

22 Letterkenny or Carndonagh hospitals in Donegal. The

23 soldiers have submitted that the evidence obtained does

24 not enable the Tribunal to exclude the possibility that

25 unknown individuals were treated in the Republic for


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1 gunshot wounds.

2 It has been suggested on behalf of some of the

3 soldiers that secret burials may have taken place of

4 casualties who died and whose deaths have not been

5 acknowledged. As to that the Tribunal has received

6 a substantial amount of civilian evidence, including

7 that of Bishop Daly as well as members of the Republican

8 movement that such burials could not have occurred. If

9 the Tribunal accepts that evidence, then a finding that

10 no unknown casualties were killed on Bloody Sunday,

11 would seem to follow.

12 Sir, I wonder if we might rise for a few moments.

13 (1.45 pm)

14 (A short break)

15 (1.55 pm)

16 MR CLARKE: I am almost finished, but before I resume my

17 place for the last time in this hall there are some

18 things I wish to say.

19 Firstly, I should like to thank the people of Derry

20 for allowing the Inquiry to take over the Guildhall for

21 so long and for accommodating and welcoming to this city

22 so large an influx of people from outside it. I should

23 like also, if I may, to pay tribute to those

24 representatives of the media who have been regular

25 observers of our proceedings and whose reporting from


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1 several different viewpoints, has been of a high

2 quality.

3 I hope it is not inappropriate to do so if, whilst

4 recognising that there are several who fall into this

5 category, I single out Paul McCauley of the BBC and of

6 this city who has been with us, I think for 430 out of

7 the 434 days that we have sat, unless unavoidably

8 prevented from doing so.

9 Lastly, and most importantly of all, I wish to pay

10 tribute to the families of those who died and to those

11 who were wounded on that day. It is they who more than

12 all others endured the pain of what happened on

13 Bloody Sunday and its aftermath. It is to them to whom

14 belongs the credit for pressing for this Inquiry and for

15 bearing what must have been the anxieties, tensions and

16 no doubt frustrations inherent in an inquiry of this

17 nature. The process has been arduous, the journey long

18 and unfinished. I hope and believe that the process

19 itself has already played a part in enabling people to

20 come to terms with the events of that day in holding to

21 account those whose decisions, actions or inactions

22 contributed to what happened and, whatever the

23 difficulty of determining the roles of individual

24 soldiers, of advancing our understanding of what

25 happened on that day, as I doubt not will become


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1 apparent in the Tribunal's report.

2 LORD SAVILLE: Thank you, Mr Clarke. The Tribunal would

3 like very much to associate itself with what you have

4 just said about the people of Derry, the media and the

5 families.

6 We would also like to thank you, Mr Clarke, and the

7 counsel who have supported you for the hard work that

8 you have put in over these last many years which have

9 provided us with the most invaluable assistence. It is

10 also an opportunity to thank the legal representatives

11 for the interested parties for their written and oral

12 submissions and, indeed, for their assistance throughout

13 the course of this Inquiry. We have found their

14 contribution to be of value, we have studied, and will

15 continue to study, their oral and written submissions as

16 we now move towards preparing our report.

17 There are a lot of other people to whom we would

18 also like to say thank you very much indeed. There is

19 an IT team now known to us as our "techies" whose

20 diligence, expertise has meant that throughout these

21 many years of the Inquiry, the downtime when we had to

22 stop for technical reasons can be measured in minutes.

23 We are extremely grateful to them and they have

24 undoubtedly meant that this Inquiry, although taking

25 a very long time indeed, would have taken very, very


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1 much longer but for their assistance and the use of the

2 equipment that they supplied.

3 We also must thank the LiveNote staff. There is

4 Heather sitting over there to our left and her team

5 behind her who have faithfully transcribed every word --

6 and there must be many, many millions of them that has

7 been spoken in this Guildhall or in the proceedings when

8 they took place in London.

9 We also thank MK audio for the sound system. My

10 colleagues and I, who have been experience judicially of

11 sound systems over the years, have no doubt that this by

12 a very large margin is the best sound and audio system

13 that we have ever encountered. There is of course the

14 Inquiry staff. Those people, again, have worked hard,

15 well, and with one aim in mind, to help the Tribunal in

16 what is, I think, undoubtedly a very difficult task. We

17 have been filled with admiration at the way they have

18 acted over the years.

19 Then there are lots of other people, in particular

20 the people who have looked after us as we come to this

21 hall to conduct the Inquiry and who looked after us when

22 we were in the Central Hall, Westminster for that part

23 of the proceedings. We are very grateful to you all.

24 (2.00 pm)

25 (Proceedings adjourned)


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